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Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 1-2/2023

15-01-2022 | Original Paper

Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules

Authors: Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 1-2/2023

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Abstract

Considering optimal non-linear income tax problems when the social welfare function only depends on ranks as in Yaari (Econometrica 55(1):95–115, 1987) and weights agreeing with the Lorenz quasi-ordering, we extend the analysis of Simula and Trannoy (Am Econ J Econ Policy, 2021) in two directions. First, we establish conditions under which bunching does not occur in the social optimum. We find a sufficient condition on individual preferences, which appears as a reinforcement of the Spence-Mirrlees condition. In particular, the marginal dis-utility of gross income should be convex, but less convex the higher the productivity. We also show that, for all productivity distributions with a log-concave survival function, bunching is precluded under the maximin, Gini, and “illfare-ranked single-series Ginis”. Second, we turn to a discrete population setting, and provide an “ABC” formula for optimal marginal tax rates, which is related to those for a continuum of types found in Simula and Trannoy (2021), but remain essentially distinct.

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Footnotes
1
In the above-mentioned companion paper (Simula and Trannoy 2021), we relax this assumption but focusing on cases in which bunching is assumed away.
 
2
Aaberge (2000) refers to this class as the Lorenz family for \(\delta =2,3,\ldots \). It corresponds to the integer subfamily of the “illfare-ranked single-series Ginis” discussed by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Bossert (1990). We refer to the latter as the “A” family. Aaberge (2009) and Aaberge et al. (2020) have indeed shown the usefulness of this family for analyzing inequality when Lorenz curves intersect.
 
3
Let \(\mu (x)=\left( \int _{0}^{x} x dF(x)\right) /F(x)\) and \(r(x)=(\mu -\mu (x))/\mu \). The Bonferroni inequality index is \(\int _{X} r(x) dF(x)\).
 
4
For every interior p, the cumulated weights are larger in the Bonferroni case than in the Gini one, implying that the former stresses poverty more than the latter.
 
5
Note that z is not bounded from above. This implies that agents always have a possibility to earn sufficiently to pay tax liabilities required from them, and that we do not have to account for a nonnegativity on z when solving the optimal income tax problem. This precludes bunching due to the violation of this nonnegativity constraint, a phenomenon highlighted in Boone and Bovenberg (2007).
 
6
Brett and Weymark (2017) characterize the income tax schedule maximizing the utility of a given agent subject to incentive-compatibility constraints and budget balancedness. Brett and Weymark (2017) themselves rely on Lollivier and Rochet (1983) who present a simple non-linear taxation model in which the agents, with quasi-linear in labor preferences, are indexed by a one-dimensional parameter.
 
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Metadata
Title
Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules
Authors
Laurent Simula
Alain Trannoy
Publication date
15-01-2022
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 1-2/2023
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01384-1

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