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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Belenios: A Simple Private and Verifiable Electronic Voting System

Authors : Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Stéphane Glondu

Published in: Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We present the electronic voting protocol Belenios together with its associated voting platform. Belenios guarantees vote privacy and full verifiability, even against a compromised voting server. While the core of the voting protocol was already described and formally proved secure, we detail here the complete voting system from the setup to the tally and the recovery procedures.

We comment on the use of Belenios in practice. In particular, we discuss the security choices made by election administrators w.r.t. the decryption key and the delegation of some setup tasks to the voting platform.

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previous chapter A Multiset Rewriting Model for Specifying and Verifying Timing Aspects of Security Protocols

Belenios – Verifiable online voting system. http://www.belenios.org/

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Title: Belenios: A Simple Private and Verifiable Electronic Voting System
Authors: Véronique Cortier
Pierrick Gaudry
Stéphane Glondu
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-19051-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-19052-1

Copyright Year: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_14

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