China and Taiwan in Africa

The interface between recognition and state sovereignty remains instrumental in the practice of international relations. The constitutive theory asserts that recognition confers an entity with international legal personality making it the foundation of sovereignty. This view however contradicts that of the declaratory theory that perceives recognition as a mere acknowledgment of the factual existence of an entity, and the willingness of the recognizing state to treat the said entity as an international person with legal rights and obligations. It is against such contradictions that entities who bear primary requirements of statehood as is the case of Taiwan have vehemently pursued international recognition as a critical aspect for their political significance in international politics. Indeed, the complexities surrounding China-Africa-Taiwan relations are founded on the very question of international recognition or nonrecognition of Taiwan as a sovereign entity with legal privileges and obligations in international law.

What makes China so unique on the international political stage is echoed not only in its strategic policymaking and economic approach with the Western world, which became all the more aggressive under the presidency of Xi Jinping, but also towards the “Global South,” namely, Africa. China’s presence in Africa has distant origins. To provide some credible scenarios, this chapter will focus on the genesis and development of relationships between the Chinese and Africans up to the present day to get a thorough, albeit Western, perspective on their significant role in today’s world economy and politics.

According to Article 1 in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in 1933, the necessary components of a “state” consist of (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a government, and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. Applying this commonly used definition to Taiwan: Taiwan currently houses about 24 million population; its controlled territory includes Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and other minor islands in the South China Sea; it is ruled by the Republic of China (ROC hereafter), the official sovereign government of Taiwan; and it maintains formal diplomatic relations with 14 states, including the Holy See as of January 2022. From this assessment, Taiwan functions and operates as a sovereign state entity, despite some challenges from lacking formal recognition from major powers such as the United States. The major difficulty for Taiwan to be classified as a state in the international society comes from its neighbor, the People’s Republic of China (China or PRC hereafter). The very fact that China has not abandoned its intention to unify Taiwan prevents Taiwan from becoming an independent state.

This study delineates the three legacies since the Cold War and the influence of their respective development of armaments, extremely diverse political systems, and fading national identity on the current cross-strait stalemate. First, the Cold War has led to the continuation of the development of the individual military forces of the two sides for confrontations. Second, the competition between the two sides (i.e., anti-communism versus communism) during the Cold War transformed into the current competition (i.e., democracy versus totalitarianism). Third, with the announcement of the lifting of the martial law in 1987, Taiwan’s subjective consciousness and even the proposition of its independence were gradually conducted in public. In addition, the DPP overthrew the KMT twice and strengthened the related propositions, which increasingly encouraged the Taiwanese to lean toward independence in their views on reunification and independence. Therefore, combining the three abovementioned points, the apparent cause of the current cross-strait stalemate is the different attitudes toward the 1992 Consensus. As a point of fact, however, they all stem from the long-term influence of the Cold War. Therefore, this current stalemate between the two sides of the strait is extremely difficult to resolve.

In the past decade, Japan-Taiwan relations warmed considerably, evidenced by the growth in tourist exchange and the establishment of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association. Considering China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan and Taiwan have strong motivation to cooperate and keep China in check. Interestingly, despite solid relations between Japan and Taiwan in recent years, a glimpse into the twentieth century betrays the fact that bilateral relations were quite different. This chapter notes Japan as one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the Nixon-Mao Summit and argues that pragmatism in Japanese foreign policy results in the treatment of Taiwan as an awkward existence that is constantly challenged by China.

The development of China-Africa relations can be separated into three phases: the first phase from 1949 to 1979, the second phase from 1979 to 1999, and the third phase from 2000 to the present. During the initial 30-year time frame, which was under Mao Zedong, Beijing’s policies toward Africa were characterized by Cold War issues. China was isolated universally and considered that the emerging, after the decolonization, African nations and the building of relations with them was a way to grow its political impact. At the same time, the Soviet Union had broken ties with China, and Washington did not recognize China and had an embargo against it.

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 passed on October 25, 1971, recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. That Resolution had a tremendous negative impact upon Taiwan (the Republic of China, “ROC”). The 1971 UN Resolution was not a historic “accident.” It was the outcome of PRC’s systematic diplomatic efforts in Africa and toward America.

After 1971, triangular relations have entered a new period. Beijing replaced Taipei’s UN Chinese representation in 1971. Establishing diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington in 1978 is a landmark event affecting these triangular relations. Therefore, gradually Taiwan authorities became passive at an international level. Firstly, Beijing is an important factor in IGOs’ contests. Secondly, as Taipei was “stripped of its recognition” as a “country” after withdrawing from the UN, Taipei had no way to gain any seats in other IGOs. Affected by these international trends, Taipei could not gain competitive advantages for IGOs’ seats. However, the WHO’s special attributes as a public health organization under the UN became a breakthrough in Taipei’s eyes. Thus, Taipei sought help from Washington and began a competition with Beijing in the WHO. The following questions will be explored: What is the purpose of the competition in the WHO? What influenced the decision of the three parties?

The end of the Second World War heralded many epochal events of global significance, some of which aftermaths are still echoing in different areas of the globe. One such event which perhaps still shapes the diplomatic decisions of many countries and regions in the aftermath of the territorial divorce of the Island of Taiping (Taiwan) from mainland China in 1949 during the Chinese civil war. Indeed, the event, which served as the spring ball of the People’s Republic of China’s One-China policy, did not only herald the mistrust between Beijing and the West; for two decades, it created a diplomatic dilemma for the United Nations as to whether Taiwan (Republic of China) be recognized as a sovereign state. Interestingly, countries’ responses to this dilemma were mixed as some recognized China, while some did the same for Taiwan.

China has forged different linkages with different African countries. However, one thing cuts across all relations—every country has to accept the One-China principle that requires all African countries to recognize that the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan is not a sovereign state. This has led to several African countries establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan and later severing those relations. Senegal is an example of one African country that established diplomatic relations with Taiwan and later severed them. Nigeria’s record with China and Taiwan has been more predictable. This chapter aims to examine and discuss China’s relations with Senegal and Nigeria as they relate to Taiwan’s efforts to establish a diplomatic foothold in Africa. It will examine why and under what circumstances Senegal re-established diplomatic relations with China in 2005. It will examine the effects, if any, of the political and economic dynamics in Senegal that contributed to the switch. On China’s side, it will examine the political and economic factors that attracted China to Senegal within the context of West Africa. The chapter will also address how Taiwan is attempting to have some form of influence and presence in the two countries.

For two and a half years following their coming to power in South Africa in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) engaged itself in ambivalent diplomacy on the matter of the “One-China” policy, trying to balance formal relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC)—which it had inherited from the apartheid era government—and the increasing pressure and anxiety from China over these relations by advocating dual recognition, which implies officially recognizing both Taiwan and China as independent diplomatic entities. It did not help matters that the ANC tripartite alliance itself was ideologically split on the issue; between 1992 and 1994, there was a frenzy of visits to Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by members of both the ANC's pro- and anti-recognition camps to appease and assure, to assuage and dissuade. In the end, however, in November 1996, the Mandela administration finally, but not surprisingly, relented and ended the torment by announcing that his government would adhere to the “One-China” doctrine and would sever relations with Taiwan in favor of China.

 The emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a global economic power has translated into its increased influence abroad. This is particularly evident in Africa. In the past two decades, China’s investments on the continent have skyrocketed and China has become the major trading partner for most African countries, often prompting a transformation of these countries’ foreign policies in support of China. While the PRC prides itself on not imposing conditionalities for its investments or development financing, one de facto precondition is the recognition of the One-China policy. The PRC has brought all African countries, except Eswatini, to change their international stance and recognize the PRC instead of the Republic of China (ROC). How has China been able to advocate the One-China policy in Africa so successfully? This chapter focuses on two of the countries that most recently switched sides, Malawi (2007) and Burkina Faso (2018), as well as Eswatini, the only African country that has not yet recognized the PRC, to investigate the strategies used by the PRC vis-à-vis those used by ROC. It sheds new light on how China transforms its power into influence in the context of selected African countries’ recognition of the One-China policy. The chapter argues that it is no longer a matter of under what conditions the PRC can advance its One-China Policy in Africa, for its economic presence on the continent has become so important that not supporting it is no longer an option.

Given recent trends over the 2000–2018 period, this chapter proposes that newly democratized or electorally competitive African states are more responsive to domestic economic imperatives and thus have proven more likely to form relations with the economically larger People’s Republic of China than the Republic of China due to the prospective trade, aid, and investment gains to be made once such a switch is affected. Seven case studies conducted over the 2001–2018 period yield results which are in line with this hypothesis. In effect, the entire universe of cases of new democracies on the African continent in the twenty-first century have all switched recognition soon after becoming politically open, but no evidence has been found demonstrating the opposite (i.e., the effect of relations with either China or Taiwan on a country’s democracy).

The ongoing conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China) and the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) is a continuation of the Chinese Civil War between the Chinese Nationalist Party—widely referred to as the Kuomintang (KMT)—and forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The first stage of the war was from 1927 to 1937, and the second stage was from 1945 to 1949. There was never a finality, no formal peace agreement to the war only that the losing side, the KMT, fled to Taiwan and have in the decades since established a new nation, a new country. Whether this political entity is a renegade province of China or a new country deserving of territorial integrity and statehood is at the heart of the current conflict—a conflict that has, in recent years, degenerated into the erosion of previous understandings, norms, and peaceful coexistence between the two Chinas.