Citizen preferences and the architecture of government

The article 'Citizen preferences and the architecture of government' examines the diverse territorial structures of public administration across the globe, highlighting the significant differences in the number of tiers and jurisdictions per tier. It discusses how reforms aimed at cost reduction and socio-demographic changes have reshaped these structures, with examples such as Denmark's 2007 reform and Latvia's 2009 reduction in municipalities. The paper introduces a theoretical framework that considers citizen preferences for public service quality and the resulting congestion effects on administrative performance. It compares a first-best architecture managed by a benevolent planner with a decentralized system where jurisdictions have decision-making autonomy. The study finds that decentralization leads to broader service scopes and fewer administrative layers, impacting overall welfare. Empirical investigations using U.S. data reveal regional differences in citizen preferences, with the Northeast and West valuing state services more than federal ones, while the Midwest and South are more balanced. This article offers a unique blend of theoretical insights and empirical evidence, making it a valuable resource for understanding the complex interplay between citizen preferences and governmental structures.