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Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit Read chapter Read first chapter

2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Apollo – End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting with Recovery from Vote Manipulation

Authors : Dawid Gaweł, Maciej Kosarzecki, Poorvi L. Vora, Hua Wu, Filip Zagórski

Published in: Electronic Voting

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We present security vulnerabilities in the remote voting system Helios. We propose Apollo, a modified version of Helios, which addresses these vulnerabilities and could improve the feasibility of internet voting.
In particular, we note that Apollo does not possess Helios’ major known vulnerability, where a dishonest voting terminal can change the vote after it obtains the voter’s credential. With Apollo-lite, votes not authorized by the voter are detected by the public and prevented from being included in the tally.
The full version of Apollo enables a voter to prove that her vote was changed. We also describe a very simple protocol for the voter to interact with any devices she employs to check on the voting system, to enable frequent and easy auditing of encryptions and checking of the bulletin board.

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previous chapter Breaching the Privacy of Israel’s Paper Ballot Voting System
next chapter Simulating STV Hand-Counting by Computers Considered Harmful: A.C.T.
Footnotes
1
Apollo is designed so that the terminal cannot tell whether \(n=0\) or \(n >0\).
 
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Metadata
Title
Apollo – End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting with Recovery from Vote Manipulation
Authors
Dawid Gaweł
Maciej Kosarzecki
Poorvi L. Vora
Hua Wu
Filip Zagórski
Copyright Year
2017
Book
Electronic Voting

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-52239-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-52240-1

Copyright Year: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52240-1_8

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