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2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Back-End Bidding for Front-End Negotiation: A Model

Authors : Réal A. Carbonneau, Rustam Vahidov

Published in: Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Negotiations allow parties to exchange offers in search for mutually agreeable solutions. The exchange process is usually flexible and ill-structured and it may involve a set of multiple issues, which may change in the course of negotiation. Auctions, on the other hand feature strict rules regarding bid submission and evaluation. Most of the existing auctions allow for single attribute bids. This paper proposes an approach by which a software agent solution could emulate a multi-attribute negotiation front-end while bidding in single-attribute auction marketplaces. The bidding model is based upon concession-making curve introduced in prior work on electronic negotiations. Using data collected from eBay the paper shows that bidding across several attributes would result in higher utility outcome, and faster results than bidding within a single attribute set.

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Metadata
Title
Back-End Bidding for Front-End Negotiation: A Model
Authors
Réal A. Carbonneau
Rustam Vahidov
Copyright Year
2015
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19515-5_30

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