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Erschienen in:
2011 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Efficiency Analysis of the Government Supervising Firms Pollution Control
verfasst von : Yan Wang, Fenghui Ji
Erschienen in: Advances in Computer Science, Intelligent System and Environment
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Pollution control, as a public good, tends to “free riding” behavior in the course of its private supply and is not easy to achieve the optimal level of social needs. So the regulation of government to pollution control is necessary. In practice, the efficiency of pollution control is low. In this paper, we explore the factors that cause the low efficiency. An incomplete information dynamic game and a complete information static game for government supervising firms’ pollution control are constructed. In the model, some factors such as the efficiency of supervision, the strength of punishment and the publication of information are involved in. The conclusions would have some theory references for environmental management.