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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

1. A Conceptual Frame of Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa and the British Nexus

Authors : Lucky E. Asuelime, Raquel A. Adekoye

Published in: Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter introduces the study and provides the overall background and identifies the problems of nuclear proliferation with follow-up questions as well as the significance of the research, provides conceptual clarifications, and outlines the theoretical framework and the significance of the study. This chapter provides the background and context for understanding of South Africa’s strategic position in an international system driven by strategic interests leading to the need for strategic weapons of mass destruction. It introduces a conceptualization of armament drive in South Africa in the era of apartheid and the inextricable links of the British government at the time to provide assistance to South Africa due largely to its historical connections, Commonwealth factor, economic arrangements, and the latter’s interest in South Africa’s uranium deposits, a vital resource which Britain could use as bargaining chip to ensure sustainability in a nuclear driven international system. While the British government was keen to improve economic ties with South Africa, diplomatically, it needed to keep the country at arm’s length in order to signal disdain for apartheid and to avoid “guilt by association.” The objective of this chapter is to problematize the South African uranium drives and nuclear proliferation from a global perspective along with other variables.

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next chapter A Methodological Framework for Nuclear Proliferation in the South
Footnotes
1
It should be noted that South Africa is not the sole developer of nuclear weapons nor is it solely responsible for undermining the collaborative efforts needed for development. I also highlight some of the history of the development of nuclear weapons post-World War II by other countries.
 
2
Apartheid (meaning separateness) was a system of legal racial segregation put in place by the National Party government of South Africa from 1948 to 1993. This denied the rights of the majority of people of color in South Africa in the interests of White supremacy.
 
3
Indeed, South Africa depended on possible collaborations from any or all of the Western states for the development of its nuclear capability. Such technological capability is a prerequisite for the development of nuclear weapons.
 
4
However, the apartheid government basically decided to “go-it-alone” in developing nuclear capability. While assistance from other countries was regarded as a bonus, such assistance was never formalized. Indeed, dual-use items were usually obtained from other countries and converted for use in the weapons program without their knowledge.
 
5
“Nuclear Weapons States” (NWS) are those states that have been acknowledged as having acquired nuclear weapons before entering into force of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and which have been allowed to keep their nuclear weapons under the NPT.
 
6
NPT recognized nuclear states—the USA, Britain, Soviet Union, France, and China.
 
7
In real life, like the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the leaders of Israel, Syria, and Egypt would understand that internal or external political considerations can force a conflict in their region. However, the internal military and political discussions within the Egyptian high command in 1973 indicate that senior civilian leaders (including Anwar Sadat) believed that they had to fight a war in order to gain sufficient internal political support to negotiate for peace. On the other hand, Israel believed that her military dominance would deter any attack, since no rational Syrian or Egyptian leader would attempt to attack. Sadat felt he could not avert war, and Syria’s leadership committed a military blunder. One can, therefore, conclude that Israel’s deterrence did not achieve its grand purpose because there was no common rational peaceful objective for the leaders of Israel, Egypt, or Syria. Their military orientation and strategic calculation differ.
 
8
While this argument is true in general terms, it does not apply to the case of South Africa. The Cubans in Angola were convinced that South Africa had tactical nuclear weapons by the mid to the end of the 1980s; as a result, the Cuban regiments in Angola were never amassed in one location. They were dispersed over several locations so that if one regiment was attacked and wiped out with a nuclear warhead, others would remain safe. Jorge Risquet, the main negotiator on the Cuban side, admitted this to Sue Onslow in London. He even sketched it on a napkin for her. He also admitted it to former Foreign Minister Pik Botha during a visit to South Africa in December 2011. The bottom line is that this fear of South African nuclear capability, while not the only factor, definitely played a role in Cuba’s considerations in accelerating negotiations for a settlement in Angola; hence, the argument can be made that it indeed played a role in ending the war. “Jorge Risquet conversations with Sue Onslow and Pik Botha, as related to nuclear historian Anna-Mart van Wyk in 2012.”
 
9
Some of these developing countries include but are not limited to Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, Iran, and others.
 
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Metadata
Title
A Conceptual Frame of Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa and the British Nexus
Authors
Lucky E. Asuelime
Raquel A. Adekoye
Copyright Year
2016
Book
Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-33372-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-33373-1

Copyright Year: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33373-1_1