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Published in:
2009 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
An eCK-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol without Random Oracles
Authors : Daisuke Moriyama, Tatsuaki Okamoto
Published in: Provable Security
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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This paper presents a (PKI-based) two-pass authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol that is secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model. The security of the proposed protocol is proven without random oracles (under three assumptions), and relies on no implementation techniques such as a trick by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin (so-called the NAXOS trick). Since an AKE protocol that is eCK-secure under a NAXOS-like implementation trick will be no more eCK-secure if some realistic information leakage occurs through side-channel attacks, it has been an important open problem how to realize an eCK-secure AKE protocol without using the NAXOS tricks (and without random oracles).