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Empirische Kapitalmarktforschung zu Conference Calls: Eine Literaturanalyse

Zeitschrift:: Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung > Ausgabe 2/2020

Autoren:: Devrimi Kaya, Christian Maier, Tobias Böhmer

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Zusatzmaterial online

Zusätzliche Informationen sind in der Online-Version dieses Artikels (https://doi.org/10.1007/s41471-019-00080-2) enthalten.

Zusammenfassung

Conference Calls im Rahmen der Ergebnisberichterstattung haben sich in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zu einem wichtigen Instrument der Offenlegung an Kapitalmärkten entwickelt. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die empirische Literatur zu den Determinanten und ökonomischen Konsequenzen von Conference Calls. Wir strukturieren unsere Literaturanalyse anhand von Themensträngen wie dem Zugang zu Conference Calls, der Teilnehmerpartizipation und den Kapitalmarktreaktionen. Zudem werden Studien analysiert, die das Phänomen Conference Call untersuchen, um wichtige Einblicke in den Informationsgehalt von Conference Calls und das Kommunikationsverhalten der Teilnehmer zu erhalten. Abschließend werden Anregungen für künftige Forschungsarbeiten gegeben. Gegenstand der Literaturanalyse bilden 49 Beiträge in international renommierten Zeitschriften aus den Jahren 1998 bis 2018.

Online Appendix der untersuchten Studien zu Conference Calls.

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Titel: Empirische Kapitalmarktforschung zu Conference Calls: Eine Literaturanalyse
Autoren:: Devrimi Kaya
Christian Maier
Tobias Böhmer
Publikationsdatum: 28.01.2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41471-019-00080-2
Verlag: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
Zeitschrift: Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research
Ausgabe 2/2020
Print ISSN: 0341-2687
Elektronische ISSN: 2366-6153

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