3. Coping with the “IMF Crisis” in the Developmental Liberal Context

South Korea’s economic collapse of 1997 was no less dramatic than its earlier economic success. Obviously, South Koreans overstretched their economic ambitions in the 1990s, so that suicidal economic expansion using short-term foreign loans was destined to cause a major balance-of-payment crisis. The unprecedented economic—and, for that matter, social—crisis, however, seems to have rooted in many more ills of the South Korean model of development. Particularly menacing were social problems emanating from the psychological bubble concerning material betterment, the welfare-suppressive accumulation strategy, and the authoritarian treatment of labor. These practices and habits were often considered instrumental to achieving rapid industrialization and economic growth, but their social costs remained unpaid. Incidentally, various risky social conditions which had accumulated under the South Korean development strategy and concomitant developmental liberalism in social policy began to hurt South Koreans at the grassroots level, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs working as a crucial catalyst.