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Erschienen in:
A Cryptographic Analysis of the WireGuard Protocol Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

DogFish: Decentralized Optimistic Game-theoretic FIle SHaring

verfasst von : Seny Kamara, Alptekin Küpçü

Erschienen in: Applied Cryptography and Network Security

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing accounts for the most uplink bandwidth use in the Internet. Therefore, in the past few decades, many solutions tried to come up with better proposals to increase the social welfare of the participants. Social welfare in such systems are categorized generally as average download time or uplink bandwidth utilization. One of the most influential proposals was the BitTorrent. Yet, soonafter studies showed that BitTorrent has several problems that incentivize selfish users to game the system and hence decrease social welfare.
Previous work, unfortunately, did not develop a system that maximizes social welfare in a decentralized manner (without a trusted party getting involved in every exchange), while the proposed strategy and honest piece revelation being the only equilibrium for the rational players. This is what we achieve, by modeling a general class of p2p file sharing systems theoretically, then showing honest piece revelation will help achieve social welfare, and then introducing a new cryptographic primitive, called randomized fair exchange, to instantiate our solution.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Message-Locked Encryption with File Update
Fußnoten
2
For simplicity, representing common behavior, assume each \(P_i\) leaves the system the moment she finishes downloading (at the end of round \(m+i-1\)). Afterward, at round \(m+i\), the seeder sends the last block to peer \(P_{i+1}\) (thus every peer receives the last block from the seeder).
 
3
More precisely, the zeros in the game should be replaced with negligible utilities (of managing to break PoS security), \({<}1\) values should be \({<}1-1/m\) (one minus non-negligible, where the file has m blocks), and ones should be one minus negligible (due to the negligible probability of the fair exchange failing). Overall, we chose not to complicate the presentation with these details, but indeed our equilibrium is a computational Nash equilibrium.
 
4
RFE is also related to oblivious transfer [47]. Indeed, at first, we were imagining a randomized oblivious fair exchange would be necessary, but it turns out we do not need obliviousness for the game theoretic analysis to go through.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
DogFish: Decentralized Optimistic Game-theoretic FIle SHaring
verfasst von
Seny Kamara
Alptekin Küpçü
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Buch
Applied Cryptography and Network Security

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-93386-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-93387-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_36