8. Challenging Heteronormativity: Sexual Citizenship, the Family, and Social Justice in Kosovo

Similar to the situation in Montenegro (see the chapter on Montenegro in this book), the contemporary social and political landscape in Kosovo could be classified as ‘proto-anti-gender’ (Petričević, this volume). There are discourses that align with typical anti-gender frames, but none of them explicitly depict ‘gender ideology’ or the concept of ‘gender’ as a threat to the Kosovar nation, its families, or its future. However, unlike in Montenegro, where the main channel for the export of ‘anti-gender’ campaigns to Montenegro is the Serbian Orthodox Church, this dynamic cannot be replicated in Kosovo due to ethnic politics and national ideologies that construct the Serbian nation as the ‘Other’, Furthermore, the Catholic Church, another source of anti-gender campaigns in the region, is relatively unimportant in terms of framing public debates as it represents a small religious community in Kosovo.

This specific religious composition in Kosovo, where the majority of the population are Muslims, and its specific political situation in relation to Serbia, seems to be, at the moment, a key factor preventing the entrenchment of anti-gender frames. Nonetheless, elements of these frames, currently manifesting primarily as anti-LGBTIQ + rhetoric, are circulating in Kosovo and represent potentially volatile ideas that could soon be integrated into broader anti-gender politics of fear.

Against this backdrop, this chapter looks at how the ‘heteronormative rationale’ limits the sexual citizenship, human rights, and social justice of the LGBTIQ + community in Kosovo by looking at the legal recognition of same-sex unions in Kosovo’s Civil Code, which is in the process of revision. It maps out the dominant discourses and actors opposing same-sex unions, pointing out the potentials for future anti-gender mobilisations, and showing how the current proto-anti-gender rhetoric poses threats for social justice, freedom, and democratic futures in Kosovo and beyond. The chapter shows that same-sex unions have become a site of contentious politics, a litmus test for democracy and public deliberations, and deep-seated fears and limitations of difference, equality, rights, and social justice within hetero-nationalist matrices. Moreover, the issue of same-sex unions brought to the fore the forces that had lain dormant and scattered among the different structures of society and institutions, which were able to mobilise on a whim and speak with one anti-LGBTIQ + voice. In this context, we see the potential for anti-gender mobilisations in Kosovo. Similar situations in other former Yugoslav republics have shown a progression from conservative anti-homosexual stances to broader neoconservative opposition to gender equality politics in general.

In scholarship on Kosovo since 1999, sexuality and gender identity have seldom taken centre stage. Very few texts (Rexhepi, 2016, 2017) have specifically focused on LGBTIQ + issues, most encompassing them within the broad spectrum of human rights discourses, institution-building, the relationship between Kosovo and the international community, and trans rights activism (Limani, 2022). Nevertheless, such accounts have provided important knowledge on LGBTIQ + rights and movements in Kosovo. However, there is a critical need for scholarship that addresses mobilisation around LGBTIQ + rights. This chapter takes same-sex unions as the primary domain of investigation, in an attempt to fill the gap and contribute to knowledge production on LGBTIQ + rights and same-sex unions in Kosovo. Focusing on law-making discussions on sex unions, the text highlights and critiques mobilisation against LGBTIQ + rights that jeopardises democratic values, diversity, and human rights, and creates an exclusively heterosexual habitus shaped by religious values.

The chapter draws upon critical discourse analysis methodology (van Dijk, 2015) to account for how mobilisation in opposition to same-sex unions has unfolded in the processes of legal and parliamentary deliberations of Kosovo’s Civil Code. The main aim of the discourse analysis is to frame critique and analyse power and ideology across the structures, actors, and practices within the broader institutional and social setting concerning same-sex unions and LGBTIQ + rights in Kosovo. The chapter is structured into three main sections and a conclusion. The first section offers a brief overview of sexual citizenship and human rights. It highlights some of the key legal and institutional practices concerning LGBTIQ + rights. This sets the scene for a discussion of LGBTIQ + activism and advocacy on human rights, in particular on same-sex unions. The following section presents an overview of the process of public deliberations on the Civil Code and the positionality of anti-LGBTIQ + actors. It highlights the dominant anti-LGBTIQ + discourses and frames related to same-sex unions and LGBTIQ + rights and points to parallels with anti-gender discourses as they appear in the region and beyond. In the conclusion, the chapter highlights the centrality that the traditional family trope and hetero-nationalism assume in the anti-same-sex union policy and the limits it poses to democratic envisioning premised on human rights and social justice.

Citizenship and human rights have been dominant themes in post-war and post-independence Kosovo. State identity discourses draw on European identity and liberal values as civic and citizenship rights for all ethnic groups living in Kosovo. As such, they have reinforced discourses on citizenship and multi-ethnicity, institutionalised by the Kosovo state. Yet, as Diane Richardson has argued, ‘access to citizenship is a process of public and personal orientation towards certain practices, values, bodies, and relationships’ (Richardson, 2017, 3). This brings to attention the relevance of citizenship in the study of LGBTIQ + rights. As feminist theorists have argued, citizenship is a contested concept. Nira Yuval-Davis and Pnina Werbner (1999) have contended that while citizenship is, on the one hand, jural and procedural, on the other, it is defined by residence, by exclusive, homogenised space, often arbitrarily defined and circumscribed ‘territory’. They maintain that ‘democratic citizenship as a social and political construct opens up spaces and arenas for freedom but also for conflict, unpredictability, intimacy, and the right to be different’ (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999, 2). Moreover, Richardson highlights the fact that ‘the “sexual” is important and is deeply embedded in constructions of citizenship, and that “sexual citizenship” intersects with aspects of citizenship that go beyond the sexual encompassing of sexual practices, identities, and relationships’ (2017, 19), emphasising the need to inquire into how ‘heteronormativity underpins citizenship and the models that reproduce sexual inequalities and privileges’ (Richardson, 2017, 2).

As a form of reality, sexuality in Kosovo has long been repressed and excluded from public discourse. Nonetheless, sexuality has emerged in the new economy of power. The diverse spectrum of gender and sexual identities has occupied a space in both the legal framework and social policy. This is in part aligned with the human rights discourses that draw on liberal values and civic and citizenship rights, and are part of the ‘Europeanisation’ agenda of Kosovo (Rexhepi, 2016). The Kosovo Constitution guarantees and grants rights to LGBTIQ + individuals, stating that ‘everyone should enjoy equal rights regardless of their personal circumstances, including sexual orientation and gender’ (Kosovo Assembly, 2008, Article 24).¹ Moreover, a set of laws deriving from the Kosovo Constitution make specific references to non-discrimination on gender and sexual identity grounds.²

While the legal guarantees are very important, there is a need to attend to ‘the everyday interaction, practices, and experiences of sexuality’ (Richardson, 2017, 9). This is of paramount importance for how sexual citizenship, human rights, and social justice are practiced across the board, more precisely by minding the gap between de jure and de facto equalities. While LGBTIQ + communities in Kosovo are legally recognised and formally granted human rights, the gap between de jure and de facto remains wide. A case in point that illustrates the gap between the de jure and de facto gap, among many others, is that of Blert Morina, a transgender man, LGBTIQ + leader and activist, who set about challenging Kosovo formal institutions in an attempt to claim his full citizenship right of changing his name from female to male; from the feminine Blerta to masculine Blert. Morina’s request was approved by the Court in Prishtina in 2022, after a two-year struggle to exercise the basic human right to change the name and sex determination. After two years of limbo, the court decision was hailed as a ‘landmark victory for transgender rights’ in Kosovo (Halili, 2020).

Moreover, widening the gap between de jure and de facto rights is also the legal divergence between the Kosovo Constitution on the freedom of marriage. While the Kosovo Constitution guarantees the freedom of marriage (Kosovo Assembly, 2008, Article 37), the family law limits marriage exclusively to heterosexual couples (Kosovo Assembly, 2004, Article 14), thus rendering same-sex unions legally impossible. This in fact contradicts the principle of equality and non-discrimination guaranteed by the Kosovo Constitution (2008), a central theme under consideration here.

Kosovo’s legal protections for the LGBTIQ + community are in stark contrast with its homophobic environment. Similar to other countries in the post-Yugoslav space, in Kosovo the majority of citizens think that LGBTIQ + ideas are a Western import (ERA, 2023, 19). Negative attitudes towards LGBTIQ + individuals persist, with the LGBTIQ + community facing widespread homophobia and transphobia. Outside the legal realm, in everyday life, the LGBTIQ + community faces discrimination in employment, housing, education, healthcare, and access to social services (CSGD and CEL, 2016; ERA, 2023), with LGBTIQ + individuals intentionally reducing the visibility of their sexual orientation and gender identity as a result (YIHR, 2013, 7). In Kosovo, there is intense social pressure to perform heteronormatively, and any departure from heteronormative ‘signs’ and ‘conduct’ is severely judged and individuals are ostracised. Thus, LGBTIQ + people hide their sexuality, and tend to mimic heterosexual norms (USAID, 2016, 19). The LGBTIQ + community is perceived as a ‘sickness’, and this perception is particularly widespread in Kosovo (ERA, 2023, 14). A vast majority (81%) of LGBTIQ + people have reported having experienced harassment or abuse due to their sexual orientation or gender identity (ILGA 2016, 98) and they are subjected to hate speech (European Commission, 2023, 36). When such cases are reported, they are rarely investigated, or, in instances where investigation takes place, they are often biased (European Commission, 2015, 23; CSGD, 2016). In addition, school textbooks often contain discriminatory language, serving to reinforce the view that the notions of sexual orientation and gender identities not conforming to the heteronormative identity are forms of social deviance (YIHR, 2017, 4).

Sexuality, and gender identity in particular, is a form of social reality. Theorising social relations in Kosovo, as elsewhere, one cannot help but notice how heterosexuality encodes everyday life. Indeed, heterosexuality is deeply institutionalised within society and culture. Such structural heteronormativity provides ample space for homophobia, which sees Kosovo occupying the unenviable position of having the highest level of homophobia among societies in the post-Yugoslav space (CEL, 2017, 37; ERA, 2023). Women’s collective mobilisations have entailed protests against gender-based violence, sexual harassment, and femicide, and, of late, has also turned its attention to LGBTIQ + rights. Largely as the result of a generational shift, the women’s movement is being redefined in terms of gender justice principles through feminist standpoints and epistemologies that see gender equality, women’s rights, and LGBTIQ + rights as indivisible.

The first LGBTIQ + groups in Kosovo emerged in 2002, with organisations such as Elysium and Qendra për Zhvillim të Grupeve Shoqërore – Centre for Social Group Development (CSGD) being among the first to be registered as non-governmental organisations, followed by Qendra për Emancipim Shoqëror – Centre for Social Emancipation (QESh), established in 2005 (CEL, 2017, 25). The LGBTIQ + movement is an organised network of organisations and individuals strongly connected with the feminist movement. Currently, there are three major LGBTIQ + organisations: the CSGD, the Centre for Equality and Liberty (CEL), and Dylberizëm. These are all active members of civil society, engaging in advocacy and awareness-raising, as well as legal and social service provision for LGBTIQ + communities in Kosovo.

In October 2017, under the slogan ‘In the Name of Love’, Kosovo was making history with the first Pride Parade ever to be held in its capital city Prishtina, celebrating LGBTIQ + persons as well as hosting a number of protests against homophobia and transphobia. The Pride Parade was attended by hundreds of people, making queer identities visible in an unprecedented way. It took place peacefully, signalling a cultural and political shift in sexual politics and human rights in Kosovo. The Pride Parade stood against the invisibility of non-heteronormative subjectivities, thereby showing that sexuality is no longer a private affair but a human rights issue. The organisers of the Pride Parade accommodated a wider involvement of activists in the events accompanying the parade, such as the campaign on reporting hate crimes against the LGBTIQ + community, the Queer Night, and panel discussions on the state of affairs of the LGBTIQ + community in Kosovo and in the region. The parade was also attended by high-level Kosovo politicians and diplomats (Prishtina Insight, 2017). This has continued every year with the organisation of the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia, and Transphobia and the Pride Week. Subsequent Pride marches have been celebrated by hundreds of citizens participating in the main square of Prishtina, with no recorded incidents.

In the domain of civil society activism, there is a rise in the LGBTIQ + movement in Kosovo. Indeed, LGBTIQ + rights and activism have become socially more visible in the public sphere. This is to be understood within the purview of debates about human rights and general discourses on gender equality. LGBTIQ + activism seeks equality in citizenship by looking at the interlocking systems of oppression based on gender, sex, sexuality, ethnicity, class, and ability. These conditions have provided a complex ground for the LGBTIQ + movement, as it finds itself faced by the multiple structures of domination and oppression. The LGBTIQ + organisations have brought to attention not only the social invisibility of LGBTIQ + persons but also the gender norms and heterosexual normativity of the state and its various regulatory practices. LGBTIQ + activism has challenged the heteronormative conceptions of citizenship and exclusionary practices at the legal and institutional level, within symbolic systems, and in everyday life.

In 2022, Prishtina hosted the European Nomadic Manifesta 14 Art Biennal, founded in the early 1990s with the goal of rethinking collaborative ways of interaction between culture and civic society, to enquire and instigate social change in partnership with the host city and its communities (Manifesta14, 2021). Within the Manifesta 2014 Art Biennal in Prishtina in 2022, LGBTIQ + intimacy took centre stage in the work of SEKHMET Institute and the artist Orange Girl: a large piece of street art in the form of a mural was painted on the wall of the University of Prishtina’s Faculty of Philosophy, which depicts Mustafa and Qerkica, a gay man with a disability and a transgender woman of Ashkali ethnicity, who have lived together for many years (see Image 1). The artists have called for ‘reflection on what those who have been cast aside can teach us if we are willing to listen, to challenge the marginalisation and erasure of gender, sexual, and ethnic minorities in/from public spaces, and to learn about respect, solidarity, and common humanity’ (Dylberizëm, 2022). The day before the mural was to be inaugurated, it had been vandalised with black colour thrown at the mural (Koha Ditore, 2022). The mural was swiftly restored by the artist and it still stands untouched on the Faculty of Philosophy building. The representations of LGBTIQ + subjectivities like the mural as well as the legal discourse on gender and sexual identity along with LGBTQ + civil society activism and its advocacy on LGBTIQ + rights do not go unchallenged. Let us now delve deeper into the dynamics of anti-LGBTIQ + mobilisation by focusing on the topic of same-sex unions.

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The regimes of heterosexuality, termed as ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ (Rich, 1980) or the ‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler, 1990) define, shape, and reproduce gender norms. Gender equality has been constantly challenged by discourses premised on tradition, morality, family values, and natural law. However, recently anti-gender campaigns have appeared in a novel guise and at the transnational level. Anti-gender campaigns are, as Kuhar and Paternotte (2017, 253) contend are, ‘neither mere national trends nor isolated occurrences, but are part of an organised transnational – and increasingly global – phenomenon’. Anti-gender movement discourses and practices are anchored in a framing of heteronormativity, a push towards illiberal norms and values, de-democratisation and de-railing of human rights, and misuse and misrepresentation of gender studies. As such, anti-gender movements thrive in the political contexts of authoritarianism, corruption, informality, low levels of social trust, and inefficient welfare institutions. Hence anti-gender mobilisation manifests itself as an attack on democracy, human rights and freedoms. Anti-gender spreads across both formal and informal domains of social life: it can be discerned in the rhetoric and discourses around gender and sexuality enveloped in the calls for return/adherence to traditional gender norms, heterosexual complementarity, and morality defined in relation to religious beliefs.

A case in point is the transnational anti-gender movement’s opposition to the Istanbul Convention (Council of Europe, 2011), which has come under strong attack in some Eastern European countries from the far-right and nationalist conservatives opposing gender equality and LGBTIQ + rights and promoting pronatalist politics. In Kosovo, however, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention was unanimously voted for by Kosovo MPs in September 2020, and no major anti-gender voices were heard in the public sphere. However, in the opposing discourse in the marriage equality debate in Kosovo, there are ‘proto-anti-gender’ elements that currently present themselves as anti-LGBTIQ + frames (or broader ‘anti-justice’ frames) but have the potential to be soon subsumed under the threat of ‘gender ideology’, as has happened elsewhere in the region. The anti-gender potential is to be discerned in the hate speech directed at gender equality and victim-blaming for gender-based violence, femicide, and domestic violence (Haxholli, 2022, 10). Moreover, in Kosovo anti-LGBTIQ + discourse largely portrays queer persons ‘as a shameful and direct threat to humanity’ and ‘the main transmitters of sexually transmitted infections/diseases’ (Haxholli, 2022, 12). Social and online media are the most common platforms for spreading hate speech and inciting hate crimes (CSGD, 2023, 12). Attacks on reproductive rights and the slow work against abortion and medically assisted pregnancy are the other currents of potential anti-gender mobilisation in Kosovo. Another important factor in this context is the fact that public discourse on the position of the religious institutions has intensified in recent years. Religious groups – the majority of Kosovo Albanians are Muslims, but there are Catholic and Eastern Orthodox minorities – have been given little say in connection with post-war political developments and state-building policies. Yet some of the demands for the construction of mosques and cathedrals (Krasniqi, 2014, 151–152) have been already accommodated; the demand for the introduction of compulsory religious instruction in primary schools has been floated, and today the attention is shifting towards gender and sexuality issues.

Feminist and LGBTIQ + movements and gender equality are being challenged by traditional ideologies and gender norms that push back against gender equality, women’s rights, and LGBTIQ + rights. Such ‘anti-justice’ discourses, which mimic anti-gender rhetoric elsewhere but not yet frame it as ‘gender ideology’, are discerned in legal and policy-making deliberations related to the rights of LGBTIQ + persons. A case in point is the opposition to marriage equality in the proposed new Kosovo Civil Code, which was rejected by the Kosovo Parliament in 2022.

The unfolding of the process of the revision of the Kosovo Civil Code is an important facet in the bringing-to-light of the nascent stages of the anti-gender movement in the making. Let us provide here a brief history of the process of the amendment of the Kosovo Civil Code. In 2014, the Ministry of Justice initiated the process of civil code revision, establishing a State Commission to work on the Civil Code. From that point until now, a decade later, five governments have changed, but the process of rewriting the Civil Code has not been concluded. The civil code project, although initiated in 2014, was not included in the government’s legislative agenda until 2017. In that year, however, while the civil code project was indeed listed, it was not presented to the Kosovo Parliament as planned. The same situation occurred with the government’s agenda in 2018, where, despite the intention to do so, the Civil Code was not submitted to the Parliament for approval. In 2019, the Civil Code was absent from the legislative agenda of that calendar year. With Albin Kurti’s second Government taking office, the process of (re-)drafting the Civil Code resumed in mid-2022, and has thus far proven to be a challenging endeavour, sparking contentious anti-LGBTIQ + politics that have delayed the process even further.

The issue that has sparked the most debate in Kosovo is the possibility of regulating same-sex unions through the Civil Code. A significant number of MPs from both the majority and the opposition opposed the draft Civil Code, even though the proposal stipulated ‘heterosexual marriage and the right for man and woman to marry and establish family’ and it also foresaw that ‘other forms of civil unions to be regulated with a specific law’ (Kosovo Government, 2022, Draft Civil Code, Chapter II, Sub-chapter I, Article 1138). It is the mention of ‘other forms of civil unions’ that sparked mobilisation among policy-makers, religious institutions, and other actors close to political factions prone to traditional gender norms and national ideologies.

In 2018, the CSGD and the CEL made the decision to (self-)organise, embarking on advocacy actions for same-sex civil partnerships. They initiated an advocacy group, with a number of civil society organisations joining the campaign to advocate for the inclusion of same-sex marriage in the Civil Code (CSGD, 2023, 6). They drew up a set of recommendations on the draft Civil Code related to Article 1138, requesting the following: usage of ‘different sexes’ instead of ‘man and woman’; replace ‘spouses of different sexes and husband and wife’ with ‘two individuals’; remove the reference to ‘special law’. They also drew attention to the conflict in the proposed bill with the Kosovo Constitution as a guarantor of equality and non-discrimination (CSGD, 2023, 6).

LGBTIQ + -led organisations, joined by a great number of civil society organisations, activists, and academics, addressed the Kosovo Parliament with an open letter requesting the inclusion of same-sex unions in the Civil Code. They used the basis of human rights as the crux of their argument, pointing to the need for synergies of the Civil Code with the Kosovo Constitution, and compliance with European human rights law and treaties. Yet this proved to be of no avail, as the Kosovo Parliament and the staunch opposers to same-sex unions remained firmly against the possibility being entered into the Civil Code. However, the open letter of civil society activists and academics showed that LGBTIQ + persons in Kosovo are not alone and that the struggle for social justice is long and needs to be sustained.

The ‘anti-justice’ frames are enveloped in misogyny and homophobia, patriarchal gender ideologies, and gender policing rhetoric that permeate discourses on the body, rights, national identity, and religion.³ Same-sex unions served as a unifying force, bringing together various actors, including political and religious institutions, all emphasising the importance of preserving what they perceive as a fundamental social order: the family, social life, as well as the nation and the state, converging into one. Standing far away from any rights-based rationale, four frames – distinct but inherently interrelated – have been identified within public communication, namely by religious community leaders and a number of MPs. They include the following: (i) maintaining the natural order; (ii) safeguarding the traditional family and the nation as an extension of the family; (iii) upholding traditional values on marriage as the cornerstone of culture and society; and (iv) protecting the public morality and public health.

The leaders of Muslim, Catholic, Evangelical, and Jewish religious communities in Kosovo,⁴ in a joint statement, affirmed:

The religious communities remain united when it comes to the protection and daily promotion of family values, pro-life values, the traditional values of marriage, the right of the foetus from conception to birth, and the natural right of sex as a predetermination for each citizen (Statement of Religious Community Leaders, quoted in Bami, 2022).

The ‘anti-justice’ discourses in Kosovo do not refer to ‘gender ideology’ as such, but there is nevertheless a conservative opposition. There are no ‘gender ideology borrowings’ from the Catholic church authorities of Croatia and Slovenia, as Kosovo’s Catholic Church is smaller, and it can only be a relevant actor in anti-gender opposition in unison with other religious authorities, but not with the Serbian Orthodox Church, due to ethnic politics and national ideologies that posit Serbian nation as the ‘Other’. Indeed, the inter-religious convergence highlights a broader societal resistance, transcending the political differences of MPs from different political parties who rallied together against the Civil Code. For example, an MP and chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Gender Equality, Missing Persons, and Petitions strongly opposed the new Civil Code, declaring that she ‘cannot go against the religion I belong to, the principles I live by, or the family values I grew up with. So, my vote will be against’ (Zeqiri, 2022). And an MP from the Vetëvendosje [Self-determination] party, which is an ideologically left-leaning political party holding the majority of seats in the Kosovo Parliament, asked ‘What will happen to the children who grow up without one of their parents? Why must we disrupt something natural to create something new and potentially problematic?’ (Vetëvendosje MP, quoted in Kadriu, 2022). During the parliamentary session of 16 March 2022, the language of a number of MPs was filled with hate speech against LGBTIQ + people. This marked the first instance where MPs referred to LGBTIQ + people as ‘sick, a threat to public health, destructive to families, and degenerates’ (CSGD, 2023, 9).

These frames resonate across diverse groups within ‘anti-justice’ mobilisations, particularly in connection with the issue of same-sex unions in the Civil Code, centred around the shared goal of safeguarding the ‘natural’ order of men-women complementarity and heterosexual family relations. Evoking the affirmation of ‘the natural order of gender’ in opposition to same sex unions is to erase plurality and reinforce heteronormativity. Hence, in this frame, LGBTIQ + individuals disrupt the presumed ‘naturalness’, and are not perceived as part of the human condition.

The family is one of the key agents of socialisation. It is a primary institution in the production of gender and sexuality. The family is the first place in which culture, norms, values, and gender roles are learned. The essentialist conceptions of family premised on the binary categories of gender and traditional views of sexuality persist in opposition to social constructionism that opens up familial possibilities beyond the heterosexual logic of intimate and family relationships. Moreover, the symbolic understandings of the family structure and national identity often overlap: family and gender roles, albeit in a metaphorical form, are central to national identity and nationalist ideologies. As McClintock (1993, 61) has argued, ‘nations are historical and institutional practices through which social difference is invented and performed’. The role of the family in nation-building is fundamental, as ‘all nations depend on powerful constructions of gender’ (McClintock, 1993, 61). The importance of the family trope, as McClintock has argued, is two-fold: ‘[T]he family offers a “natural” figure for sanctioning social hierarchy within a putative unity of interests. Second, it offers a ‘“natural” trope for figuring historical time […] and indispensable metaphoric figure by which hierarchical (and, one might add, often contradictory) social distinctions could be shaped into a single historical genesis narrative’ (McClintock, 1993, 64).

The centrality of the trope of the heterosexual family within nation(-state) building resonates in the context of Kosovo, where opposition to same-sex unions is framed by the notion that defending ‘the family’ it is to ‘defend’ the nation and the state, with the nation and state being metaphorical extensions of the family. The traditional family of the husband, wife, and children is perceived to safeguard ‘a healthy nation’ and public morals against the risks of social and moral degradation. The Civil Code is hence opposed on the grounds that it ‘destroys the main strand of the state and it kills the family’ (Justice Party, former MP, quoted in Klan Kosova, 2022). Hence the opposition to same-sex unions is a reflection that anything beyond existing gender norms and heterosexuality equals ‘depravity and moral degradation’ (Euronews, 2022a, 2022b). Moreover, religion is recast in the framing of the opposition to same-sex unions. God, nation, and homeland are invoked to argue against same-sex marriage. For the voices opposing same-sex marriage, a vote against it is an indicator of accountability ‘first and foremost to God and voters’ (MP Vetëvendosje 2022, Facebook post). These frames bring about more fundamental questions regarding the shifting of democracy towards illiberal and religious values, arguably signalling the limitations of secular politics today.

The positioning of the religious and political actors appeal to the broader public, as presented in Fig. 8.1, which indicates the extent to which same-sex unions are widely rejected throughout the region, with the exception of Slovenia. Kosovo scores among the lowest in support of same-sex unions, with only 20% in favour (ERA, 2023, 20). Yet this is a (mildly) positive change compared to the previous measurement in 2015, with the public support for same-sex unions having increased by 6% (ERA, 2023, 7). It is this (slow but steady) shift in the public opinion that offers critical hope for social justice in Kosovo. However, with this hard data at hand, the prospect of the right to same-sex unions being enshrined in the Civil Code seems rather bleak. Moreover, as the same 2023 survey indicated, ‘71% of Kosovo voters would be unwilling to support an LGBTIQ + -friendly party’ (ERA, 2023, 25). This will constrain further the progressive segments of political parties from a robust movement on the issue – with the nation-wide elections on the horizon. In this context, the political and religious actors concerned with ‘safeguarding the natural order’, ‘traditional family’, and the nation will gain momentum limiting the space for gender, diversity, and human rights to flourish, despite the positive legal framework and vibrant civic activism on LGBTIQ + rights.

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The opposition to same-sex unions as demonstrated here is likely to become part of the anti-gender mobilisation in the making in Kosovo, reflecting the deep-seated traditional conceptions of gender norms in a society in flux, and changing attitudes towards gender and diversity issues and lifestyles. As manifested in Kosovo, the current ‘anti-justice’ mobilisation is not a fixed but rather a fluid set of relations between formal institutions – both political and religious – and social groups, one which is constantly being remade and contested. While the legal and institutional framework in Kosovo is anchored in human rights principles that safeguard human dignity without discrimination, it falls short of granting LGBTIQ + individuals full citizen rights. Hence, heterosexuality is dominant, and opposition to same-sex unions, paired with persisting homophobia, signifies the lack of de facto equal sexual citizenship. To understand how conservative mobilisation is evolving, the chapter has contended that special attention should be paid to the discourses and frames of political and religious actors about the family and gender equality. ‘Anti-justice’ discourses redefine the nation and the state through a religious ‘twist’ and seek centre stage in the moulding of social and political life. Yet there is strong resistance to this, and counter-discourses stemming from LGBTIQ + activism and more broadly civil society seek simultaneously to expand the rights of non-heterosexual persons in Kosovo.

The opposition to same-sex marriage speaks of the centrality of the trope of ‘the family’ in anti-LGBTIQ + mobilisation; the mobilisation is not uni-focal, but rather dispersed across the political spectrum, yet nested in the national ideologies and religious discourses that erase any form of being in the world beyond heterosexuality. The inability of Kosovo’s parliament to pass a version of the Civil Code that enables same-sex unions shows the increasing power of conservative politics and religion in secular state affairs and policymaking. This poses important questions about the limits of secularism.

This chapter has shown that ‘anti-justice’ mobilisation limits human rights and freedoms, and also social justice for LGBTIQ + persons. Opposition to same-sex unions negates the imagination of possibilities of being and living beyond heterosexual normativity. The analysis presented here calls for social justice policy enactments and activism to ensure the rights of the LGBTIQ + community and individuals are fully granted without any discrimination. The right to same-sex unions is foundational to democratic sexual citizenship and social justice, yet with much at stake for the future ways of being and living, and intimacy according to human rights principles.