Top

Published in:

2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

9. Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to Effective Antitrust Enforcement?

Author : Florence Thépot

Published in: Competition Law Compliance Programmes

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config

AI-assisted search

Off

Abstract

This chapter discusses the significance of corporate compliance programmes as a competition enforcement tool. Current enforcement challenges in the fight against collusive practices that are, a low probability of detection and under-deterrence of corporate fines, raise the need to move away from a strictly sanction-based type of enforcement. It is argued that competition authorities should steer companies’ incentives towards implementing effective compliance programmes. Rewarding effective compliance programmes in the context of an investigation can improve the effectiveness of corporate sanctions in providing ex ante incentives to companies to deter and detect illegal behaviour internally. Outlining the key foundations of an effective compliance programme, this chapter also helps understanding how and when competition authorities should reward the compliance efforts of companies.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

previous chapter Compliance and Individual Sanctions in the Enforcement of Competition Law

next chapter Legal Incentives for Compliance Programmes: Stick or Carrot?

Angelucci and Han (2010), p. 2. Compliance programmes broadly refer to all of the management tools used to prevent and detect misconduct. Murphy (2011), pp. 14–15.

The UK: Guidance provided by the CMA: OFT (2011); France: Autorité de la Concurrence (2012a); The EU: European Commission (DG COMP) (2012).

Although in the 1980s and 1990s the Commission granted some fine reduction in export ban and abuse of dominance cases. E.g. National Panasonic, European Commission (1982), para 68; Napier Brown - British Sugar, European Commission (1988), para 86. However, British Sugar was later involved in a cartel, and its compliance programme was considered as an aggravating factor: European Commission (1998), para 208.

US Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2012) §8C2.5 Culpability Score, (f) Effective Compliance and Ethics Program.

US Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2012) §8A1.2 Narrow circumstances under which the involvement of senior executives does not rule out the possibility of being credited for an effective compliance programme. Chapter 8, (f)(3)(C)(i) and §11.

3 U.S. v. Barclays Plc, No. 3: 15-cr-00077-SRU, Plea agreement, available at http://www.justice.gov/file/440481/download; U.S. v. Kayaba Industry Co., Ltd, d/b/a KYB Corporation, Plea agreement available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/791911/download No information as to the actual content of the programme is given.

Anti-corruption legislation is defined at EU level by a framework decision of the Council. Council of the European Union (2003), art 5-6. Member States are free to implement measures in order to achieve the required goals set out in the decision.

DoJ ‘Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA’ (April 2012) Press release available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html.’

This section is an adapted version of a contribution to Lianos et al. (2014).

Empirical studies estimated a probability of detection of between 13 and 17 % of cartels that were eventually detected. See: 1. Bryant and Eckard (1991); Combe et al. (2008), 2. Wils also concludes that based on such a probability of getting caught, the deterrent level of the fine would be about 150 % of the annual turnover in the products affected by the infringement (Wils 2002).

Based on a game theoretical approach—and does not impact on ethics within companies.

See empirical studies by C. Marvao showing how repeat offenders reap larger benefits from leniency (Marvão 2015).

The ICC provides a whole range of practical solutions to implement an effective compliance programme, relevant not only to large companies, but also to those of a much smaller size with constrained resources. Also, for example, J. Murphy proposes an organisation of compliance to small companies for “a Dollar a Day” that meets the principles set out in the US Sentencing Guidelines and OECD Good Practice Guidance (Murphy 2012).

Abrantes-Metz, R., Bajari, P., & Murphy, J. (2010). Enhancing compliance programs through antitrust screening. The Antitrust Counselor, 4(5).

Almunia, J. (2011). Speech/11/268 from 14 Apr 2011.

Angelucci, C., & Han, M. A. (2010). Monitoring managers through corporate compliance programs. Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-14.

Arlen, J. (1994). The potentially perverse effects of corporate criminal liability. The Journal of Legal Studies, 23(2), 833–867.CrossRef

Autorité de la Concurrence. (2012a). Antitrust compliance and compliance programmes, Corporate tools for competing safely in the market place. Paris.

Autorité de la Concurrence. (2012b). Framework-Document of 10 February 2012 on Antitrust Compliance Programmes. Available from http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/framework_document_compliance_10february2012.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2016.

Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217.CrossRef

Bryant, P. G., & Eckard, E. W. (1991). Price fixing: The probability of getting caught. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 531.CrossRef

Combe, E., Monnier, C., & Legal, R. (2008). Cartels: The probability of getting caught in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Research papers.

Council of the European Union. (2003). Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector. Official Journal of the European Union L192/54.

Department of Justice (DoJ). (1993). Corporate Leniency Policy.

European Commission. (1982). National Panasonic Case COMP IV/30.070, Decision no. 82/853/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union L284/41.

European Commission. (1988). Napier Brown – British Sugar Case COMP IV/30.178, Decision no. 88/518/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union L284/41.

European Commission. (1998). British Sugar plc Case COMP IV/F-3/33.708, Tate & Lyle plc Case COMP IV/F-3/33.709, Napier Brown & Company Ltd Case COMP IV/F-3/33.710, James Budgett Sugars Ltd Case COMP IV/F-3/33.711. Decision no. 1999/210/EC. Official Journal of the European Union L076/01.

European Commission (DG Competition). (2012). Compliance matters, What companies can do better to respect EU competition rules. Brussels.

Geradin, D. (2013). Antitrust compliance programmes & optimal antitrust enforcement: A reply to Wouter Wils. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1(2), 18.CrossRef

Global Compliance News. (2014). Italy: Competition Compliance programs a mitigating factor for fines imposed by the Italian Antitrust Authority, 4 Nov 2016. Available from http://globalcompliancenews.com/italy-competition-compliance-20141104/. Accessed 10 April 2016.

Lianos, I., Jenny, F., Wagner von Papp, F., Motchenkova, E., David, E., Thépot, F., Massman, J., and Strader, M.J. (2014). Just and Optimal Financial Penalties for Infringement of Competition Law: A Comparative Analysis. Project Report. UCL Faculty of Laws, London.

Marvão, C. (2015). The EU leniency programme and recidivism. Review of Industrial Organization, 48(1), 1–27.CrossRef

Murphy, J. E. (2011). In OECD, Policy Roundtable, Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, 14-15. Report available from: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetitionlaw2011.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2016.

Murphy, J. E. (2012). A compliance & ethics program on a dollar a day: How small companies can have effective programs. Available from: http://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/ResourceOverview/CEProgramDollarADay-Murphy.pdf. Accessed 12 April 2016.

Murphy, J. E. (2013). Making the sentencing guidelines message complete. Available from: http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20130801/Public_Comment_Murphy_Proposed_Priorities.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2016.

OFT. (2011). How your business can achieve compliance with competition law. OFT1340, London.

OFT. (2012). OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty. OFT423, London.

Parker, C., & Gilad, S. (2011). Internal corporate compliance management systems: Structure, culture and agency. In C. Parker & V. Lehmann Nielsen (Eds.), Explaining compliance: Business responses to regulation. Edward Elgar.

Posner, R. A. (1976). Antitrust law: An economic perspective (p. 225). University of Chicago Press. In Wils (2002) The optimal enforcement of EC antitrust law (p. 200). Kluwer Law International.

Snyder, B. (2015). Speech at the Sixth Annual Chicago Forum on International Antitrust, 08.06.2015. Available from http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-brent-snyder-delivers-remarks-sixth-annual-chicago. Accessed 10 April 2016.

Sokol, D. (2012). Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement. Antitrust Law Journal, 78, 202.

Stephan, A., & Nikpay, A. (2015). Leniency decision-making from a corporate perspective: Complex realities. In C. Beaton-Wells & C. Tran (Eds.), Anti-Cartel enforcement in a contemporary age: Leniency religion. London: Hart Publishing.

Thépot, F. (2015). Antitrust v. anti-corruption policy approaches to compliance: Why such a gap?. Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 6(2).

United States Attorney’s Manual. (2008). 9-28.400, Special Policy Concerns. Available from: http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. Accessed 10 April 2016.

US Sentencing Guidelines Manual. (2012). United States Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C.

Wils, W. P. J. (2002). The optimal enforcement of EC antitrust law (p. 200). Kluwer Law International.

Wils, W. P. J. (2013). Antitrust compliance programmes and optimal antitrust enforcement. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1, 52–81.CrossRef

Title: Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to Effective Antitrust Enforcement?
Author: Florence Thépot
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Competition Law Compliance Programmes
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-44632-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-44633-2

Copyright Year: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44633-2_9