nach oben

Erschienen in:

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Diversity Within the Rijndael Design Principles for Resistance to Differential Power Analysis

verfasst von : Merrielle Spain, Mayank Varia

Erschienen in: Cryptology and Network Security

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

The winner of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) competition, Rijndael, strongly resists mathematical cryptanalysis. However, side channel attacks such as differential power analysis and template attacks break many AES implementations.

We propose a cheap and effective countermeasure that exploits the diversity of algorithms consistent with Rijndael’s general design philosophy. The secrecy of the algorithm settings acts as a second key that the adversary must learn to mount popular side channel attacks. Furthermore, because they satisfy Rijndael’s security arguments, these algorithms resist cryptanalytic attacks.

Concretely, we design a 72-bit space of SubBytes variants and a 36-bit space of ShiftRows variants. We investigate the mathematical strength provided by these variants, generate them in SageMath, and study their impact on differential power analysis and template attacks against field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) by analyzing power traces from the DPA Contest v2 public dataset.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel Side-Channel Attacks on Threshold Implementations Using a Glitch Algebra

Nächstes Kapitel NEON-SIDH: Efficient Implementation of Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol on ARM

For instance, one can modify Manteena’s implementation of AES in VHDL [19, Appendix D] to produce different, static mappings of byte values in SubBytes, mappings of byte locations in ShiftRows, and matrix constants in MixColumns.

Our variants perform XOR, just as AES does. By contrast, Rijmen and Oswald [13] create variants that preserve AES’ original SubBytes functionality, at the cost of replacing XOR with a (slower and leakier) table lookup.

It is also possible to choose the primitive root of the polynomial used to represent elements of \({{\mathrm{GF}}}(256)\) [9]. This yields 3 bits of entropy independent of the affine transformation. However, SageMath encapsulates its choice of primitive root, so our work skips this extra flexibility.

We remark that Jing et al.’s calculation of this value [16] is inaccurate by a multiplicative factor of 7. Coincidentally, this 1/7 error closely matches the omitted 13.5 % throughput of SubBytes lacking fixed points.

This analysis generalizes to plaintext attacks.

Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). doi:10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25 CrossRef

Chari, S., Rao, J.R., Rohatgi, P.: Template attacks. In: Kaliski, B.S., Koç, K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 13–28. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). doi:10.1007/3-540-36400-5_3 CrossRef

DPA Contest v2. http://www.dpacontest.org/v2/. Accessed 12 September 2014

Weingart, S.H.: Physical security devices for computer subsystems: a survey of attacks and defenses. In: Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2000. LNCS, vol. 1965, pp. 302–317. Springer, Heidelberg (2000). doi:10.1007/3-540-44499-8_24 CrossRef

Akkar, M.-L., Giraud, C.: An implementation of DES and AES, secure against some attacks. In: Koç, Ç.K., Naccache, D., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2001. LNCS, vol. 2162, pp. 309–318. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). doi:10.1007/3-540-44709-1_26 CrossRef

National Institute of Standards and Technology: Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197: Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard, November 2001

Clavier, C., Isorez, Q., Wurcker, A.: Complete SCARE of AES-like block ciphers by chosen plaintext collision power analysis. In: Paul, G., Vaudenay, S. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2013. LNCS, vol. 8250, pp. 116–135. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-03515-4_8 CrossRef

Barkan, E., Biham, E.: In how many ways can you write Rijndael? In: Zheng, Y. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 160–175. Springer, Heidelberg (2002). doi:10.1007/3-540-36178-2_10 CrossRef

Rostovtsev, A., Shemyakina, O.: AES side channel attack protection using random isomorphisms. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/087 (2005)

10.

Wu, S.-Y., Lu, S.-C., Laih, C.S.: Design of AES based on dual cipher and composite field. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) CT-RSA 2004. LNCS, vol. 2964, pp. 25–38. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24660-2_3 CrossRef

11.

Ghellar, F., Lubaszewski, M.S.: A novel AES cryptographic core highly resistant to differential power analysis attacks. In: Symposium on Integrated Circuits and System Design (2008)

12.

Moradi, A., Mischke, O.: Comprehensive evaluation of AES dual ciphers as a side-channel countermeasure. In: Qing, S., Zhou, J., Liu, D. (eds.) ICICS 2013. LNCS, vol. 8233, pp. 245–258. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-02726-5_18 CrossRef

13.

Rijmen, V., Oswald, E.: Representations and Rijndael descriptions. In: Advanced Encryption Standard (2004)

14.

Karroumi, M.: Protecting white-box AES with dual ciphers. In: Rhee, K.-H., Nyang, D.H. (eds.) ICISC 2010. LNCS, vol. 6829, pp. 278–291. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_19 CrossRef

15.

Jing, M.H., Hsu, C., Truong, T.K., Chen, Y.H., Chang, Y.: The diversity study of AES on FPGA application. In: Field-Programmable Technology (2002)

16.

Jing, M.H., Chen, Z.H., Chen, J.H., Chen, Y.H.: Reconfigurable system for high-speed and diversified AES using FPGA. Microprocess. Microsyst. 31, 94–102 (2007)CrossRef

17.

Grosek, O., Siska, J.: Semigroup of matrices over GF2\({}^{\text{s}}\) and its relation to AES. Comput. Artif. Intell. 22, 417–426 (2003)

18.

Grosek, O., Zajac, P.: Searching for a different AES-class MixColumns operation. In: WSEAS International Conference on Applied Computer Science (2006)

19.

Manteena, R.: A VHDL Implemetation of the Advanced Encryption Standard-Rijndael Algorithm. Ph.D. thesis, University of South Florida (2004)

20.

Dziembowski, S., Kazana, T., Wichs, D.: Key-evolution schemes resilient to space-bounded leakage. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 335–353. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_19 CrossRef

21.

Shannon, C.E.: Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 28, 656–715 (1949)MathSciNetCrossRefMATH

22.

Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: The Design of Rijndael. Springer, New York (2002)

23.

Murphy, S., Robshaw, M.J.B.: Essential algebraic structure within the AES. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 1–16. Springer, Heidelberg (2002). doi:10.1007/3-540-45708-9_1 CrossRef

24.

Paar, C., Rosner, M.: Comparison of arithmetic architectures for Reed-Solomon decoders in reconfigurable hardware. In: Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM) (1997)

25.

OpenSSL: Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES). https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/aes/aes_core.c. Accessed 3 April 2016

26.

Rouvroy, G., Standaert, F., Quisquater, J., Legat, J.: Compact and efficient encryption/decryption module for FPGA implementation of the AES Rijndael very well suited for small embedded applications. In: International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (2004)

27.

Cusick, T.W., Stanica, P.: Cryptographic Boolean Functions and Applications. Academic Press, San Diego (2009)MATH

28.

Stein, W., et al.: Sage Mathematics Software (Version 6.2). The Sage Development Team (2015). http://www.sagemath.org

29.

Biham, E., Keller, N.: Cryptanalysis of reduced variants of Rijndael. In: 3rd AES Conference (2000)

30.

Piret, G., Quisquater, J.J.: Impossible differential and square attacks: cryptanalytic link and application to Skipjack (2001)

31.

Choudary, O., Kuhn, M.G.: Efficient template attacks. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (2013)

32.

Dichtl, M.: A new method of black box power analysis and a fast algorithm for optimal key search. J. Cryptographic Eng. 1, 255–264 (2011)CrossRef

33.

Rivain, M., Roche, T.: SCARE of secret ciphers with SPN structures. In: Sako, K., Sarkar, P. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2013. LNCS, vol. 8269, pp. 526–544. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-42033-7_27 CrossRef

34.

Veyrat-Charvillon, N., Gérard, B., Renauld, M., Standaert, F.-X.: An optimal key enumeration algorithm and its application to side-channel attacks. In: Knudsen, L.R., Wu, H. (eds.) SAC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7707, pp. 390–406. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35999-6_25 CrossRef

35.

Novak, R.: Side-channel attack on substitution blocks. In: Zhou, J., Yung, M., Han, Y. (eds.) ACNS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2846, pp. 307–318. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45203-4_24 CrossRef

36.

Hanley, N., Tunstall, M., Marnane, W.P.: Unknown plaintext template attacks. In: Youm, H.Y., Yung, M. (eds.) WISA 2009. LNCS, vol. 5932, pp. 148–162. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10838-9_12 CrossRef

Titel: Diversity Within the Rijndael Design Principles for Resistance to Differential Power Analysis
verfasst von: Merrielle Spain
Mayank Varia
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Cryptology and Network Security
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-48964-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-48965-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_5

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"