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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Climate Change, Catastrophic Risks and Social Choice Theory

Author : Norman Schofield

Published in: The Economics of the Global Environment

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The enlightenment was a philosophical project to construct a rational society without the need for a supreme being. It opened the way for the creation of market democracy and rapid economic growth. At the same time economic growth is the underlying cause of climate change, and we have become aware that this may destroy our civilization. The principal underpinning of the enlightenment project is the general equilibrium theorem (GET) of Arrow and Debreu (1954), asserting the existence of a Pareto optimal price equilibrium. Arrow’s work in social choice can be interpreted as an attempt to construct a more general social equilibrium theorem. The current paper surveys recent results in social choice which suggests that chaos rather than equilibrium is generic. We also consider models of belief aggregation similar to Condorcet’s Jury theorem and mention Penn’s Theorem on existence of a belief equilibrium. However, it is suggested that a belief equilibrium with regard to the appropriate response to climate change depends on the creation of a fundamental social principle of “guardianship of our planetary home.” It is suggested that this will involve conflict between entrenched economic interests and ordinary people, as the effects of climate change make themselves felt in many countries.

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Footnotes
1
See Pagden (2013) for an argument about the significance today of the enlightenment project, but a counter arguement by Gray (1995, 1997, 2000).
 
2
Weber (1904) speculated that there was a connection between the values of Protestantism and Capitalism. It may be that there are connections between the preference for scientific explanation and protestant belief about the relationship between God and humankind.
 
3
See Feingold (2004).
 
4
For Hobbes, see Rogow (1986). For Descartes, see Gaukroger (1995). For Spinoza and Liebnitz see Stewart (2006) and Goldstein (2006). See also Israel (2011) for the development of the Radical Enlightenment.
 
5
It is of interest that the English word “soul” derives from Old English sáwol (first used in the 8th century poem, Beowulf.
 
6
Hawking and Mlodinow (2010) assert that God did not create the Universe, perhaps implying that the soul does not exist. However they do say that they understand Isaac Newton’s belief that God did “create” and “conserve” order in the universe. See other books by Dawkins (2008) and Hitchens (2007) on the same theme, as well as Wright (2009) on the evolution of the notion of God and Lilla (2007) on political theology.
 
7
Tegmark (2008, 2014) suggests a version of the Hawking, Mlodonow thesis that he calls the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, but he is aware that the Godel Turing Theorems put limits on how able we are to apprehend reality. See also Yanofsky (2013), for the limits of science and mathematics.
 
8
See for example Hardin (1971, 1982), Taylor (1976, 1982), Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Axelrod (1981, 1984), Kreps et al. (1982), Margolis (1982).
 
9
Strong reciprocity means the punishment of those who do not cooperate.
 
10
Indeed, White et al. (2009) present evidence of a high degree of cooperation among very early hominids dating back about 4MYBP (million years before the present). The evidence includes anatomical data which allows for inferences about the behavioral characteristics of these early hominids.
 
11
Gintis cites the work of Robson and Kaplan (2003) who use an economic model to estimate the correlation between brain size and life expectancy (a measure of efficiency). In this context, the increase in brain size is driven by the requirement to solve complex cooperative games against nature.
 
12
See the discussion in Schofield (2011). See also Nordhaus (2013) for an economic model of climate change.
 
13
Weitzman (2009) and Chichilnisky (2010, 2014). See also Chichilnisky and Eisenberger (2010) on other catastrophic events such as collision with an asteroid.
 
14
See Schofield (1977, 1980a, b). In a sense these voting theorems can be regarded as derivative of Arrow’s Impossiblity Theorem (Arrow 1951). See also Arrow (1986).
 
15
The theory of chaos or complexity is rooted in Smale’s fundamental theorem (Smale 1966) that structural stability of dynamical systems is not “generic” or typical whenever the state space has more than two dimensions.
 
16
In their early analysis of chaos, Li and Yorke (1975) showed that in the domain of a chaotic transformation f it was possible for almost any pair of positions (xy) to transition from x to \(y=f^{r}(x),\) where \(f^{r}\) means the r times reiteration of f.
 
17
See Minsky (1975, 1986) and Keynes’s earlier work in 1921.
 
18
Karklins and Petersen (1993), Lohmann (1994). See also Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, and Welsh (1992).
 
19
The response by the citizens of these countries to the demise of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, is in large degree also unpredictable.
 
20
See for example Carothers (2002) and Collier (2009).
 
21
Golub and Jackson (2010).
 
22
See Henrich et al. (2004, 2005), which reports on experiments in fifteen “small-scale societies,” using the game theoretic tools of the “prisoners’ dilemma,” the “ultimatum game,” etc.
 
23
See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2008).
 
24
The popular protests in N. Africa and the Middle East in 2011 were in opposition to oligarchic and autocratic power.
 
25
See also Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975).
 
26
ie \(d(x)(v)>0\) for all \(x\in V,\) for all \(v\in H(x),\) whenever \(H(x)\ne \varnothing \).
 
27
Results on belief aggregation include Penn (2009) and McKelvey and Page (1986).
 
28
Schofield (1972a, b); Ladha (1992, 1993), 1995, 1996; Ladha and Miller (1996).
 
29
Sunstein (2006, 2011) also notes that belief aggregation can lead to a situation where subgroups in the society come to hold very disparate opinions.
 
30
Gleick (1987), Buchanan (2001, 2003), Gladwell (2002), Johnson (2002), Barabasi (2003, 2010), Strogatz (2004), Watts (2002, 2003), Surowiecki (2005), Ball (2004), Christakis and Fowler (2011).
 
31
See, for example, Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004), Shiller (2003, 2005), Taleb (2007), Barbera (2009), Cassidy (2009), Fox (2009).
 
32
See for example Cavallli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Bowles et al. (2003).
 
33
See also Eldredge (1976), Gould (1976).
 
34
Indeed as I understand the dynamical models, the chaotic episodes are due to the complex interactions of dynamical processes in the oceans, on the land, in weather, and in the heavens. These are very like interlinked coalitions of non-gradient vector fields.
 
35
It is interesting to note that Alfred Wallace (1898), who developed the theory of Natural Selection at the same time as Darwin, did not believe that the theory could provide an explanation for the development of mathematical abilities and moral beliefs in humankind.
 
36
This is suggested by Kahneman (2011).
 
37
As Smolin (2007) and Rees (2001) point out, the anthropic principle has been adopted because of the experimental evidence that the expansion of the universe is accelerating. Indeed it has led to the hypothesis that there is an infinity of universes all with different laws. An alternative inference is the principle of intelligent design. My own inference is that we require a teleology as proposed in the conclusion.
 
38
The work by Poincare in the late 19th century focussed on the structural stability of the solar system and was the first to conceive of the notion of chaos.
 
39
See also Waltham (2014).
 
40
Zhang (2007) and Hsiang et al. (2013) have provided a quantitative analysis of such adverse effects in the past. See also Parker (2013) for an historical account of the effect of climate change in early modern Europe, and Broodbank (2013) for the effects on the civilizations of the Mediterranean over a two thousand year period.
 
41
See Sperber (2013) for a discussion of the development of Marx’s ideas, in the context of 19th century belief in the teleology of “progresś” or the advance of civilization. The last hundred years has however,made it difficult to hold such beliefs.
 
42
The empirical work by Piketty (2014) suggests that capital is becoming predominant, and may be threatening the ability of democratic capitalism to survive. Cooper (2014) also argues against the neo-classical equilibrium model in economics, and suggests that governments engage in investment that would benefit the less well off members of society. This could be done by expanding investment in new technologies to counter climate change. Vogel (2014) sketches the increasing ability of “Big Money” to dominate politics. It is an open question whether the bad times that Randers (2014) and Turk and Rabino (2013) envision in our future will weaken the power of big money by inducing a popular backlash.
 
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Metadata
Title
Climate Change, Catastrophic Risks and Social Choice Theory
Author
Norman Schofield
Copyright Year
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31943-8_18