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About this book

This book studies relationship dynamics between National Competent Authorities (NCAs) within two agencies governing the European banking sector: the European Banking Authority and the Single Resolution Board. The analysis centres on NCAs policy preferences and the variety thereof, particularly in the context of banking market fragmentation (Euro area vs. non-Euro area countries/banking union "ins" and "outs"). The focus is not so much on the motivations of these preferences, but on the processes and mechanisms that help reach NCAs consensus on prudential matters. Through an interdisciplinary approach rooted in legal analysis and political economy, the book shows how national actors inform decision-making within European agencies in banking, and whether—and how—the reality of differentiated integration within the internal banking market challenges policy creation.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction

Abstract
Through a brief overview of crisis-driven reforms of Economic and Monetary Union governance, the rationale and progress of agencification therein and an outline of agencies’ basic functions, this chapter details the motivation for studying agencies in European banking and their mode of governance. The chapter introduces the book’s main research question, objectives and methodology design. Bridging a precise lacuna in relevant scholarship, this short volume engages in a systematic, exploratory research of European agencies with competencies in prudential policy-making in order to shed light on the relationship dynamics of National Competent Authorities (NCAs) as part of these regulatory networks. By zooming in on NCAs’ interplay the book determines key drivers of agency governance, offering new knowledge on the actual practices of banking regulation and prudential policy-making.
Marta Božina Beroš

Chapter 2. Agencies in European Banking: Establishing the Theoretical Framework

Abstract
This chapter details the progress of agencification within the European financial and banking sector. It explains how agencies have come to replace pre-existent regulatory entities (networks and committees) within a policy field otherwise resilient to centralization and further delegation of powers to the EU level. It then proceeds to explore the multi-level character of agency governance, through the lens of political economy and bureaucratic politics. By employing a “bottom up” approach the chapter attempts to explain the background to National Competent Authorities’ diverging policy preferences, as well as various modes of coordination.
Marta Božina Beroš

Chapter 3. The European Banking Authority

Abstract
This chapter studies the European Banking Authority (EBA), a decentralized agency tasked with specific microprudential responsibilities in the EU banking sector. By examining the EBA’s institutional and legal background, the chapter first explains the paradigm shift from coordination to centralization in governance and, consequently, the transition from committees to agencies. It then proceeds with the analysis of EBA’s internal governance framework, drawing evidence from founding acts, official documents and policy papers. Special consideration is given to criticism related to the political neutrality of EBA’s executive organs, where national interests were found to dominate. In this regard, the chapter determines whether EBA is indeed subject to “power struggles” and, if so, how they are mitigated and precluded from influencing policy outcomes.
Marta Božina Beroš

Chapter 4. The Single Resolution Board

Abstract
This chapter studies the Single Resolution Board (SRB), an EU agency with sizeable competencies in resolution as a complementary activity to supervision in the broader context of prudential policy. Through a qualitative analysis of legal documents, official texts and relevant scholarship, the chapter first explains that SRB represents an important advancement in agency powers compared to the European Banking Authority. It then proceeds to analyse the formal framework and practical aspects of the Board’s internal governance in order to map National Competent Authorities’ interplay and determine the main weaknesses exhibited by the Board’s executive organs.
Marta Božina Beroš

Chapter 5. Conclusion

Abstract
This book examined the case of two European agencies in the banking sector (the European Banking Authority and the Single Resolution Board) in order to unravel relationship dynamics of National Competent Authorities at agencies’ executive level. It argues that one of the most pressing issues both European agencies face is that of maintaining equality between different subsets of countries (Euro area vs. non-Euro area/Banking Union participants and outsiders). Against this background, this chapter not only summarizes the main findings but also offers a forward-looking perspective to these issues. It reflects on how existing governance mechanisms may be enhanced in order to create a level playing field for all Member States in shaping policy outputs.
Marta Božina Beroš

Backmatter

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