nach oben

Erschienen in:

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. Economic Theory and Economic History

verfasst von : Robert P. Gilles

Erschienen in: An Economist’s Guide to Economic History

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This chapter argues that the dismal science is in a dismal state. The problem is caused by the existence of very difficult methodologies, complicating the relationship between economic theorising and empirics. As part of a possible remedy, the author discusses how economic theorising could relate more productively to (economic) history. While analytic narratives can be used to explain the particular economic aspects of a historical episode, history can also provide insights about human economic endeavours that help formulate better general theories.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel Economics, Economic History and Historical Data

Nächstes Kapitel Economic History and the Policymaker

Even the natural sciences can get carried away by their adherence to the fictional narratives that form the foundation of their theories (Smolin 2006).

An example is that of the unemployment rate. Throughout the past century, this figure has been (re)constructed from government data of unemployment benefits and related registrations. In the past decades, the unemployment rate has been redefined habitually by government agencies for the political benefit of political parties that are in government.

An example of this is the formulation of the theory of money and debt founded on the historical intervention of nation states from the nineteenth century through the monopolisation of monetary instruments, the regulation of banking and the establishment of national central banks to regulate the monetary and financial system. This has resulted in the economic theory of fiat money and its derivatives (Menger 1892; Mitchell 1944; Sargent and Velde 2002).

Historical examples for this theoretical perspective are, for example, the case of Henry Ford’s introduction of the semi-automated production of his T-model car and the case of the introduction of the compact disk to replace vinyl music recordings.

A prime example of such entrepreneurship is the case of Microsoft under the leadership of Bill Gates, using acquired software to provide IBM with an operating system for its Personal Computer in 1980.

This general perspective on institutional entrepreneurship allows one to consider political agents as economic entrepreneurs if their actions indeed affect the institutional foundations or matrix of the economy—such as is the case for Gaius Octavianus Augustus, Napoleon Bonaparte and Margaret Thatcher.

I refer to Sims (2017) and Gilles (2018, chap. 5) for details of the following conclusions and insights.

Backhouse, R. 2010. The Puzzle of Modern Economics: Science or Ideology? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Bates, R.H., A. Greif, M. Levi, J.-L. Rosenthal, and B. Weingast. 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Baumol, W.J. 1990. Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive. Journal of Political Economy 98: 893–921.CrossRef

———. 2010. The Microtheory of Innovative Entrepreneurship. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRef

Burt, R.S. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 2004. Structural Holes and Good Ideas. American Journal of Sociology 110: 349–399.CrossRef

———. 2005. Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foley, D.K. 2006. Adam’s Fallacy: A Guide to Economic Theology. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.CrossRef

Gilles, R.P. 2018. Economic Wealth Creation and the Social Division of Labour: I—Institutions and Trust. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef

Greif, A. 1993. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition. American Economic Review 83 (3): 525–548.

———. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Harari, Y.N. 2014. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. London: Vintage Books.

Hodgson, G.M. 2008. After 1929 Economics Changed: Will Economists Wake Up in 2009? Real-World Economics Review 48: 273–278.

Jackson, M.O. 2008. Social and Economic Networks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keen, S. 2011. Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor Dethroned? Revised and Expanded ed. London: Zed Books.

Kirman, A.P. 2010a. The Economic Crisis is a Crisis for Economic Theory. GREQAM Working Paper.

———. 2010b. Walras’ Unfortunate Legacy. GREQAM Working Paper 2010-58.

Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lakatos, I. 1978. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

McCloskey, D.N. 1983. The Rhetoric of Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 21: 481–517.

Menger, K. 1892. On the Origin of Money. Economic Journal 2: 239–255.CrossRef

Mirowski, P. (2010). The Great Mortification: Economists’ Responses to the Crisis of 2007—(and Counting). Hedgehog Review, Summer, 28–41.

Mitchell, W.C. 1944. The Role of Money in Economic History. Journal of Economic History 4 (Supplement: The Tasks of Economic History): 61–67.

Padgett, J.F., and C.K. Ansell. 1993. Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434. American Journal of Sociology 98: 1259–1319.CrossRef

Popper, K. 1968. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper and Row.

Rubinstein, A. 2006. Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist. Econometrica 74 (4): 865–883.CrossRef

———. 2012. Economic Fables. New York: Open Book Publishers.CrossRef

Sargent, T.J., and F.R. Velde. 2002. The Big Problem of Small Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRef

Schlefer, J. 2012. The Assumptions Economists Make. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRef

Schumpeter, J. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial.

Sims, O. 2017. Entrepreneurship and Wealth Generation in Socially Structured Economies. PhD Thesis, Queen’s University, Belfast, UK.

Smolin, L. 2006. The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of Science, and What Comes Next. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Sutton, J. 2000. Marshall’s Tendencies: What Can Economists Know? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Titel: Economic Theory and Economic History
verfasst von: Robert P. Gilles
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: An Economist’s Guide to Economic History
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-96567-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-96568-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96568-0_4