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We study the effects of emigration on bribery experience and attitudes towards corruption in the migrants’ countries of origin. Using data from the Gallup Balkan Monitor survey and instrumental variable analysis, we find that having relatives abroad reduces the likelihood of bribing public officials, renders bribe-taking behavior by public officials less acceptable, and reduces the likelihood of being asked for bribes by public officials. Receiving monetary remittances does not change the beneficial effects regarding bribe paying and attitudes toward corruption; however, remittances counteract the beneficial effect on bribe solicitations by public officials. Overall, our findings support the conjecture that migration contributes to the transfer of norms and practices from destination to source countries.
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- Does emigration reduce corruption?
Roswitha M. King
- Springer US
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