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Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 2/2016

01.08.2016 | Original Research

Dodd–Frank and risk in the financial services industry

verfasst von: Aigbe Akhigbe, Anna D. Martin, Ann Marie Whyte

Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | Ausgabe 2/2016

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Abstract

We present evidence that discretionary risk taking by financial institutions has declined following the passage of Dodd–Frank. The largest institutions experience the greatest reduction in risk consistent with the legislation’s objective of reducing systemic risk and an ultimate goal of ending the too-big-to-fail doctrine. Analysis of a sample of banks, the most highly regulated financial institutions, reveals that banks exhibiting characteristics consistent with riskier business strategies prior to Dodd–Frank experience the greatest risk reduction. Further, banks that alter their business practices by increasing their capital ratios and reducing their level of non-performing loans following the law’s passage are shown to experience the greatest reduction in risk. Our results point to the efficacy of Dodd–Frank in reducing risk in the financial system.

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Fußnoten
3
With a limited number of bank charters (i.e., less competition), banks avoid risks that may increase bankruptcy likelihood as this would erode the value of their charter and their ability to earn monopoly rents. With more charters (i.e., more competition), banks are less inclined to avoid risk. Thus, regulators may desire to constrain the number of competitors in order to preserve the stability of the banking system.
 
4
Allen (2010) and Fama and Litterman (2012) argue that Dodd–Frank will not prevent failures and bailouts.
 
5
We use the following two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes: 60 for depository institutions, 63 for insurance companies and 62 for securities firms/brokers.
 
6
We identify key legislative events leading up the Dodd–Frank’s passage as reported in the Library of Congress (see http://​thomas.​loc.​gov/​home/​LegislativeData.​php?​&​n=​BSS&​c=​111).
 
7
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this important set of characteristics.
 
8
The magnitude of decline in the risk measures is not significantly different between the depository and non-depository institutions at least at the 5 % level, except for the average change in beta. Depository institutions do not have a significant change in beta but non-depository institutions have a significant decline in beta. The difference between the two portfolios is significant at the 1 % level.
 
9
Our sample size is reduced considerably because of data constraints.
 
10
The models include the size proxy that is defined to be a dummy variable equal to 1 for institutions with total assets ≥$50 billion and 0 otherwise, because this measure more specifically hones in on institutions that are likely to be considered too-big-to-fail. Nevertheless, when we run the models using the continuous form of the size variable, our results are mainly consistent.
 
11
The TCL rating is “sticky” and does not change significantly even over a 2 year period (2009–2011). Thus, it is not surprising that this measure is only marginally significant.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Dodd–Frank and risk in the financial services industry
verfasst von
Aigbe Akhigbe
Anna D. Martin
Ann Marie Whyte
Publikationsdatum
01.08.2016
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting / Ausgabe 2/2016
Print ISSN: 0924-865X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7179
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-015-0506-4

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