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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Electoral Democratic Representation and the Market Economy: Irreconcilable Assumptions, Driving Forces and Outcomes

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Abstract

This chapter elaborates on the contradictions between normative definitions of democracy and its actual functioning as representative democracy. It discusses the concepts of political representation as well as political equality and their different dimensions. It is argued that despite equal rights, inequalities in opportunities between individuals might lead to systematic inequalities in political outcomes, specifically with regard to the representation of their interests in elections.

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Fußnoten
1
In Europe examples of such practices include notably Prussia, where until 1918 a three class electoral system prevailed in which the richer citizens were given much more weight as each group, whose actual number was very uneven (less than 5 % of the population were in the richest class and only about 20 % in the second), could elect one third of the deputies. In Belgium there was a complex institution of the vote plural that notably gave more weight to votes of men who had a certain wealth. An indirect example of differential political rights depending on wealth is also the case of the plural vote in the UK and other Anglo Saxon countries. It allowed property owners (but also academics) to vote twice, they had a right to vote where they live but also where their property was located.
 
2
It has however to be noted that Switzerland did not restrict male suffrage in its first Federal Constitution of 1848. All men aged above 20 had the right to vote, provided that they were granted citizenship rights in their canton of residence (Constitution Fédérale de 1848, art. 63). As cantons deprived their residents of active citizenship based, among others, on mental illness, feeble mindedness, bankruptcy, immorality or begging, approximately 20 % of men were disenfranchised (Poledna 2012).
 
3
Dahl is not by far the only author for whom the equal consideration of citizens is a defining feature of democracy. For instance Verba states: “Political equality refers to the extent to which citizens have an equal voice in governmental decisions. One of the bedrock principles of democracy is the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens.” (Verba 2003: 663).
 
4
Beyond the long history of disenfranchisement, notably of poor citizens in most modern democracies, the inclusion of some groups of the population to the electorate is still problematic. The inclusion of migrants has grown into an important issue. This is a particularly important topic in Switzerland where almost 20 % of people having reached the age to vote and living in the country are deprived from the right to vote at the national level on the basis of their nationality (see Caramani and Strijbis 2013).
 
5
There are various ways citizens can voice their disagreement. Demonstrations could be a channel but some citizens might send letters to their representatives, others write to newspaper, others might “vote with their feet” and emigrate, create lobbies and, in the Swiss case, launch and sign petitions for referendums or initiatives. The channels through which information can be possibly be transmitted from individuals are very numerous but in each of these case the question arises how, based on this information, can the representative infer the position of her constituents?
 
6
An obvious example of a case in which citizens’ interests are likely to be conflicting is redistribution. In that matter the interests of poor and rich citizens drastically differ. But one could think of conflicts of interests in almost any case as, say, between generations over pensions, parents and non-parents over education spending, or car owners and public transport users over transport infrastructure.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Electoral Democratic Representation and the Market Economy: Irreconcilable Assumptions, Driving Forces and Outcomes
verfasst von
Jan Rosset
Copyright-Jahr
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27117-0_2