Skip to main content

2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Elite: Automatic Orchestration of Elastic Detection Services to Secure Cloud Hosting

verfasst von : Yangyi Chen, Vincent Bindschaedler, XiaoFeng Wang, Stefan Berger, Dimitrios Pendarakis

Erschienen in: Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Intrusion detection on today’s cloud is challenging: a user’s application is automatically deployed through new cloud orchestration tools (e.g., OpenStack Heat, Amazon CloudFormation, etc.), and its computing resources (i.e., virtual machine instances) come and go dynamically during its runtime, depending on its workloads and configurations. Under such a dynamic environment, a centralized detection service needs to keep track of the state of the whole deployment (a cloud stack), size up and down its own computing power and dynamically allocate its existing resources and configure new resources to catch up with what happens in the application. Particularly in the case of anomaly detection, new application instances created at runtime are expected to be protected instantly, without going through conventional profile learning, which disrupts the operations of the application.
To address those challenges, we developed Elite, a new elastic computing framework, to support high-performance detection services on the cloud. Our techniques are designed to be fully integrated into today’s cloud orchestration mechanisms, allowing an o rdinary cloud user to requ est a detection service and specify its parameters conveniently, through the cloud-formation file she submits for deploying her application. Such a detection service is supported by a high-performance stream-processing engine, and optimized for concurrent analysis of a large amount of data streamed from application instances and automatic adaptation to different computing scales. It is linked to the cloud orchestration engine through a communication mechanism, which provides the runtime information of the application (e.g., the types of new instances created) necessary for the service to dynamically configure its resources. To avoid profile learning, we further studied a set of techniques that enable reuse of normal behavior profiles across different instances within one user’s cloud stack, and across different users (in a privacy-preserving way). We evaluated our implementation of Elite on popular web applications deployed over 60 instances. Our study shows that Elite efficiently shares profiles without losing their accuracy and effectively handles dynamic, intensive workloads incurred by these applications.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
How long the detector needs to stay in “training mode” depends on many factors such as the nature of the service provided by the application instances, the quality of training inputs, and to what extent the cloud user can tolerate the false positives. Precise tuning of the training time and the trade-offs involved is not the focus of this paper.
 
2
Those calls need to happen on almost all intrusion vectors (as evidenced by our false negative evaluation in Sect. 4.2). Also our design can be easily extended to accommodate other types of calls.
 
3
An example here is JMeter Script Recorder, which can be provided by the cloud and customized by the user.
 
4
False positives incurred by such profile sharing can be further adjusted during the system’s online operation.
 
5
In addition to the contents with wildcards, those profile templates were also specialized according to the ID of the stack.
 
Literatur
1.
Zurück zum Zitat Somorovsky, J., Heiderich, M., Jensen, M., Schwenk, J., Gruschka, N., Lo Iacono, L.: All your clouds are belong to us: Security analysis of cloud management interfaces. In: CCSW (2011) Somorovsky, J., Heiderich, M., Jensen, M., Schwenk, J., Gruschka, N., Lo Iacono, L.: All your clouds are belong to us: Security analysis of cloud management interfaces. In: CCSW (2011)
2.
Zurück zum Zitat Mulazzani, M., Schrittwieser, S., Leithner, M., Huber, M., Weippl, E.: Dark clouds on the horizon: using cloud storage as attack vector and online slack space. In: USENIX Security (2011) Mulazzani, M., Schrittwieser, S., Leithner, M., Huber, M., Weippl, E.: Dark clouds on the horizon: using cloud storage as attack vector and online slack space. In: USENIX Security (2011)
8.
Zurück zum Zitat Sung, A.H., Xu, J., Chavez, P., Mukkamala, S.: Static analyzer of vicious executables (save). In: ACSAC, Washington, DC, USA (2004) Sung, A.H., Xu, J., Chavez, P., Mukkamala, S.: Static analyzer of vicious executables (save). In: ACSAC, Washington, DC, USA (2004)
9.
Zurück zum Zitat Kirda, E., Kruegel, C., Banks, G., Vigna, G., Kemmerer, R.A.: Behavior-based spyware detection. In: USENIX Security, Berkeley, CA, USA (2006) Kirda, E., Kruegel, C., Banks, G., Vigna, G., Kemmerer, R.A.: Behavior-based spyware detection. In: USENIX Security, Berkeley, CA, USA (2006)
10.
Zurück zum Zitat Kolbitsch, C., Comparetti, P.M., Kruegel, C., Kirda, E., Zhou, X., Wang, X.: Effective and efficient malware detection at the end host. In: USENIX Security (2009) Kolbitsch, C., Comparetti, P.M., Kruegel, C., Kirda, E., Zhou, X., Wang, X.: Effective and efficient malware detection at the end host. In: USENIX Security (2009)
11.
Zurück zum Zitat Yin, H., Song, D., Egele, M., Kruegel, C., Kirda, E.: Panorama: Capturing system-wide information flow for malware detection and analysis. In: CCS, New York, USA (2007) Yin, H., Song, D., Egele, M., Kruegel, C., Kirda, E.: Panorama: Capturing system-wide information flow for malware detection and analysis. In: CCS, New York, USA (2007)
12.
Zurück zum Zitat Hofmeyr, S.A., Forrest, S., Somayaji, A.: Intrusion detection using sequences of system calls. J. Comput. Secur. 6, 151–180 (1998) Hofmeyr, S.A., Forrest, S., Somayaji, A.: Intrusion detection using sequences of system calls. J. Comput. Secur. 6, 151–180 (1998)
13.
Zurück zum Zitat Forrest, S., Hofmeyr, S.A., Somayaji, A., Longstaff, T.A.: A sense of self for unix processes. In: IEEE S&P (1996) Forrest, S., Hofmeyr, S.A., Somayaji, A., Longstaff, T.A.: A sense of self for unix processes. In: IEEE S&P (1996)
15.
Zurück zum Zitat Provos, N.: Improving host security with system call policies. In: USENIX Security (2002) Provos, N.: Improving host security with system call policies. In: USENIX Security (2002)
31.
Zurück zum Zitat Kim, G.H., Spafford, E.H.: The design and implementation of tripwire: a file system integrity checker. In: CCS, New York, USA (1994) Kim, G.H., Spafford, E.H.: The design and implementation of tripwire: a file system integrity checker. In: CCS, New York, USA (1994)
32.
Zurück zum Zitat Vigna, G., Kruegel, C.: Host-based intrusion detection (2005) Vigna, G., Kruegel, C.: Host-based intrusion detection (2005)
33.
Zurück zum Zitat Roesch, M.: Snort - lightweight intrusion detection for networks. In: USENIX System Administration, Berkeley, CA, USA (1999) Roesch, M.: Snort - lightweight intrusion detection for networks. In: USENIX System Administration, Berkeley, CA, USA (1999)
34.
Zurück zum Zitat Tsai, C.-F., Hsu, Y.-F., Lin, C.-Y., Lin, W.-Y.: Intrusion detection by machine learning: a review. Expert Syst. Appl. 36, 11994–12000 (2009)CrossRef Tsai, C.-F., Hsu, Y.-F., Lin, C.-Y., Lin, W.-Y.: Intrusion detection by machine learning: a review. Expert Syst. Appl. 36, 11994–12000 (2009)CrossRef
35.
Zurück zum Zitat Lee, W., Stolfo, S.J., Mok, K.W.: A data mining framework for building intrusion detection models. In: S&P (1999) Lee, W., Stolfo, S.J., Mok, K.W.: A data mining framework for building intrusion detection models. In: S&P (1999)
36.
Zurück zum Zitat Lee, W., Stolfo, S.J., Mok, K.W.: Adaptive intrusion detection: a data mining approach. Artif. Intell. Rev. 14, 533–567 (2000)CrossRefMATH Lee, W., Stolfo, S.J., Mok, K.W.: Adaptive intrusion detection: a data mining approach. Artif. Intell. Rev. 14, 533–567 (2000)CrossRefMATH
37.
Zurück zum Zitat Azmandian, F., Moffie, M., Alshawabkeh, M., Dy, J., Aslam, J., Kaeli, D.: Virtual machine monitor-based lightweight intrusion detection. ACM SIGOPS 45, 38–53 (2011)CrossRef Azmandian, F., Moffie, M., Alshawabkeh, M., Dy, J., Aslam, J., Kaeli, D.: Virtual machine monitor-based lightweight intrusion detection. ACM SIGOPS 45, 38–53 (2011)CrossRef
38.
Zurück zum Zitat Garfinkel, T., Rosenblum, M., et al.: A virtual machine introspection based architecture for intrusion detection. In: NDSS (2003) Garfinkel, T., Rosenblum, M., et al.: A virtual machine introspection based architecture for intrusion detection. In: NDSS (2003)
39.
Zurück zum Zitat Kholidy, H.A., Baiardi, F.: CIDS: a framework for intrusion detection in cloud systems. In: ITNG (2012) Kholidy, H.A., Baiardi, F.: CIDS: a framework for intrusion detection in cloud systems. In: ITNG (2012)
40.
Zurück zum Zitat Modi, C., Patel, D., Borisaniya, B., Patel, H., Patel, A., Rajarajan, M.: A survey of intrusion detection techniques in cloud. JNCA 36, 42–57 (2013)CrossRef Modi, C., Patel, D., Borisaniya, B., Patel, H., Patel, A., Rajarajan, M.: A survey of intrusion detection techniques in cloud. JNCA 36, 42–57 (2013)CrossRef
41.
Zurück zum Zitat Patel, A., Taghavi, M., Bakhtiyari, K., Celestino Jr., J.: Review: an intrusion detection and prevention system in cloud computing: a systematic review. JNCA 36, 25–41 (2013) Patel, A., Taghavi, M., Bakhtiyari, K., Celestino Jr., J.: Review: an intrusion detection and prevention system in cloud computing: a systematic review. JNCA 36, 25–41 (2013)
42.
Zurück zum Zitat Gember, A., Krishnamurthy, A., John, S.S., Grandl, R., Gao, X., Anand, A.: Stratos: a network-aware orchestration layer for virtual middleboxes in clouds. arXiv (2013) Gember, A., Krishnamurthy, A., John, S.S., Grandl, R., Gao, X., Anand, A.: Stratos: a network-aware orchestration layer for virtual middleboxes in clouds. arXiv (2013)
43.
Zurück zum Zitat Chari, S.N., Cheng, P.-C.: Bluebox: A policy-driven, host-based intrusion detection system. ACM TISSEC 6, 173–200 (2003)CrossRef Chari, S.N., Cheng, P.-C.: Bluebox: A policy-driven, host-based intrusion detection system. ACM TISSEC 6, 173–200 (2003)CrossRef
44.
Zurück zum Zitat Smalley, S., Vance, C., Salamon, W.: Implementing selinux as a linux security module. NAI Labs Rep. 1, 43 (2001) Smalley, S., Vance, C., Salamon, W.: Implementing selinux as a linux security module. NAI Labs Rep. 1, 43 (2001)
46.
Zurück zum Zitat Harada, T., Horie, T., Tanaka, K.: Task oriented management obviates your onus on linux. In: Linux Conference (2004) Harada, T., Horie, T., Tanaka, K.: Task oriented management obviates your onus on linux. In: Linux Conference (2004)
47.
Zurück zum Zitat Forrest, S., Hofmeyr, S., Somayaji, A.: The evolution of system-call monitoring. In: ACSAC (2008) Forrest, S., Hofmeyr, S., Somayaji, A.: The evolution of system-call monitoring. In: ACSAC (2008)
Metadaten
Titel
Elite: Automatic Orchestration of Elastic Detection Services to Secure Cloud Hosting
verfasst von
Yangyi Chen
Vincent Bindschaedler
XiaoFeng Wang
Stefan Berger
Dimitrios Pendarakis
Copyright-Jahr
2015
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26362-5_27