It is a standard hypothesis that authoritarian regimes are more successful than democratic ones at implementing economic reform, because their leaders can act without fear of being voted out of office by those who feel the ‘short-term’ negative effects such as job loss, lower incomes and reduced social services (Sachs, 1990). Yet several recent studies have shown that, despite predictions to the contrary (based largely on the early examples of China and Chile), democracies are no less able to carry out economic reforms than authoritarian regimes (see Plattner and Diamond, 1994; Remmer, 1995; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). A second proposition, that economic liberalization creates the conditions for political liberalization, is also widely maintained but less well studied (Armijo, 1995; Przeworski et al., 1996; Chu, 1996).
Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
- Economic Liberalization in One-Party-Dominant States: Indonesia and Mexico
Jane S. Jaquette
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
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