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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China

Authors : Joseph Lee, Yonghui Bao

Published in: Takeover Law in the UK, the EU and China

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter, the takeover market is used as an example to examine the extent to which regulatory alignment between the UK and China is possible. The focus is on the role of financial intermediaries in the two markets and how they may influence the governance model of transfer of corporate control by an open offer to the shareholders of the target company (a takeover bid). This chapter argues that the policy goals are very different, making regulatory alignment difficult to be realised. There are differences between the UK and China in their economic model, ownership structure and institutional arrangements, which is reflected in the differences in the interests served by takeover law in the two regimes. The design of the framework for takeover law in the UK empowers financial market participants, so as to attract capital to the London markets. In contrast, China’s takeover law is mainly aimed at facilitating industrial restructuring and creating globally competitive national companies (national champions). Hence, the UK’s shareholder-centred takeover model, with a strong focus on financial intermediaries and international investors, could not easily be replicated in China. However, the UK model could provide lessons for China as it develops its takeover market, extends its market structure reform, develops independent financial intermediaries and attracts an increasing number of investors.
Footnotes
1
Armstrong (2018).
 
2
European Parliament (2018).
 
3
Tella (2019).
 
4
Armour and Skeel (2007).
 
5
Huang (2019).
 
6
For introduction of facts of the Vanke takeover battle (by Baoneng).
 
7
Armour and Skeel (2007).
 
8
Lee (2017).
 
9
Xi (2015).
 
10
National Statistics (2016).
 
11
Lee (2017).
 
12
The Takeover Panel (2020).
 
13
Takeover Code, General Principle 5, Rule 24.16 and Rule 25.8.
 
14
Bodnaruk et al. (2009).
 
15
Ibid.
 
16
Ibid.
 
17
Liu and Lou (2016).
 
18
Ibid.
 
19
Ibid.
 
20
Takeovers Code, Rule 19.
 
21
Takeovers Code, Rule 24.8.
 
22
Takeovers Code, Rule 24.10.
 
23
Takeovers Code, Rule 3.1 and Rule 26.3.
 
24
Takeovers Code, Rule 3.3 and Rule 16.2.
 
25
Takeovers Code, Rule 25.2 (a).
 
26
Kershaw (2016).
 
27
Servaes and Zenner (1996).
 
28
Takeovers Code, Rule 9.5.
 
29
Han (2017).
 
30
Armour et al. (2002a, b).
 
31
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018).
 
32
Xi (2006).
 
33
As of 2018, the market value of funds in China amounted to 130 billion.
 
34
Xi (2006).
 
35
Ibid.
 
36
Ibid.
 
37
The figure was 19.86% in accordance to the survey report conducted by OECD in 2017.
 
38
WFE data in 2016; also see OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Frameworks in Asia 2017.
 
39
Corporate Governance Code of China’s Listed Companies, Art. 78, 79, 80, 81 & 82.
 
40
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Law, Art. 4.
 
41
See ‘Notice Concerning the Relevant Issues on Strengthening the Approval, Registration, Foreign Exchange Control and Taxation Administration of Foreign-Funded Enterprises (2003)’.
 
42
Foreign Investment Law, Art. 21.
 
43
Schaub et al. (2019).
 
44
Foreign Investment Law, Article 9.
 
45
Koty (2019).
 
46
Xin Hua News (2018).
 
47
Securities Law (2019 revision), Art. 63.
 
48
Securities Law (2019 revision), Art. 68.
 
49
Shen (2014).
 
50
Sender (2011).
 
51
SMEs as the creators of 60% of China’s GDP only enjoy 30% share of bank loans.
 
52
China Banking News (2018).
 
53
Huang (2019).
 
54
Opinions on Promoting Enterprise Merger and Restructuring, Article 1.
 
55
The State Council (2014a).
 
56
Shen (2016).
 
57
Zhu (2004).
 
58
Ibid.
 
59
Loubere and Zhang (2015).
 
60
Ibid.
 
61
Shen (2016).
 
62
Ibid.
 
63
See ‘Notice on Further Improving the Quality and Effect of Financial Services for Micro and Small-sized Enterprises in 2019’.
 
64
Coffee (2001).
 
65
The Investment Association (2018).
 
66
Office for National Statistics (2018a, b).
 
67
For detailed discussions, see Paul (1993).
 
68
Office for National Statistics (2018a, b).
 
69
For detailed discussion, see Andrew (2014).
 
70
Davis (2015).
 
71
Office for National Statistics (2018a, b).
 
72
Ibid.
 
73
The Investment Association (2019).
 
74
Ibid.
 
75
Armour et al. (2009).
 
76
Davis (1993).
 
77
Ibid.
 
78
Ibid.
 
79
OECD (2011).
 
80
Armour and Skeel (2007).
 
81
Huang and Chen (2018).
 
82
Kershaw (2016).
 
83
Ibid.
 
84
LEX (2012).
 
85
Charkham (1989).
 
86
Financial Reporting Council (2020).
 
87
Ibid.
 
88
Bishop and Kay (1989).
 
89
Shahid et al. (2005).
 
90
Huang and Chen (2018).
 
91
Lee (2017).
 
92
Ibid.
 
93
Ibid.
 
94
The Investment Association (2017).
 
95
Takeovers Code, Rule 21.1.
 
96
Takeovers Code, Rule 9.1.
 
97
Takeovers Code, Rule 24.16.
 
98
Lee (2017).
 
99
Takeovers Code, Rule 2.2.
 
100
Takeovers Code, Rule 24.16, Rule 25.8.
 
101
Cassis and Wojcik (2018).
 
102
Franks and Mayer (2017).
 
103
Lee (2017).
 
104
Reisberg (2015).
 
105
The UK Stewardship Code, Principle 2.
 
106
Armour et al. (2002a, b).
 
107
Steinitz (2012).
 
108
Ibid.
 
109
Lee (2017).
 
110
Ibid.
 
111
Ibid.
 
112
CCP (1982).
 
113
Cai (2011a, b).
 
114
Bebchuk et al. (1999).
 
115
Xianchu (2003).
 
116
Wolff (2004).
 
117
Ibid.
 
118
The State Council of China (2014) Opinions on further Optimising M&A Market Conditions.
 
119
SASAC (2013).
 
120
Report on China’s Corporate Governance 2009: The Market for Corporate Control and Corporate Governance. Fudan University Press.
 
121
Ibid.
 
122
Chi et al. (2009).
 
123
The State Council (2010).
 
124
Ibid.
 
125
Xi (2015).
 
126
Huang and Chen (2018).
 
127
Cai (2011a, b).
 
128
Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies, Article 8 & 33.
 
129
Cai (2011a, b).
 
130
Ibid.
 
131
Xi (2015).
 
132
Lin et al. (2017).
 
133
Bagwell (1991).
 
134
Lee (2017).
 
135
Milhaupt (2015).
 
136
Qiu (2017).
 
137
People’s Bank of China and the CSRC (2018).
 
138
Zhang (2008).
 
139
Cai (2011a, b).
 
140
Measures for Takeovers 2014, Art. 61.
 
141
Ibid.
 
142
Ibid.
 
143
Measures for Takeovers 2014, Article 24.
 
144
Cai (2011a, b).
 
145
Measures for Takeovers 2014, Article 25.
 
146
Cai (2011a, b).
 
147
Measures for Takeovers 2020, Art. 61.
 
148
Measures for Takeovers 2020, Art. 62 & 63.
 
149
Xi (2015).
 
150
Securities Law (2019 Revision), Art. 65.
 
151
Measures for Takeovers 2020, Art. 24.
 
152
Securities Law (2019 Revision).
 
153
Code of Corporate Governance for China’s Listed Companies (2019 Revision).
 
154
Huang and Chen (2018).
 
155
Lee (2017).
 
156
Ibid.
 
157
Kershaw (2016).
 
158
Ogowewo (2007).
 
159
The Takeover Panel (2020).
 
160
Kershaw (2016).
 
161
Nyombi (2015).
 
162
Ibid.
 
163
Department for Business (2012).
 
164
Kershaw (2016).
 
165
Lee (2017).
 
166
Ibid.
 
167
Kershaw (2016).
 
168
Lee (2017).
 
169
Ibid.
 
170
Guanghua and Minkang (2001).
 
171
Hui (2014).
 
172
Ibid.
 
173
Guanghua (2005).
 
174
Huang and Chen (2018).
 
175
Ibid.
 
176
Xi (2015).
 
177
Measures for Takeovers 2002, Article 49.
 
178
Measures for Takeovers 2002, Article 34.
 
179
Measures for Takeovers 2002, Article 13, 14 and 23.
 
180
Xi (2015).
 
181
Measures for Takeovers 2002, Article 13.
 
182
Measures for Takeovers 2006, Article 24 and 25.
 
183
The State Council (2014b).
 
184
Ibid.
 
185
Cai (2011a, b).
 
186
Measures for Takeovers 2006, Article 8 and 24.
 
187
Measures for Takeovers 2006, Article 49.
 
188
Hua (2007).
 
189
Measures for Takeovers 2002, Article 13.
 
190
Measures for Takeovers 2002, Article 49.
 
191
For the detailed discussions, see Sect. 3 of this chapter.
 
192
Cai (2011a, b).
 
193
Ibid.
 
194
Ibid.
 
195
Ibid.
 
196
James (2019).
 
197
Ibid.
 
198
Huang and Chen (2018).
 
199
Ibid.
 
200
Caixin (2017).
 
201
Huang (2019).
 
202
China Daily (2017).
 
203
An Ran (2017).
 
204
Ibid.
 
205
Sheng (2017).
 
206
Empirical studies revealed that, in many listed companies’ articles of associations, an array of draconian takeover defences has been adopted, which harms shareholders’ interests. However, these defences are regulated by a soft-law approach, rather than prohibited by the securities regulatory authority (CSRC), i.e. stock exchanges issue ‘letters of concern’ to listed companies. For detailed discussion, see James (2019); also see Hui (2019).
 
207
Such as hostile takeover battels between Nanbo Float Glass Co., Ltd., v. Baoneng Investment Group (bidder), Yili Industrial Group v. Sunshine Insurance Group (bidder), and Gree Electric Appliances Industrial Group v. Foresea Life Insurance (bidder).
 
208
Xi (2015).
 
209
Guofeng and Junyi (2015).
 
210
CBRC (2018).
 
211
Ibid.
 
212
Ibid.
 
213
Measures for Takeovers 2020, Article 4.
 
214
Weilin et al. (2017).
 
215
Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (2017).
 
216
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2017).
 
217
Ibid.
 
218
For example, the contest between Chinese Company China National Offshore Oil Corporations (bidder) and US Unocal was the first big unsolicited takeover, which occurred in 2005.
 
219
Lee (2017).
 
220
Ibid.
 
221
Cai (2011a, b).
 
222
James (2019).
 
223
Cai (2011a, b).
 
224
Xi (2015).
 
225
Ibid.
 
226
Ibid.
 
227
Ibid.
 
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Metadata
Title
Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China
Authors
Joseph Lee
Yonghui Bao
Copyright Year
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72345-3_2

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