2. Conceptualizing the United States–China Security Dilemma

The terms ‘motives’ and ‘intentions’ have generally been used in an interchangeable manner by IR scholars, but in the context of the security dilemma states’ motives refer to the actual drivers of their responses to events, while states’ intentions relate to the actual behavior or policy prescriptions.

The ‘status quo’ (or a ‘status quo state’) is a term frequently used by Power Transition Theory (PTT) IR scholars to describe states that consider the international system of states (and international law) as integral features of the international system which need to be upheld and defended. Actors who hold the opposite view are termed ‘revisionists’ (or revisionist states). The term can also relate to a broad range of nonsecurity areas such as economic and trade relations. To be sure, states may be dissatisfied with the status quo in the ‘security’ domain, while they are satisfied with ‘nonsecurity’ relations. This book will focus specifically on the concept of ‘status quo’ (and ‘status quo states’) in the context of the United States–China military balance in the Asia-Pacific.

The ‘benign’ and ‘greedy’ or nongreedy concept in this context refers to particular states’ behavior within the international community, and, specifically, whether a state intends to expand and accumulate power motivated by security seeking; or instead driven by aggressive and expansionist foreign policies and military doctrines. See, Glaser, C. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171–201.

For the purposes of clarity, this book differentiates between the ‘security dilemma concept’ (or the security dilemma theory and theorizing) and ‘security dilemma dynamics’. The former denotes a particular condition in IR, while the latter, the various possible causes, conceptual assumptions, regulators, and implications of this condition between states. Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623.

Booth, K., & Wheeler, N.J. (2008). The security dilemma: Fear, cooperation, and trust world politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan, Chap. 2.

From a political science perspective, the use of the term ‘anarchy’ refers to an absence of an international political authority that is separate from and superseding sovereign states. There has been some debate among IR theorists relating to the nature of the link between anarchy, the security dilemma, and war. Several scholars have challenged the notion that anarchy in IR necessarily results in security dilemmas and conflict. See Trachtenberg, M. (1991). History and strategy. Oxford; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425. Kydd, A. (1997). Sheep in sheep’s clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other. Security Studies, 7(1), 114–155.

Security dilemmas also exist in other non-IR contexts where anarchical conditions have been established such as environmental climate debates; ethnic conflicts; and even some areas of International Political Economy (IPE), for example currency wars and tariff negotiations. See Posen, B.R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. Survival, 35(1), 22–47; Brown, M.E. (1993). Ethnic conflict and international security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Wheeler, N.J. (2014). Interview with Robert Jervis. International Relations, 28(4), 479–504.

Herz, J.H. (1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. World Politics, 2(2), 157–180.

Herz, J.H. (1951). Political realism and political idealism: A study in theories and realities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 15.

Butterfield, H. (1951). History and human relations. London: Collins, 20. Herz originally posited that security dilemmas were all pervasive, but in his later writings, he refuted Butterfield’s position that the security dilemma was the root cause of all human conflict. Thus, for Herz the security dilemma was a cause, but not the only possible cause of war.

Ibid., 21.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chap. 3. In this pioneering text, Jervis discusses the interaction between the structure features that exist in the international system (especially anarchy and uncertainty), with the perceptions held by actors in the system.

The conceptual framework used by Jervis in this seminal paper on the security dilemma draws on Rousseau’s ideas on the ‘Stag Hunt’ and ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ games. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception international politics (pp. 74–77). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Several scholars have noted, however, that Jervis did not adequately address the issue of the extent to which these cognitive and perceptual factors outweigh, or offset, the structural anarchical ones. See Glaser, C. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171–201.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.

See Glaser, C. (1992). Political consequences of military strategy: Expanding and refining the spiral and deterrence models. World Politics, 44(4), 497–538; Lynn-Jones, S.M. (1995). Offense-defense theory and its critics. Security Studies, 4(4), 660–691; Lieber, K. (2000). Grasping the technological peace: The offense-defense balance and international security. International Security, 25(1), 71–104.

Snyder, J.L. (2014). Both fox and hedgehog: The art of nesting structural and perceptual perspectives. In J. Davis (Ed.), Psychology, strategy and conflict: Perceptions of insecurity in international relations (pp. 13–24). New York, NY: Routledge. Jervis distinguished between actors whose perceptions are either emotionally driven (‘motivated’) or more cognitively influenced (‘nonmotivated’). He stated that ‘the former derive from the need to maintain psychological well-being and a desired self-image; the latter from the need for short-cuts to rationality … [conditioned by] complex and ambiguous information’. In his more recent research, Jervis added a caveat: the influences and drivers of motivated and cognitive influences are hard to separate. Jervis, R. (2002). Signaling and perception. In K.R. Monroe (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 293–314). NJ: Earlbaum.

Ibid., 202.

Wheeler, N.J. (2014). Interview with Robert Jervis. International Relations, 28(4), 486.

Jervis, R. (2002). Signaling and perception. In K.R. Monroe (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 293–314). NJ: Earlbaum.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 75.

Scholars have often used United States–Soviet relations during the Cold War to illustrate self-images and perceptual bias in IR. See Garthoff, R.L. (1994). Detente and confrontation: American-soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Neoliberal IR scholars argue that the existence of ‘democratic political structures’ can maintain peace between states, precisely because they are able to alleviate the security dilemma. See Weinberger, S. (2003). Institutional signaling and the origins of the cold war. Security Studies, 12(4), 80–115. Constructivist IR theorists argue that the dilemma is just one of the available avenues by which states—through a process of shifting identities—can influence the nature of anarchy in IR. See Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425.

On theoretical debates relating to these ‘material regulators’ and the security dilemma theorizing, see Snyder, J.L. (1993). Myths of empire: Domestic politics and international ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Buzan, B., Jones, C.A., & Little, R. (1993). The logic of anarchy: Neorealism to structural realism. Chichester; New York: Columbia University Press; Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623.

See Quester, G.H. (1977). Offense and defense in the international system. New York; London: Wiley; Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214; Snyder, J.L. (2014). Both fox and hedgehog: The art of nesting structural and perceptual perspectives. In J. Davis (Ed.), Psychology, strategy and conflict: Perceptions of insecurity in international relations (pp. 13–24). New York, NY: Routledge; Glaser, C. (1992). Political consequences of military strategy: Expanding and refining the spiral and deterrence models. World Politics, 44(4), 497–538; Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Historically states have tended to face greater challenges in projecting their military power over long distances, especially at sea. See Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York; London: Norton, 83–84.

See Christensen, T.J., & Snyder, J.L. (1990). Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multi-polarity. International Organization, 44(2), 137–168; Posen, B.R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. Survival, 35(1), 22–47; Acharya, S. (2007). Security dilemmas in Asia. International Studies, 44(1), 57–72; Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623.

Notable and recent exceptions include Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623; Acharya, S. (2007). Security dilemmas in Asia. International Studies, 44(1), 57–72.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214; Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623.

Schweller, R.L. (1998). Deadly imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s struggle for world conquest. NY: Columbia University Press; Jervis, R. (2002). Signaling and perception. In K.R. Monroe (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 39–42). NJ: Earlbaum.

Wolfers, A. (1952). “National security” as an ambiguous symbol. Political Science Quarterly, 67(4), 481–502.

Booth, K., & Wheeler, N.J. (2008). The security dilemma: Fear, cooperation, and trust world politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 4–5, & 38.

Jervis, R. (2002). Signaling and perception. In K.R. Monroe (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 293–314). NJ: Earlbaum.

This opportunistic strategy has been termed by Steven Van Evera as a ‘window of opportunity’. Van Evera used this concept to describe preemptive power shifts in the relative balance of power between states. However, these ‘windows’ are invariably more perceived than determined by reality. Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Chap. 2.

Chengxin, P. (2004). The “China threat” in American self-imagination: The discursive construction of other as power politics. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(3), 305–331; Deng, Y. (2008). China’s struggle for status: The realignment of international relations. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; Friedberg, A., & Ross, R.S. (2009). Here be dragons. The National Interest, (103), 19–34.

Until the 1990s, the dominant opinion among both Western and Chinese scholars was that since 1949 China has pursued a relatively peaceful (or benign) trajectory, avoiding major conflict and wars, and employing military power in a limited fashion. See Johnston, A.I. (1995–1996). China’s new ‘old thinking’: The concept of limited deterrence. International Security, 20(3), 26; Scobell, A. (2003). China’s use of military force: Beyond the great wall and the long march. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 16–23. China’s use of military force (as opposed to the threat to use military force) declined in the post–Cold War era; since the 1990s, however, Beijing has placed an increasing emphasis on the accumulation of offensive-dominant capabilities—supported by the evolution of an equally offensive military doctrine. See Swaine, M., & Tellis, A.J. (2000). Interpreting China’s grand strategy: Past, present and future. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation; Goldstein, A. (2005). Rising to the challenge: China’s grand strategy and international security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

See Bernstein, R., & Munro, R. (1997). The coming conflict with America. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations; Wortzel, L. (1998). China’s military potential. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College; Johnston, A.I. (2004). Beijing’s security behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is China a dissatisfied power? In J.J. Suh, P.J. Katzenstein & A. Carlson (Eds.), Rethinking security in East Asia (Studies in Asian security). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 34–96; Kaplan, R. (2010). The geography of Chinese power. New York Times, 19 April 2016. Available at: http://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2010/​04/​20/​opinion/​20iht-edkaplan.​html (Accessed: 8 May 2014); Mearsheimer, J.J. (2014). The tragedy of great power politics. New York; London: Norton & Company; Rosato, S. (2014). The inscrutable intentions of great powers. International Security, 39(3), 48–88; Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future of warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti access, area denial, U.S. air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia. International Security, 41(1), 7–48.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York; London: Norton. For a contrarian view, that comes closest to maintaining that ‘nothing has changed’ in the durability and sustainability of the United States’ unipolar era, see Beckley, M. (2011). China’s century? Why America’s edge will endure. International Security, 36(3), 41–78.

Frequently cited examples of this ‘new’ assertive foreign policy include (1) Chinese bans on rare earth metal exports to Japan following the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands incident in 2010; (2) a ban on banana imports from the Philippines following the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident; (3) Chinese intransigence at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit on climate change; and more recently (4) recalcitrant Chinese responses to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and the official visit to the United States by the Dalai Lama in 2016; (5) allegations of Chinese (economic and trade) aggression in its disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over the South China Seas following the 2016 Hague arbitral tribunal ruling, and visa restrictions imposed on Korean celebrities in response to the decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea.

See Johnston, A.I. (2013). How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security, 37(4), 7–48; Bader, J. (2013). Obama and China’s rise: An insider’s account of America’s Asia strategy. NY: Brookings Institution Press, Chap. 7; Swaine, M. (2010). Perceptions of an assertive China. China Leadership Monitor, 32 (Spring); Landingin, R. & Kwong, R. (2012). Philippine business warns on China standoff. Financial Times, 15 May 2012. Available at: http://​www.​ft.​com/​intl/​cms/​s/​0/​24d5edf2-9e80-11e1-a767-00144feabdc0.​html#axzz3zSIh4ors (Accessed: 10 February 2013); West, K. (2012). Banana Crisis blamed on Philippine-China dispute. ABC News, 29 June 2012. Available at: http://​www.​abc.​net.​au/​news/​2012-06-29/​an-banana-exporters-caught-in-philippines-china-dispute/​4100422 (Accessed: 10 February 2013); Hyo-Sik, L. (2016). Cosmetics, entertainment stocks hit by China’s THAAD backlash. The Korea Times, 5 August 2016; http://​www.​koreatimes.​co.​kr/​www/​news/​biz/​2016/​08/​123_​211227.​html (Accessed: 10 February 2013).

Friedberg, A. (2015). The sources of Chinese conduct: Explaining Beijing’s assertiveness. The Washington Quarterly, 37(4), 133–134; Shambaugh, D. (2010). The year China showed its claws. The Financial Times, 16 February 2010. Available at: http://​www.​ft.​com/​intl/​cms/​s/​0/​7503a600-1b30-11df-953f-00144feab49a.​html#axzz431FHEnb4 (Accessed: 10 February 2013).

President Xi defined this ‘new type of great power relations’ as (1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and treating each other’s strategic intentions objectively; (2) mutual respect, including for each other’s core interests and major concerns; and (3) mutually beneficial cooperation, by abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest. Li, C. & Xu, L. (2014). Enthusiasm and American cynicism over the “new type of great power relations”. Brookings Op-ed. 4 December 2014. Available at: https://​www.​brookings.​edu/​opinions/​chinese-enthusiasm-and-american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/​ (Accessed: 8 May 2017).

Johnston, A.I. (2013). How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security, 37(4), 7–48; Silove, N. (2016). The pivot before the pivot: U.S. strategy to preserve the power balance in Asia. International Security, 40(4), 45–88.

Beckley, M. (2011). China’s century? Why America’s edge will endure. International Security, 36(3), 41–78; Khong, Y.F. (2013). Primacy or world order? The United States and China’s rise—A review essay. International Security, 38(3), 153–175. IR theorists have long debated whether military ‘parity’ between states increases or decreases the likelihood of conflict and war. See Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Boston, Mass: McGraw-Hill; Lemke, D., & Werner, S. (1996). Power parity, commitment to change, and war. International Security, 40(2), 235–260.

Swaine, M. (2010). Perceptions of an assertive China. China Leadership Monitor, 32 (Spring), 2. Friedberg, A. (2015). The sources of Chinese conduct: Explaining Beijing’s assertiveness. The Washington Quarterly, 37(4), 133–134.

See Johnston, A.I. (2003). Is China a status quo power? International Security, 27(4), 50. Godwin, P. (2010). Asia’s dangerous security dilemma. Current History, 109(728), 264–266. Scobell, A. (2012). Learning to rise peacefully? China and the security dilemma. Journal of Contemporary China, 21(76), 713–721; Allison, G. (2012). Thucydides’ trap has been sprung in the Pacific: China and America are the Athens and Sparta of today, says Graham Allison. The Financial Times, 21 August 2012. Available at: http://​www.​ft.​com/​intl/​cms/​s/​0/​5d695b5a-ead3-11e1-984b-00144feab49a.​html?​siteedition=​intl#axzz3AEPoyH5A (Accessed: 12 February 2013).

Schelling, T.C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University; Nye, J.J. (2010). Cyber power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School.

Mastro, O.S. (2015). Why Chinese assertiveness is here to stay. The Washington Quarterly, 37(4), 151–170; Johnston, A.I. (2013). How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security, 37(4), 7–48.

Kydd, A. (1997). Sheep in sheep’s clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other. Security Studies, 7(1), 114–155; Glaser, C. (2004). When are arms races dangerous? Rational versus suboptimal arming. International Security, 28(4), 44–84; Johnston, A.I. (2013). How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security, 37(4), 7–48.

For example, Poling, G. (2017). China’s big three near completions: Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Townshend, A., & Medical, R. (2016). Shifting waters: China’s new passive assertiveness in Asian maritime security. Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute.

See Christensen, T.J. (1999). China, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia. International Security, 23(4), 49–80; Christensen, T.J. (2001). Posing problems without catching up. International Security, 25(4), 5–40; Deng, Y. (2006). Reputation and the security dilemma: China reacts to the China threat theory. In A.I. Johnston, & R.S. Ross (Eds.), New directions in the study of China’s foreign policy (pp. 186–216). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 186–216; Glaser, B.S., & Medeiros, E.S. (2007). The changing ecology of foreign policy-making in China: The ascension and demise of the theory of “peaceful rise”. The China Quarterly, 190(190), 291–310.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 181.

Johnston, A.I. (2004). Beijing’s security behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is China a dissatisfied power? In J.J. Suh, P.J. Katzenstein, & A. Carlson (Eds.), Rethinking security in East Asia (Studies in Asian security). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 54.

For example, at least since 2010 China’s coastguard has conducted regular patrols in the waters around the Senkaku Islands, designed to challenge Japan’s administrative control of the islands and adjoining seas.

Glaser, C., & Fetter, S. (2001). National missile defense and the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. International Security, 26(1), 40; Friedberg, A. (2005). The future of U.S.-China relations. International Security, 30(2), 23; Lieber, K., & Press, D. (2006). The end of MAD? The nuclear dimension of U.S. primacy. International Security, 30(6), 7–47.

See Blair, B., & Chen, Y. (2006). Editor’s notes: The space security dilemma. World Security Institute, 2(1); Johnson-Freese, J. (2007). Space as a strategic asset. New York, NY: Columbia University Press; Gompert, D.C., & Libicki, M. (2014). Cyber warfare and Sino-American crisis instability. Survival, 54(7), 7–22; Johnson-Freese, J. (2015). Testimony before the U.S.-China economic and security review commission—‘China’s space & counter-space programs’. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future of warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti access, area denial, U.S. air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia. International Security, 41(1), 7–48.

Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 594.

Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623.

The competing schools of structural realism generally agree on this point.

Several IR scholars have debated these kinds of issues in relation to the security dilemma. See Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Snyder, J.L. (1985). Perceptions of security dilemma in 1914. In R. Jervis, R.N. Lebow, & J.G. Stein (Eds.), Psychology and deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Lebow, R.N., & Stein, J.G. (Eds.). (1989). Psychology and deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Larson, D. (1997). Anatomy of mistrust: U.S.-soviet relations during the cold war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Tang, S., & Montgomery, E.B. (2007). Uncertainty and reassurance in international politics. International Security, 32(1), 193–200; Kydd, A. (2007). Trust and mistrust in international relations (3rd ed.) Princeton University Press.

For a theoretical study on ‘asymmetrical conflict’, see Arreguin-Toft, I.M. (2005). How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Freedman, L. (2013). Strategy: A history. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 220–221.

Collins, A.R. (2000). The security dilemma of Southeast Asia. London: Palgrave Macmillan; Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623.

‘Weapons asymmetry’ in this context is conditioned by the overwhelming superiority of the United States in all military domains. That is, the ‘asymmetrical’ features of China’s weapons are conditioned by the nature of the prevailing United States–China military balance of power, or an asymmetric distribution of military power. In other words, it is the ‘target’ of these weapons, as opposed to any intrinsic asymmetric features of these weapons themselves, which determines ‘asymmetry’. As this chapter described, the military balance of power between states is one of the core ‘material regulators’ of the security dilemma.

Several scholars have conducted this kind of comparative weapons analysis, and in a few cases have also used security dilemma explanations, for example studies on space, cyber, and electronic warfare (EW) domains. See Pollpeter, K. (2012). Space, cyber, and electronic warfare: Controlling the information domain. In A.J. Tellis, & T. Tanner (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s military challenge (pp. 163–194). Seattle and Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 163–194; Gompert, D.C., & Saunders, P. (2011). The paradox of power: Sino-American strategic restraint in the age of vulnerability. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

Notable exceptions include Finkelstein, D.M. (2007). China’s national military strategy: An overview of the “military strategic guidelines”. In R. Kamphausen, & A. Scobell (Eds.), Right sizing the people’s liberation army: Exploring the contours of China’s military. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 69–140; Wishik, A.L. (2011). An anti-access approximation: The PLA’s active counterattacks on exterior lines. China Security, World Security Institute, 1(19), 37–48; Fravel, T.M., & Twomey, C.P. (2015). Projecting strategy: The myth of Chinese counter-intervention. The Washington Quarterly, 37(4), 171–187; Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future of warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti access, area denial, U.S. air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia. International Security, 41(1), 7–48.