5. Challenges Towards the Implementation and Functioning of the CPEC

Rashid (2012), Hussain (2007), Riedel (2009, June 23), Gul (2010), Lieven (2011), and Bano (2012).

Also known as ‘Azad Kashmir’ or Free [Azad] Jammu and Kashmir.

The ‘partition’ refers to the territorial division of British Colonial India, which gave rise to the independent states of Pakistan and India on 14 and 15 August 1947 respectively (Mitra, Wolf, & Schöttli, 2006, p. 328).

The Gilgit Scouts were a paramilitary force raised by the British colonial ruler in 1889 and deployed in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

For more details, see ‘the India-Pakistan Question’ in the United Nations, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Chap. 8: Consideration of ‘Questions under the Council’s Responsibility for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security’ [1946–1951], pp. 344–352. See: http://​www.​un.​org/​en/​sc/​repertoire/​46-51/​Chapter%20​8/​46-51_​08-16-The%20​India-Pakistan%20​question.​pdf

As per the Population of Baluchistan Census 2017, http://​www.​pakinformation.​com/​population/​Baluchistan.​html

Baluchistan possesses a remarkable amount of both metallic and non-metallic minerals: Antimony Ore, Barytes, Chromite Ore, Coal, Copper, Fluorite, Gypsum, Anhydrite, Iron Ore, Lead-Zinc Ore, Limestone, Magnesite, Marble, Quartzite, Sand, Gravel, Sulfur.

The highest incidence of poverty in Pakistan prevails in Baluchistan, where more than half (52%) of the households live in poverty. The situation becomes worse when one considers the urban-rural divide: rural Baluchistan has the highest incidence of poverty in Pakistan, where three-quarters of the total households (74%) living below the poverty line and 29% of the households living below the power line. Urban poverty in Baluchistan is much lower than that occurring in the countryside (Naveed & Ali, 2012, p. 19).

For example, higher representation in the National Assembly, restructuring of the constituencies (especially the creation or more and smaller ones), new (fair) system for the distribution of revenue, among others.

Since independence, the Pakistani state and Baloch nationalists had already fought on four occasions—in 1948, 1958, 1962, and 1973–1977 (Grare, 2013, p. 25). Currently, Baluchistan is witnessing the fifth insurgency movement.

It is reported that in 2013 and 2014, around 700 people were killed in political violence (Surya & Tiba, 2015, March 19). In 2014, Xinjiang witnessed a total of 27,164 arrests, a 95% increase from 2013 (Abuza, 2017, August 15). Furthermore, Chinese courts convicted 712 suspects for the incitement of separatism, terrorism and related charges (Abuza, 2017, August 15). In 2015, that number jumped to 1419.

Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, many Uyghurs left China and migrated to Pakistan (RFA, 2010, April 6).

Another large Uyghur militant group is the Turkestan Islamic Party (Hizb al Islam al Turkestani), aiming to establish a territorial entity that stretches beyond the borders of today’s Xinjiang (Pantucci & Schwarck, 2014).

According to Chinese officials, about 300 Uyghurs from Xinjiang joined IS (Surya & Tiba, 2015, March 19).

It is believed that one of the main suspects belongs to Turkey’s Grew Wolves, a neo-fascist organisation in Turkey (Sherwell, 2015, August 29).

Uyghurs with fake Turkish passports were also found in other countries, for example 155 in Malaysia in October 2014. China claims that Turkish diplomats in South Asia had facilitated the illegal movement of Uyghurs (Reuters, 2015b, January 14).

Because of the rather competitive than cooperative relationship between al-Qaeda and Islamic State as well as the local focus of the Taliban.

According to the latest available surveys, the number of the Uyghur fighters in Syria are running in high hundreds or even thousands (Ali, 2016b, March 2; Pantucci, 2016a, September 1).

Initially, their preferred to use knifes.

See for the increasing significance of the Crime-Terror Nexus in detail, see Basra, Neumann, & Brunner (2016).

Also in the Cambodian case of 2009, where a group of ethnic Uyghurs who had sought political asylum, got returned to China, international responses remained on a relatively moderate level (RFA, 2010, April 6).

Summer of 2015.

The inaugural issue of Resurgence, a new jihadist magazine published in English by al-Qaeda’s media arm, As-Sahab (‘The Cloud’) Media, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region, describes ‘East Turkistan’ as an ‘occupied Muslim land’ to be ‘recovered [into] the shade of the Islamic Caliphate’ (Resurgence, 2014, p. 50).

The FATF intergovernmental organisation was founded in 1989 so as to develop policies designed to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combatting money laundering and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system. Since 9/11, the FATF focuses on preventing terrorist financing. For more information, see http://​www.​fatf-gafi.​org/​about/​historyofthefatf​/​

In cooperation with the FATF and the International Co-operation Review Group (ICRG), Pakistan negotiated an ‘26-point action plan’ to address strategic deficiencies in the country’s anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing regime. This process put Pakistan on the grey-list but was a necessary step to avoid an immediate black-listing. However, if Pakistan fails to implement the action plan’s commitments, which includes measures like ‘squelching of finances of Jamaatud Dawa, Falah-i-Insaniat, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban’ (Syed, 2018a, June 29), blacklisting will be a very likely consequence.

Following the suppression by the military, the MRD reassembled as the ‘Alliance for Restoration of Democracy’ and contributed successfully to the ousting of former COAS General and then President Pervez Musharraf in 2007 (Mitra et al., 2006, pp. 242–243, 289).

Imran Khan is a chairman of the PTI, the Pakistan Movement for Justice. Critics say that the philosophy of pursing justice has gone bankrupt. Instead, the party adopted extreme political points of view, especially developed a ‘soft-corner’ towards Islamic fundamentalism (Wolf, 2013f, April 19).

For more details on Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri and his movement, see Wolf (2013j, February 8).

A hard-line religious party belonging to the Barelvi sect of Islam (Masood, 2017, November 27). Available at https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2017/​11/​27/​world/​asia/​islamabad-protesters-blasphemy-deal.​html

Regarding regional imbalances in Pakistan, see also Sect. 4.​1.​7.

Regarding the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2013, 91% of the population in Pakistan think corruption is a problem, even a serious one. Moreover, 72% of the population believes that the level of corruption in Pakistan increased. Only 16% think the anti-corruption efforts of the government are effective (Martini, 2016, p. 3). Nearly half respondents admitted they paid a bribe for public services in the last 12 months, as the 2017 GCB survey showed (Pring, 2017, p. 8).

The Constitution of Pakistan provides for certain ‘Fundamental Rights’ which are available and enforceable against the federal state. Neither the central government (federation) or Parliament can act or pass any law contrary to or in violation of Fundamental Rights which may result in unequal or discriminatory or arbitrary treatment. The country’s Public Procurement Policy is based on such principles and aims to achieve transparency and equal treatment for bidders. State authorities decided to establish a Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) at the federal level, under the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002—followed by promulgation of Public Procurement Rules in 2004. Muhammad Saqlain Arshad points out that the PPRA is an autonomous body responsible for recommending laws and regulations governing public procurements. It is also responsible for monitoring the application of procurement laws and regulations as well as the performance of federal procuring agencies aiming to improve governance, management, transparency. Provincial Governments have independent Acts and Rules of Public Procurement for provincially owned entities (Arshad, 2017, July 4).

The media was forced to stop critical reporting on the army’s involvement in the country’s politics and economy.

There is an an-going debate about how far the civilians ever had a chance to establish effective control over the armed forces and exercise their legitimate rights for political decision-making and running the affairs of the state. Here some argue that civilians never had either a realistic chance or the opportunity to establish functional oversight mechanisms, for example over the bureaucracy. However, others state that periods in the country’s history did exist in which civilians had the power to exercise a substantial amount of decision-making power, suh as during Prime Minister office of Nawaz Sharif’s second term (1997–1999). However, due to corruption and autocratic tendencies by civilian leaders, it is argued that the military was forced to intervene in order to protect the country’s stability, a rationale which came to be known as the ‘doctrine of necessity’. For more information, see Wolf (2012a).

Understood as a praetorian regime dominated by the military, a coalition of the military and bureaucracy, or a coalition of military, civilian politicians and technocratic groups (Kukreja, 1989, p. 163).

Especially Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to initiate a normalisation of the relations with India so as to open an opportunity for more economic interaction was blocked by the military (Aljazeera, 2018, May 23; Shams, 2015a, December 25).

Such resources and opportunities can include the transfer of state-land to military personnel; resources spent on providing perks and privileges for retired armed forces personnel, such as the provision of support staff, exclusive club memberships, subsidies on utility bills and travel; diverting business opportunities to armed forces personnel or the military organisation by flouting norms of the free-market economy; or money for training of personnel who seek early retirement in order to join the private sector (Siddiqa, 2009, p. 5).

Each of them functions as a subsidiary of one of the three branches of the military. The Fauji Foundation is directly subordinated to the MoD.

A struggle which obviously seems to continue under the new PM Iran Khan after the 2018 elections.

Insufficient human resources combined with rampant corruption leads to failure of numerous development initiatives, like the ‘Yellow Cab Scheme, ‘Green Tractor Scheme’, ‘Karachi Mass Transit Project’, ‘Ghazi Barotha Hydropower Project’ and even the earlier attempt to conduct the ‘Motorway Project’ among others (Faisal & Jafri, 2017, p. 62).

Reportedly, some of the washing out of bridges create halt on traffic up to more than a month (Hodge, 2013, June 30).

For example, the earthquake on 4 June 2010, loose a mountainside next to the KKH, which tumbled onto the road and dammed the Hunza River, 100 km from the Chinese border. Subsequently, during the next months, a 100-m deep lake appeared (Attabad Lake) which immerged around 27 km of the road bringing the transport of goods in both direction to a halt (Hodge, 2013, June 30).

The Khunjerab Pass remains traditionally closed from December 1 to April 1 due to harsh weather conditions prevailing in the region (Mir, 2016, December 6; Wolf, 2016d, September 13).

Another harsh reality for Pakistan is that most of its logistic companies are equipped with old fashioned vehicles for cargo transport, unfit for a smooth flow of goods to China through the rugged, high-altitude terrain (Wolf, 2016d, September 13).