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This chapter seeks to understand the apprehension and reluctance in the use of economic evidence observed in the enforcement of the competition law in India. Incorporation of economic theory and sophistication of data interpretation are now considered critical for defining the market and of consumer harm in mature competition jurisdiction. Reluctance for economic evidence is an apprehension emanating from the belief that economic analysis is oriented to efficiency criteria rather than of equity consequently fails to capture the idiosyncrasies of an emerging market. Taken from a total welfare viewpoint or a rigorous consumer welfare angle decisions based on economic evidence may have been different. A precipitous analysis of competition in some of the illustrations runs the risk of distorting competition and market functioning.
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