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Dynamic Games and Applications
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications 2/2022

19-11-2021

A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment

Authors: Fulei Shi, Chuansheng Wang, Cuiyou Yao

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Issue 2/2022

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Abstract

This study conducts a new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management under dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), in which the central government’s punishment to the local government is taken into consideration. Then, we compared the two models under the DPM. Moreover, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise tends to converge to a stable value under the basic model. Notably, when we add the central government’s punishment to the model, the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise will tend to spiral converge to a stable focus. Thus, the new evolutionary game model that we presented is more conducive than the basic model. The central government’s punishment mechanism will take an active role in dealing with industrial pollution problems.
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Metadata
Title
A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment
Authors
Fulei Shi
Chuansheng Wang
Cuiyou Yao
Publication date
19-11-2021
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Dynamic Games and Applications / Issue 2/2022
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Electronic ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00407-x

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