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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. China’s Vision of the Future Networked Battlefield: Emerging Military-Technological Challenges to the United States

Author : James Johnson

Published in: The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Abstract

This chapter examines the intersection of China’s evolving C4ISR architecture with the cyber, space, and electronic warfare asymmetric challenges posed by China to the United States on the future network-centric battlefield. Compared to China’s conventional weapon systems, far less ink has been spilt on Chinese thinking in the development of the critical support architecture that enables and enhances China’s technologically advanced war-fighting capabilities. A central argument this chapter makes is that China’s war-fighting capabilities networked by C4ISR posed greater threats to the United States than the sum of their parts. It describes the contours of a discourse within the U.S. defense community that interpreted these ‘systems of systems’ as specifically designed to exploit U.S. military vulnerabilities in the Western Pacific. This emerging C4ISR military paradigm increased the incentives for both sides to strike first and preemptively against the other C4ISR systems, which during the Obama presidency perceptibly worsened strategic stabilizing in the Asia-Pacific.

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previous chapter Washington’s Perceptions and Misperceptions of China’s Anti-access Area Denial ‘Strategy’

next chapter ‘Guam Express’ and ‘Carrier Killers’: China’s Asymmetric Missile Threat to the United States in the Pacific

Modern military C4ISR systems are the central nervous system of the military organization—designed to exploit new weapons technologies and improve battle situational awareness for integrated joint military operations.

China’s ‘near seas’ include the South and East China Seas, and Yellow Seas.

According to the U.S. DoD, ‘anti-access’ actions are intended to slow the deployment of an adversary’s forces into a combat theater, or cause them to operate at distances from the conflict beyond which they would prefer to do so. ‘Area denial’ actions affect maneuvers within a combat theater and are intended to impede an adversary’s operations within areas where forces cannot (or will not) prevent access. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 33–50.

Several recent open-source Chinese military research reports published from the mid-2000s demonstrated an increasing focus on the development of advanced weapons systems to extend the power-projection ranges of Chinese missile strike capabilities.

With the change of administration in 2017 there has been some speculation regarding the longevity of the Third Offset Strategy. According to the DoD, this strategic focus remains ongoing. Pomerleau, M. (2017). The Relationship between third offset and multi-domain battle. C4ISRnet, 7 April 2017. Available at: http://www.c4isrnet.com/articles/the-relationship-between-third-offset-strategy-and-multi-domain-battle (Accessed: 10 April 2017).

Johnson, J.S. (2017). China missiles threaten new arms race. Newsweek, 27 March 2017. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/china-missiles-threaten-new-arms-race-us-574590 (Accessed: 29 March 2017).

‘Electronic Warfare’ refers to any action involving the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to control the spectrum to attack an adversary or impede enemy countermeasures. ‘Cyber warfare’ refers to actions taken by a nation-state to penetrate another state’s computers or networks with the intention of causing damage or disruption. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2007). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2007. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, i–x.

Nye, J.J. (2017). Deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace. International Security, 41(3), 44–71.

Then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson coined the U.S. concept of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) in 1997.

The accidental bombing of the Chinese Belgrade Embassy was cited by Chinese analysts as the catalyst for former Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s order to develop so-called Assassin’s mace weapons and C4ISR systems to prepare the PLA for the high-tech challenges of future wars, especially to deter the United States.

Shambaugh, D. (2004). Modernizing China’s military: Progress, problems, and prospects. London: University of California Press, 69–70.

The use of concepts such as ‘information warfare’, ‘information domain’, and ‘network warfare’ are broadly analogous to the U.S. ‘cyber warfare’ concept. However, Chinese analysts also use other concepts to describe distinct components of this broader idea including psychological, network, intelligence, and electromagnetic warfare. Pollpeter, K. (2010). Towards an integrative C4ISR system: Informationization and joint operations in the people’s liberation army. In R. Kamphausen, D. Lai, & A. Scobell (Eds.), The PLA at home and abroad: Assessing the operational capabilities of China’s military (pp. 193–235). Seattle, WA: U.S. Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research.

Wortzel, L.M. (2013). The dragon extends its reach: Chinese military power goes global. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 31. At least since the early 2000s, the Chinese term ‘informationized’ (or ‘informationalized’) has been frequently used by Chinese authorized empirical sources. However, these sources have rarely explicitly (or adequately) defined the term, and its use by Chinese analysts has been ambiguous at best.

Zhu, N. (2014). Xi Jinping leads internet security group. Xinhua News Service, 27 February 2015. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/27/c_133148273.htm (Accessed: 10 April 2017).

Since the 1990s, the PLA’s force size has been downsized on three occasions: in 1997, 2002, and 2015. The most recent reorganization announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015 represented a wider reform agenda promulgated at the November 2013 Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee. This agenda included a shift away from the PLA’s historical focus on its dominant ground forces, toward maritime and airborne forces—both considered crucial for informationized warfare.

In addition to space-based ISR systems, China currently builds its maritime picture via several other sources: tactical reporting in China’s littoral ranges; ground-based radars (surface-wave and sky-wave versions); airborne ISR (including UAVs) to support short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2016. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 36–37.

China’s National Defense white papers from 2011 to the latest report in 2015 reiterated these broad military ‘informatization’ objectives.

In 2017, the U.S. DoD stated that ‘China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including cyber theft (or espionage), targeted foreign direct investment, and exploitation of the access of private Chinese nationals to such technologies’. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, ii and 72.

Chinese military leaders have established a well-documented tradition of studying and learning from advanced military organizations (especially the United States), doctrines, and operations. For example, Chinese strategists still hold U.S. military operations in Kosovo (1999) and in Afghanistan and Iraq as ‘gold standards’ in modern warfare. Peng, G., & Yao, Y. (Eds.). (2005). The science of military strategy (English Edition ed.). Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 256–257.

PLA Communication Command Academy. (2011). Comprehensive integrated study of the military information system. Beijing, China: Haichao Publishing House, 68–170; National Defense University. (2011). Information system-based system of systems operational capability building in 100 questions. Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 30–31. By 2004, Chinese military writings began explicitly to connect the PLA’s practical understanding of command and control (C2) automation, with its overall C4ISR framework.

Dai, Q. (2002). On integrating network warfare and electronic warfare. Zhonggou Junshi Kexue, February (1), 112–117.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2010). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010, 37; Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017, 50.

Information system-based system of systems operational capability building in 100 questions. Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 48–49.

Peng, G., & Yao, Y. (Eds.). (2005). The science of military strategy (English Edition ed.). Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 380.

Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China. (2015). China’s military strategy, 2014. Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council.

Shou, X. (Ed.). (2013). The science of military strategy. Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 148.

Chinese analysts have acknowledged the benefits of the U.S. Cyber Command in effectively consolidating cyber functions under a single entity, centralizing the management of cyber resources, and combining offensive and defensive cyber capabilities under one military organization. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017, 35 and 42. For a recent study on China’s recent military reforms, see Saunders, P.C., & Wuthnow, J. (2017). Chinese military reforms in the age of Xi Jinxing: Drivers, challenges, and implications. (No. 10). Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

For example, it remains unclear what the SSF’s precise role in the space domain will be: will the force’s responsibilities include kinetic ASATs, or will these continue to be controlled by the PLA Second Artillery Force’s successor—the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF )? Costello, J. (2016). The strategic support force: Update and overview. China Daily, 16(19), 1–14.

Chinese analysts have argued that a ‘launch on warning’ nuclear deterrence posture would be beneficial to enhance China’s nuclear retaliatory readiness, and they highlight that such a shift would be consistent with China’s no-first-use nuclear policy. See Xue, B. (2010). Study on the development of contemporary strategic warning system. Military History Research, 3, 102; Yawed, J., & Tang, L. (2013). Discussion and revelation of American ‘Quick global attack’ plan. Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command & Technology, 3, 60. Chapter 6 discusses the potential strategic implications of a formal shift by China to a ‘launch on warning’ nuclear deterrence posture.

Li, G.S. (2016). The strategic support force is a key to winning throughout the course of operations. People’s Daily Online, 5 January 2016. Available at: http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0105/c1011-28011251.html (Accessed: 30 March 2017).

Saunders, P.C., & Wuthnow, J. (2017). Chinese military reforms in the age of Xi Jinxing: Drivers, challenges, and implications. (No. 10). Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 28.

Ibid.

Chase, M.S., Engstorm, J., Cheung, T.M., Gunness, K.A., Harold, S.W., Puska, S., & Berkowitz, S.K. (2015). China’s incomplete military transformation—Assessing the weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 116.

In the future, other regional maritime states in the Asia-Pacific (notably Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines) will also have to consider how to respond to a better organized, trained, and technologically equipped, and potentially emboldened PLA war-fighting force in the region.

Kyoto News. (2017). Chinese’s military dominance in South China Sea complete. ABS-CBN News, 20 March 2017. Available at: http://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/03/20/17/chineses-military-dominance-in-s-china-sea-complete-report (Accessed: 8 April 2017).

For example, the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) continues to play a central role in China’s broader civil–military integration initiatives, including in military applications for quantum technology.

Krekel, B., Adams, P., & Bakos, G. (2012). Occupying the information high ground: Chinese capabilities for computer network operations and cyber espionage—Prepared for the U.S.-China economic and security review commission. Washington, DC: Northrop Grumman, 10.

Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China. (December 2011). China’s space activities in 2011. Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council, Part I. China National Defense white papers from 2011, 2013, and 2015 consistently characterized space and cyber domains as emerging as the ‘new commanding heights in strategic competition’, which elevated the importance of the cyberspace to the ‘new domain of national security [that China has the right] to protect’ with defensive and offensive means. Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China. (2015). China’s military strategy, 2014. Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council.

Li, G. (2017). Xi underlined innovation in military upgrading. People.cn, 13 March 2017. Available at: http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0313/c90000-9189415.html (Accessed: 11 April 2017).

China’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2020) prioritized several focus areas for research and innovation that had military implications including aerospace engines; A.I.; quantum communications; automation and robotics; nanotechnology; neuroscience; deep space exploration; and on-orbit servicing and maintenance. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2014). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014, 68–69.

Kang, Y. (2017). Military-civil integration development committee established. Xinhua News Service, 23 January 2017. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2017-01/23/c_129458492.htm (Accessed: 12 June 2017).

‘Quantum information science’ encompasses quantum communications and cryptography; quantum computing; and quantum navigation. Costello, J., & Kania, E. (2016). Quantum leap (part 1): China’s advances in quantum information science. China Brief, 16(18), 11–16. Chinese efforts to develop quantum information science and Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) increased in importance in the aftermath of the leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden which demonstrated the disparity between the PLA’s offensive cyber-warfare capabilities vis-à-vis those of the United States. See Kania, E. (2017). China’s quest for an AI revolution in warfare. The Strategy Bridge, 8 June 2017. Available at: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/6/8/-chinas-quest-for-an-ai-revolution-in-warfare (Accessed: 11 June 2017).

See Zheng, Y. (2013). Lectures on the science of information operations. Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 79–91; Wang, J. (2015). Quantum Technology: Informatization and the Changing face of Warfare. PLA Press, 27 September 2015. Available at: http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-01/08/content_5726287.htm (Accessed: 27 March 2017); Chen, S. (2016). Quantum teleportation breakthrough earns Pan Jianwei’s team China’s top science award. South China Morning Post, 8 January 2016. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/tech/science-research/article/1899060/quantum-teleportation-breakthrough-earns-pan-jianweis-team (Accessed: 2 June 2017); Yu, D. (2015). In China quantum computing comes of age. Caixin Global, 6 February 2015. Available at: http://www.caixinglobal.com/2015-02-06/101012695.html (Accessed: 28 March 2017).

In 2013, President Xi visited Anhui Quantum Communication Technology Co. Ltd. for a collective learning session, and met with Pan Jianwei, the deputy chief of staff of the PLA’s new Northern Theater Command. QuantumCTek (2013). Anhui quantum communication innovation achievement debut: Central Politburo team learning event. QuantumCTek, 13 September 2013. Available at: http://www.quantum-sh.com/news/146.html (Accessed: 13 June 2017).

During China’s 2015 18th Party Congress’ Fifth Plenum, President Xi Jinping included quantum communication as a priority research strategy focus for ‘major breakthroughs’ by 2030. China plans to conduct quantum distribution experiments on the Tiangong-2 space station—launched in late 2016. Costello, J., & Kania, E. (2016). Quantum leap (part 1): China’s advances in quantum information science. China Brief, 16(18), 11–16.

In 2017, the U.S. DoD reported that China has made ‘notable advances in cryptography research’, which would have significant implications for China’s military—especially secure communications. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017, 34.

Ibid.

The value of quantum cryptography for military use has been subject to some debate—the substitution of standard encryption technology for quantum variants does not remove the basic vulnerabilities inherent to communication systems. Mehta, A. (2015). Air force study shows potential limits of quantum technology. Defense News, 9 August 2015. Available at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/air-force/2015/08/09/air-force-study-shows-potential-limits-quantum-technology-pentagon/31233467/ (Accessed: 28 March 2017).

Costello, J., & Kania, E. (2016). Quantum leap (part 2): The strategic implications of quantum technologies. China Brief, 16(19), 22–27.

During a recent DoD’s Defense Innovation Board (DIB) session, a call was made for greater collaboration between the private and state sectors (or ‘citizen–leaders–innovators’) in the study of new innovative cutting-edge technologies for military applications—especially investment in A.I. and machine learning. Pellerin, C. (2016). Defense innovation board makes interim recommendations. DoD News, Defense Media Activity, 5 October 2016. Available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/965196/defense-innovation-board-makes-interim-recommendations (Accessed: 3 April 2017).

Ravindranath, M. (2016). America’s lead in quantum computing is ‘under siege’. Defense One, 7 December 2016. Available at: http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/12/americas-lead-quantum-computing-under-siege/133698/ (Accessed: 10 June 2017).

See Costello, J., & Kania, E. (2016). Quantum leap (part 2): The strategic implications of quantum technologies. China Brief, 16(19), 22–27. The value of quantum cryptography for military use has been subject to some debate—the substitution of standard encryption technology for quantum variants does not remove the basic vulnerabilities inherent to communication systems. Mehta, A. (2015). Air force study shows potential limits of quantum technology. Defense News, 9 August 2015. Available at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/air-force/2015/08/09/air-force-study-shows-potential-limits-quantum-technology-pentagon/31233467/ (Accessed: 28 March 2017).

Zhang, H. (2005). Action/reaction: U.S. space weaponization and China. Arms Control Today, 1 December 2005. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-CVR (Accessed: 10 December 2014).

According to Chinese analysts, other potential targets described by Chinese analysts in authoritative publications include missile positions and launchers; military transportation and logistical hubs (such as ports and airfields); key military facilities and bases; critical infrastructure; and carrier strike groups (CSGs). Shou, X. (Ed.). (2013). The science of military strategy. Beijing, China: Military Science Press; The science of military campaigns. Beijing, China: Guofang University Publication, 161–172.

Currently, U.S. civilian and military agencies possess approximately 500 satellites, of which an estimated 20 percent are deployed for military purposes. This compares to China’s estimated 142 satellite deployments, of which at least 95 are owned and controlled by the PLA. Defense analysts expect Chinese dependencies on these systems to increase, especially in ranges beyond China’s near seas. See Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future of warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti access, area denial, U.S. air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia. International Security, 41(1), 7–48.

Shou, X. (Ed.). (2013). The science of military strategy. Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 148–150. Also see Zhu, H. (Ed.). (2009). Strategic Air Force. Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 39; China’s evolving perspectives on network warfare: Lessons from science of military strategy. China Brief, 15(8), 1–3; Zhu, H. (Ed.). (2009). Strategic Air Force. Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 39.

Gertz, B. (2016). China’s military in 2016: Missiles, intelligence and the SCS. Asia Times, 28 December 2016. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/chinas-military-2016-missiles-intelligence-scs/ (Accessed: 10 January 2017); McReynolds, J. (2015).

For example, in 2011, U.S. analysts alleged that Chinese hackers took control of two NASA satellites—Landsat-7 and Terra EOS AM-1. Wolf, J. (2011). China key suspects in US satellite hack: commission. Reuters. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-satellite-idUSTRE79R4O320111028 (Accessed: 28 October 2011).

Rogers, M. (2016). Hearing to receive testimony on United States cyber command in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2017, and the future years defense program, written testimony of Michael Rogers. Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017, 59.

To date, limited information has been released on this new military force. Gertz, B. (2016). China’s military in 2016: Missiles, intelligence and the SCS. Asia Times, 28 December 2016. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/chinas-military-2016-missiles-intelligence-scs/ (Accessed: 10 January 2017).

Chinese C4ISR capabilities could act to enhance the PLA’s counter-space power projection during a crisis or conflict in several ways: (1) space-based satellite communication, navigation, meteorology, and robotics could be utilized to support and enable directed energy weapons (DEWs), direct ascent ASATs, and missile defenses; (2) space-based ISR systems could be used to defend and protect China’s expanding C4ISR capabilities; (3) space-based ISR systems could enhance the PLA’s cyber-warfare capabilities; and related, (4) space-based ISR systems could be used to complete the ‘kill-chain’ sequencing for long-range precision-strike missiles (e.g. antiship cruise and ballistic missiles).

The term ‘dual-use’ in this context refers to the various military and civilian uses of weapons technologies and weapons systems, and the civilian–military industrial structures that develop them. China is not the only state developing space technologies for military applications—Japan, Russia, and Pakistan also run similar programs.

Burgess, R.L. (2012). U.S. defense intelligence agency—Annual threat assessment, statement before the senate armed services committee U.S. states senate, 16 February 2012. Washington, DC: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 19.

Daniels, J. (2017). Space arms race as Russia, China emerges as ‘rapidly growing threats’ to US. CNBC, 27 March 2017. Available at: http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/29/space-arms-race-as-russia-china-emerge-as-rapidly-growing-threats-to-us.html (Accessed: 30 March 2017).

The U.S. DoD has identified several Chinese space-based ISR satellites with dual-use capabilities including the Yaogan; Haiyang; Huanjing; Qianwei; and Gaofan series. The Yaogan series represents a core component of China’s maritime ISR architecture, and includes electro-optical (EO), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and electronic intelligence (ELINT) variants—which appear to perform military ISR functions, for example maritime surveillance and early-warning infrared sensors to detect ballistic missile launches. Reinsch, W.A., & Shea, D.C. (2016). 2016 report to congress of the U.S.-China economic and security review committee, 114th congress, 2nd session, November 2016. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Committee, 213.

Tate, A. (2016). China commissions new space tracking ship. IHS Jane’s 360, 15 July 2016. Available at: http://www.janes.com/article/62292/china-commissions-new-space-tracking-ship (Accessed: 1 April 2017).

The over-the-horizon and maritime targeting C4ISR challenges for successful antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) targeting are especially complex. See Yuan, L., & Jiang, J. (2004). An exploration of anti-satellite weapon development. Winged Missiles Journal, December (12), 46; Chang, X. (2005). Military astronautics. Beijing, China: National Defense Industry Press, 259–260.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017, 31 and 61.

Additionally, a wide range of military, law enforcement, and commercial shipping vessels operating in these waters would further complicate missile locating, tracking, and targeting in any future conflict.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2012). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2012, 12.

Blanchard, B. (2017). China says weapons won’t stop unification with Taiwan. Reuters, 30 March 2017. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-defence idUSKBN171173 (Accessed: 31 March 2017).

Jervis, R. (1978) ‘Cooperation under the security dilemma’, World Politics, 30(2), 193.

Despite the ongoing scholarly debates surrounding the continued utility of ‘offensive–defensive’ related concepts and theories in IR, the idea that where the offense holds a dominant position (or is offensive-dominant) the security dilemma is intensified continues to receive wide acceptance. For examples of these debates, see Lynn-Jones, S.M. (1995). Offense-defense theory and its critics. Security Studies, 4(4), 660–691; Lieber, K. (2000). Grasping the technological peace: The offense-defense balance and international security. International Security, 25(1), 71–104; Lynn-Jones, S.M., Miller, S.E., Brown, M.E., & Cote, O.R. (2004). Offense-defense theory and its critics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hagt, E. (2006). Mutually assured vulnerabilities in space. World Security Institute (WSI) China Security, 2(1), 84–106; Johnson, J.S. (2017). Washington’s perceptions and misperceptions of Beijing’s anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) ‘strategy’: Implications for military escalation control and strategic stability. The Pacific Review, 30(3), 271–288.

In 2015, the PLA published the book Light War, which gives a central role to fighting a future war using lasers—in addition to cyber weapons, direct energy weapons, and rail guns. Gertz, B. (2017). Get ready for China’s laser-weapons arsenal. The National Interest, 12 April 2017. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-chinas-laser-weapons-arsenal-20138?page=show (Accessed: 13 April 2017).

Gertz, B. (2013). China conducts test of new anti-satellite missile. Freebeacon, 14 May 2015. Available at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-conducts-test-of-new-anti-satellite-missile/.

Chinese media reported that this was a high-altitude space-exploring rocket test, and part of a project to study space weather—reaching an altitude of 10,000 km.

The most recent edition of the doctrinal SMS explicitly identified U.S. space-based ISR as one of the main strategic threats China faces. Shou, X. (ed.) (2013) The science of military strategy. Beijing, China: Military Science Press, p. 148. In 2012, China launched Beidou to supply its navigation network with regional Positional, Navigation and Timing (PNT), which has reportedly been integrated into the PLA’s weapons guidance systems. The DoD anticipates Beidou -2 enabling global PNT coverage will be operational by 2020. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2016, 61.

Hou, M. (Ed.). (2010). Direction and implication of the development of the U.S. anti-satellite weapons (Social Sciences Edition ed.). Beijing, China: Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

Despite the United States–China renewed government-to-government interactions on space policy in 2006, the political momentum has stalled in the aftermath of the 2011 NASA appropriations.

For example, United States–Soviet cooperative projects in the space sector (e.g. the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission) increased channels of communications between scientists and engineers on both sides, which helped ameliorate perceptions of a Cold War space race.

Fearon, J.D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.

U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2011). U.S. national security space strategy—Unclassified summary. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

Pawlyk, O. (2017). US air preparing for war in space. Military.com , 4 April 2017. Available at: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/04/04/us-air-force-preparing-war-space.html (Accessed: 8 April 2017).

Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future of warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti access, area denial, U.S. air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia. International Security, 41(1), 7–48.

The air–sea battle (ASB) operational concept (renamed in 2014) stressed the importance of hardening U.S C4ISRs , to protect U.S. military assets in the Asia-Pacific against Chinese A2/AD asymmetric threats and preemptively disrupting and destroying China’s A2/AD precision-strike ‘kill-chain’. ASB also called for the accumulation of a variety of conventional offensive capabilities. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2013). Air-sea battle: Service collaboration to address anti-access & area denial challenges. Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle Office.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2014). Quadrennial defense review report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 20–37. The 2012 U.S. Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG) stated that the United States ‘will employ cutting-edge technology in the future … we will also invest in cyber … in space … in unmanned systems … we will invest in the newest technology’. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (January 2012). Sustaining U.S. global leadership for the 21st century defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

Pellerin, C. (2015). Work: Human-machine teaming represents defense technology future. DoD News, Defense Media Activity, 8 November 2015. Available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/628154/work-human-machine-teaming-represents-defense-technology-future (Accessed: 10 April 2017).

Clark, C. (2015). Dep. sec defense Work invokes ‘space control’, analyst fear space war escalation. Breakingdefense.com , 15 April 2015. Available at: http://breakingdefense.com/2015/04/depsecdef-work-invokes-space-control-analysts-fear-space-war-escalation/ (Accessed: 8 April 2017).

Ye, J. (2015). Review: U.S. Military’s ‘National defense innovation initiative’. Contemporary International Relations, 1, 35–40; Wang, Q. (2014). The US third ‘offset strategy’: The global impact of unmanned systems. China Defense Daily, 15 November 2014. Available at: http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-11/15/content_6225368.htm (Accessed: 15 June 2017).

Jiang, L. (2015). Why military-civilian integration has become a national strategic interest. People’s Daily, 30 May 2015. Available at: http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2015/0531/c1003-27080928.html (Accessed: 17 June 2017).

Ferris, S.P., & Keithly, D.M. (1999). Auftragstaktik, or directive control in joint and combined operations. Parameters, Autumn(3), 118–133; Kaufman, A. (2005). Caught in the network: How the doctrine of network-centric warfare allows technology to dictate military strategy. Armed Forces Journal, 142(7), 20–22.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.

Ibid., 182–183.

For example, despite U.S. technological superiority during the Vietnam War and the Second Iraqi War Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (2009–2011), Washington failed to achieve its military objectives. For a recent research on the durability of U.S. military superiority vis-à-vis China in the Asia-Pacific, see Heginbotham, E., Nixon, M., Morgan, F.E., Heim, J.L., Hagan, J., Li, S. (Eds.). (2015). The U.S.-China military scorecard: Forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power 1996–2014. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

White, H. (2013). The China choice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pollpeter, K. (2012). Space, cyber, and electronic warfare: Controlling the information domain. In A.J. Tellis, & T. Tanner (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s military challenge (pp. 163–194). Seattle and Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research.

Most U.S. analysts have agreed that cyber warfare is ‘offensive-dominant’ in nature. See Gompert, D.C., Libicki, M., & Cavaiola, L.J. (2015). Cyber house rules: On war, retaliation and escalation. Survival, 57(1), 81–104. For an opposing view on the debate that in cyber warfare the ‘defense’ has the advantage, see Rid, T. (2012). Think again: Cyberwar. Foreign Policy, 192(March/April), 5–32.

100

Lindsay, J.R., & Reveron, D.S. (2015). Conclusions: The rise of China and the future of cybersecurity. In J.R. Lindsay, T.M. Cheung & D.S. Reveron (Eds.), China and cybersecurity: Espionage, strategy and politics in the digital domain (pp. 333–355). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

101

Easton, I.M., & Hsiao, R. (2013). The Chinese people’s liberation army’s unmanned aerial vehicle project: Organizational capacities and operational capacities. Washington, DC: Project 2049 Institute.

102

It is noteworthy that there has been very little discussion in Chinese military writings on the various shortcomings and limitations associated with the U.S. experience with RMA.

103

Nye, J.J. (2017). Deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace. International Security, 41(3), 44–71.

104

Ibid.

105

It remains uncertain as to what might constitute an act of ‘cyber warfare’, or how either side would react if (yet undefined) cyber ‘red lines’ were breached—or perceived to have been. Both the United States and China continue to explore concepts and capabilities for deterrence in cyberspace. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2016, 43; Nye, J.J. (2017). Deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace. International Security, 41(3), 41–71.

106

The U.S. DoD has reported that China could also use nuclear weapons in space to destroy and disable an adversary’s satellites. Recent evidence indicates that China has been developing space capabilities to enable the PLA to replace smaller damaged or destroyed satellites relatively quickly, but these satellites are considered inadequate in size and capacity for counter-space operations. Pollpeter, K.L. (2015). Testimony before the U.S.-China economic and security review commission for the hearing on “China’s space and counter space programs”. San Diego, CA: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

107

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 193.

108

Johnson, J.S. (2017). China missiles threaten new arms race. Newsweek, 27 March 2017. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/china-missiles-threaten-new-arms-race-us-574590 (Accessed: 29 March 2017).

109

For recent coverage on China’s research, developments, and innovation in the defense industry, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2016, 68.

110

111

China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department recently called for the PLA to leverage A.I. and related technologies to advance toward ‘intelligentized’ command and decision-making in its construction of a joint operations command system. Wang, L. (2017). National people’s congress representative Liu Guozhi: Artificial intelligence will accelerate the process of military transformation. Xinhua News Service, 8 March 2017. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-03/08/c_129504550.htm (Accessed: 12 June 2017).

Title: China’s Vision of the Future Networked Battlefield: Emerging Military-Technological Challenges to the United States
Author: James Johnson
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75837-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-75838-1

Copyright Year: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75838-1_4

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