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Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 1/2016

19-01-2016 | Original Paper

A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda’s rule

Authors: Jerry S. Kelly, Shaofang Qi

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 1/2016

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Abstract

For a fixed number n of individuals, and a given weak ordering of m alternatives, we ask: is there a profile of n preferences that maps to that ordering under Borda’s rule? Evidence is presented for a conjectured answer, which is settled except for the case of odd n and even m.

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Metadata
Title
A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda’s rule
Authors
Jerry S. Kelly
Shaofang Qi
Publication date
19-01-2016
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 1/2016
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0948-6

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