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2010 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

8. Concealment and Its Applications to Authenticated Encryption

Author : Yevgeniy Dodis

Published in: Practical Signcryption

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

In this chapter we will study a recent cryptographic primitive called concealment, which was introduced by Dodis and An [75, 76] because of its natural applications to authenticated encryption.

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previous chapter Hybrid Signcryption
next chapter Parallel Signcryption
Footnotes
1
We note that authenticated encryption in the public-key setting is typically called signcryption [203, 204]. However, since all our applications of concealments will work, with minor adjustments, in both in the symmetric- and in the public-key settings, we will use the term authenticated encryption throughout.
 
2
In this chapter, though, we will concentrate on the more popular symmetric-key setting, only briefly mentioning the simple extension to the public-key setting.
 
3
Except that both [107] and [40] insist on achieving some kind of pseudorandomness of the output. Even though our constructions achieve it as well, we feel this requirement is not crucial for any application of RKAE and was mainly put to make the definition look similar to RK-PRPs.
 
4
Unfortunately, the shortest length of the binder b which we can currently achieve is roughly 300 bits. This means that most popular block ciphers, such as AES, cannot be used in this setting. However, any block cipher with a 512-bit block seems to be more than sufficient.
 
5
We could have allowed \({\mathcal{A}}\) to find \(h\neq h'\) as long as \((h,b)\), \((h',b)\) do not open to distinct messages \(m\neq m'\). However, we will find the stronger notion more convenient.
 
6
Meaning that the maximal probability that two unequal messages collide under a random H is at most \(\frac{n}{{\it v}2^{\it v}}\).
 
7
Meaning “strong unforgeability against chosen message attack.”
 
8
Meaning “indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attack.”
 
9
Of course, since S and R share the same key and use the same algorithms, there is no need to allow for “another” chosen message attack on R or a chosen ciphertext attack on S.
 
10
A slightly weaker notion of UF-CMA requires C to correspond to “new” message m not submitted to \({\texttt{AuthEnc}}_K(\cdot)\).
 
11
Note that the definition does not prevent so-called reflection attacks, where a message produced by S is returned back to S as a valid message from R. Such attacks can (and should) be easily prevented by a higher level application.
 
12
Meaning “indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack.”
 
13
The formalization of this claim is somewhat subtle; see [6].
 
14
Clearly, this also means that this is a secure way to build a “long” authenticated encryption from a single call to a block cipher. In fact, preimage resistance of H and key-one-wayness of \({\texttt{Enc}}\) are not needed in this case.
 
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Metadata
Title
Concealment and Its Applications to Authenticated Encryption
Author
Yevgeniy Dodis
Copyright Year
2010
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book
Practical Signcryption

Print ISBN: 978-3-540-89409-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-540-89411-7

Copyright Year: 2010

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89411-7_8

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