A ‘Macro-regional’ Europe in the Making

With the adoption of its first ‘macro-regional’ strategy in 2009 — the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) — the European Union has started to charter new territory in transnational cooperation and cohesion policy. Subsequently, other ‘macro-regions’ have begun to self-identify — such as the Danube (2011), the Adriatic-Ionian basin (2014), the Alpine (2015) and the North Sea regions¹ (see European Parliament, 2015) — and are in the process of developing similar strategies of their own, often drawing on ‘the inspiration from the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the Danube Region’ (North Sea Commission, 2011, p. 2). These developments suggest that some parts of Europe, if not the entire EU, could come to be covered by some kind of macro-regional strategy. Indeed, in 2013, the Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council proposed a ‘Europe of macro-regions’ (Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council, 2013, p. 9) and an ever-increasing area has been described as having succumbed to a kind of ‘macro-regional fever’ (Dühr, 2011, p. 3). Such observations and the concrete developments that underpin them warrant a critical assessment of this ‘“nouvelle vogue” of transnational cooperation’ (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2012), which has also been depicted as a new ‘tool of European integration’ (Dubois et al., 2009, p. 9; see also Bellini and Hilpert, 2013).²

Though the concept of macro-regional strategies that emerged in 2004/2005 was a new programme for the EU itself, the form and content of envisaged activities were not exactly a novel development within Europe. A plethora of multilateral cross-border cooperation platforms already existed in the form of the so-called subregional groupings (SRGs) that had proliferated in Europe after 1989. Every state currently included in one or more of the three EU macro-regions presently in action — the Adriatic and Ionian, the Baltic Sea and the Danube Region (or in advanced planning) the Alpine Region — was and remains a partner in one or more SRGs. Most SRGs have traditionally had, and continue to have, cooperation agendas that resemble the goals and activities of EU macro-regions. They also occupied, in whole or in part, the same territorial spaces. This was the case for the Baltic Sea macro-region and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and the first draft of the Danube Basin macro-region was more than reminiscent of the Trieste-based Central European Initiative (CEI) in terms of not only its member countries but also its portfolios of activity.

‘Macro-regions’ are an established concept in economic and political geography, as well as in spatial planning (Smith et al., 2002; Pain and van Hamme, 2014). As such, they are widely applied in a range of contexts. However, following the adoption of EU macro-regional strategies for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), the Danube Region (EUSDR) and the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR), as well as an agreement in the European Council for a strategy to be developed for the Alpine Region (EUSALP), the concept of macro-regions has gained increased prominence in contemporary policy practice and debates. Under EU Cohesion Policy, a ‘macro-regional strategy’ is defined as ‘an integrated framework endorsed by the European Council, which may be supported by the European Structural and Investment Funds among others, to address common challenges faced by a defined geographical area relating to Member States and third countries located in the same geographical area which thereby benefit from strengthened cooperation contributing to achievement of economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (CEC DG Regio, 2014). In theory, EU macro-regional strategies are a new multilevel governance instrument providing an opportunity for new thinking about territorial spaces, the opportunities and challenges in these spaces and new thinking on forms of intervention.

The term ‘region’ is normally used to denote a subnational authority located between the national centre and the local periphery, but it is also (with increasing frequency) used to denote a space of varying size with economic, social and cultural significance. Institutional regions have precise boundaries, defined powers and belong to nation states. Spatial regions, in contrast, have fuzzy borders, informal or derivative powers and may span across nation states. ‘Regionalization’ — the process through which regions develop or acquire new prominence — is therefore a polysemic word. Regionalization can denote the process of creating free trade areas, common markets and monetary unions among sovereign states (so it is synonymous with regional integration); it can indicate the process of political or administrative devolution to institutional tiers located below the national centre (as in regional decentralization); and it can indicate the creation of intermediate entities among sovereign states and subnational governments in order to jointly carry out certain activities (also denoted as sub- or macro-regionalization, see Gänzle and Kern, chapter 1 in this volume). Finally, it can indicate more bottom-up processes that do not generate any new institutional structures but are nevertheless characterized by intensified economic, social and cultural exchanges between the people living in contiguous or distant places (Fioramonti, 2012a, 2012b). This broader phenomenon is loosely indicated as ‘cross-border cooperation’ (CBC), regardless of whether such cooperation gives rise to mere agreements, working communities or novel institutional tiers. In all cases, the aim is to reap material and symbolic benefits.

The launch of the first EU macro-regional strategy in the Baltic Sea Region in 2009 marked the start of a number of similar initiatives across Europe. According to various commentators in the planning and geography disciplines, the new macro-regional strategies signal the redefinition of regional policy rationales, new scales of policy intervention, new actor constellations and variable geometries of governance (see e.g. Allmendinger et al., 2014; Antola, 2009; Bialiasiewicz et al., 2013; Faludi, 2012; Stead, 2011). In short, they argue that the appearance of these new strategies has created new policy arenas which exist either between or alongside formal institutions and which arise from cooperation across various spatial scales, and involve different policy sectors and actor constellations.

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), which was presented by the European Commission in June 2009, is the first macro-regional strategy of the EU. In the words of the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn, it was designed to serve as a ‘new model for co-operation’ and ‘to inspire other regions’ (Hahn, 2010, 2) in Europe. From this perspective, the EUSBSR has certainly provided some ‘inspirational successes’, almost triggering a veritable ‘macro-regional fever’ (Dühr, 2011, 3) amongst EU members and partner countries, and pushing the number of countries currently involved in the formulation of macro-regional strategies to 27.¹ The EUSBSR targets eight EU member states — Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany, that is, the German Länder of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Hamburg — and also two partner countries (the Russian Federation and Norway) (Figure 6.1); hence, it can almost be conceived as an internal strategy of the EU (European Commission, 2009). In contrast, both the EU Strategy for the Danube Region and the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region are far more diverse in membership and exhibit a strong external focus (see Gänzle, forthcoming; Ágh, chapter 7, Cugusi and Stocchiero, chapter 8 this volume).

Since its inception in 2011, the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) has undergone a tumultuous, roller-coaster-like evolutionary path. It cannot be understood when stripped from its wider context, requiring a broader perspective, that appreciates how deeply embedded EUSDR has been and still is in the wider history of the EU and its new member states (NMS). More so, the EUSDR is inextricably linked with wider processes of globalization and can be seen as merely constituting a rather short chapter in the very complex history of the EU. Here, we will therefore examine the EUSDR within its appropriate context, which will allow us to see that there has been no linear or evolutionary process in the EUSDR’s development, with the process having instead been largely shaped by external circumstances. Despite the potential capacity that the strategy still holds to shape the future, it is enough to allude to the Ukrainian crisis (and the ‘new Cold War’ this has produced with Russia) to cast serious doubt over its future prospects. Nevertheless, the EUSDR may be on the correct side of history, as there has been a long-run tendency in governance for regional strategies to take hold, which has been brought about by general trends towards greater globalization, so that what has emerged can be termed ‘globalization-cum-regionalization’.

Since the launch of the first macro-regional strategy in the Baltic Sea Region in 2009, many other cross-border regions and macro-regions have expressed their interest in defining their own strategy, with the macro-regional vogue eventually reaching the Mediterranean area (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2012). In December 2012, the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR) was launched, and was subsequently endorsed by the European Council in September 2014; a debate is going on as to the possibility of diffusing such macro-regional approaches to other Mediterranean areas. However, it is not as if the expansion of projects under the banner of ‘macro-regions’ was a neat and uniform process; the origins of all existing macro-regions are highly diverse, since ‘there has been no regulation to support the concept. This has meant that there is also a certain level of uncertainty amongst member states and also sub-national actors to what extent and into what direction the concept will develop’ (Van der Zwet and McMaster, 2012, p. 14). EU macro-regions are identified according to a functional approach, in order to respond to common cross-border challenges and opportunities that require collective action (Stocchiero, 2010). The concept of functional macro-regions links areas according to ‘mutual interdependence’ and ‘spatial coherence’, meaning that factors such as specific transnational interde– pendencies, material and immaterial flows, hard and soft linkages all qualify the geographical scale and contents of a macro-region (Stocchiero, 2010).

The emergence of macro-regional strategies on the European policy agenda is a curious development. On the one hand, the new instrument offers a promising approach to address several previous shortcomings in the implementation of the territorial cohesion objective, including the widespread shortage of meaningful policy integration and the apparent lack of coherence between numerous territorial policy initiatives. On the other hand, the EU has been cautious about actively promoting them and has emphasized that macro-regional strategies would entail no new regulations, no new institutions and no new financial resources. Despite this hesitation, several processes of macro-regionalization (see chapter 1 for a definition) have emerged since the Baltic and Danube strategies were adopted in 2009 and 2011, respectively. In December 2012, the European Council mandated the European Commission to proceed with its preparation of a macro-regional EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR), and in December 2013, it did so for an EU Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP). A public consultation was conducted from mid-July to mid-October 2014. Its results were examined at a conference in Milan in December 2014, organized in the context of the Italian double presidency of the EU and the Alpine Convention. If and when the EUSALP is finalized as the fourth macro-regional strategy in mid-2015, a total of 19 EU members and 9 non-members will have joined in the macro-regional ‘turn’.

Within the framework of Europe 2020 (CEC, 2010), there is a stress on the territorial coverage of the regional policies and complementary EU activities. There is increasing attention on the performance and effectiveness of such policies, the efficiency of governance structures and implementation arrangements, and the relationship between cohesion policy and other EU structural policies. Over the last few years, there has also been a growing recognition and support for the concept of ‘macro-regions’, which some have promoted as serving to meet these objectives.¹ The Fifth Cohesion Report (CEC, 2010) broadly embraces this approach of defining geographies which extend beyond national borders and conventional ‘Territorial Cooperation’ collaborations, but within specifically defined quadrants of the continent. The future architecture of cohesion policy, therefore, is likely to see demand for similar strategies for parts of Europe as already apply for the Baltic Sea, the Danube and the Adriatic-Ionian area.

The EU Council’s decisions to create macro-regional development strategies for the Baltic Sea, Danube, Adriatic-Ionian and Alpine regions stimulated demands for a similar approach in Europe’s Atlantic zone. Indeed, Atlantic activists, such as the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), perceive themselves as pioneers of ‘macro-regional’ strategic thinking within the EU (CPMR, 2014), pointing out that the idea of a European ‘Atlantic Arc’ region stretching from southern Portugal to northern Scotland (Figure 11.1) was conceived way back in the 1980s and has, over some 25 years, engendered numerous transnational projects within the permanent institutional framework of an Atlantic Arc Commission (AAC) and an Atlantic Area established by the EU to coordinate its regional policy in the zone. This demand for an Atlantic macro-regional entity on a par with others in the EU has been strongly supported by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the EU Committee of the Regions (CoR) and, most significantly, the European Parliament (EP). However, the EU Commission has hitherto resisted such a comprehensive approach for the Atlantic zone, insisting on the need to first assess developments in the initial macro-regions before adopting the same strategy elsewhere.