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2011 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

Author : Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer

Published in: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision

Publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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How to induce trading partners to make relationship-specific investments is a central theme in the contract-theoretic literature. A party may have insufficient incentives to make non-contractible investments if it fears that it will be held up by its partner in the future. This hold-up problem is an important ingredient of the incomplete contracting approach, which has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.

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previous chapter The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures
next chapter Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Metadata
Title
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
Author
Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Copyright Year
2011
Book
Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision

Print ISBN: 978-3-658-24132-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-658-24133-9

Copyright Year: 2011

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_5