Skip to main content
Top
Published in:

01-10-2013

Corporate tax competition between firms

Authors: Simon Loretz, Padraig J. Moore

Published in: International Tax and Public Finance | Issue 5/2013

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Firms’ tax planning decisions, similar to their other operational decisions, are made in a competitive environment. Various stakeholders observe the tax payments and evaluate these against the relevant peer group. This implies firms might not simply minimise their tax burden, but also consider their competitors behaviour when deciding about tax planning. Empirically this creates interdependencies in the tax planning activities of firms. Introducing the concept of a reputational loss we show the positive interdependence in a theoretical model and test it in a spatial econometric model. Empirical evidence suggests that benchmarking takes place both within countries and within industries, however for the latter it is important to include firms in large non-EU OECD countries.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
Throughout the paper ETR denotes various ratios of tax payments or liabilities to pre-tax profit. For a survey and discussion of early empirical evidence, see Hines (1999).
 
2
The big exception is the accounting literature where a number of recent papers have investigated tax aggressiveness. See Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for a comprehensive survey.
 
3
See Slemrod (2007) for a review of the literature on personal income tax evasion.
 
4
See Freedman et al. (2009) for a discussion of this risk rating.
 
5
For further evidence for this hypothesis see Desai et al. (2007) and Desai and Dharmapala (2009).
 
6
See Rego (2003) for a summary and discussion of this literature.
 
7
See Zimmerman (1983) and Omer et al. (1993) for a discussion and early evidence for the political cost hypothesis.
 
8
Collins and Shackelford (1999) find only inconclusive evidence for this hypothesis.
 
9
See www.​theguardian.​co.​uk/​taxgap. For further examples of political pressure from the wider public, see the publications of Citizen for Tax Justice (United States) or Tax Justice Network International.
 
10
See also Moore (2008) for a different theoretical approach to tax benchmarking, where managers optimise the ETR in order to avoid being voted off by the shareholders.
 
11
However, the results do not change qualitatively if the reputational loss is tax-deductible. The calculations are available from the authors by request.
 
12
See the working paper version of this paper for a version which uses ORBIS, provided by Bureau van Dijk, which covers more companies with less detailed accounting information.
 
13
In particular, the requirement to pay the taxes in installments upfront may lead to a negative correlation between the actual tax burden and the tax payable in the case of losses. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this problem. The results using the ETR payable measure can be found in the Online Appendix at the authors’ website.
 
14
This also includes current liabilities; see also Huizinga et al. (2008) for a similar approach.
 
15
We are grateful to Dhammika Dharmapala for pointing us in this direction.
 
16
We also eliminate all observations with a leverage bigger than unity. A complete description of the cleaning process is available from the authors upon request.
 
17
The corresponding descriptive statistics for the full unbalanced sample are very similar and are available in the Online Appendix on the authors’ website.
 
18
See Overesch and Rincke (2009) for a discussion of this problem.
 
19
The results are qualitatively similar without the size weighting. The full set of results is included in the Online Appendix on the authors’ website.
 
20
See Anselin (1988) for a discussion about row standardisation.
 
21
See Brueckner (2003) for a discussion of this issue.
 
22
See also Anselin et al. (2008).
 
23
See Cowling and Waterson (1976) or Machin and Van Reenen (1993) for evidence on the connection between market share, industry concentration and profitability.
 
24
See also Kelejian and Prucha (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the problem of unbalanced data in a spatial setting.
 
25
An additional complication lies in the variety of accounting standards which are used by firms. While we aim to control for different accounting standards by the inclusion of firm fixed effects, time fixed effects and the inclusion of the statutory corporate tax which varies at the country-year level, there might be other idiosyncratic effects associated with the accounting standards.
 
26
An alternative approach would be to (partly) collapse the panel into a cross section, which would mitigate the time dimension issue of the loss carry-forward. In fact, we have collapsed the firm data into four points of time and reran the regression on this sample. The results change only quantitatively and a similar conclusion can be drawn.
 
27
For example, a common shock could be enforcement strategies which vary across jurisdictions as discussed in De Waegenaere et al. (2006).
 
Literature
go back to reference Abarbanell, J., & Bushee, B. (1998). Abnormal returns to a fundamental analysis strategy. The Accounting Review, 13(1), 19–45. Abarbanell, J., & Bushee, B. (1998). Abnormal returns to a fundamental analysis strategy. The Accounting Review, 13(1), 19–45.
go back to reference Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323–338. CrossRef Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323–338. CrossRef
go back to reference Anselin, L. (1988). Spatial econometrics: methods and models. Boston: Kluwer Academic. CrossRef Anselin, L. (1988). Spatial econometrics: methods and models. Boston: Kluwer Academic. CrossRef
go back to reference Anselin, L., Le Gallo, J., & Jayet, H. (2008). Spatial panel econometrics. In L. Mátyás & P. Sevestre (Eds.), The econometrics of panel data. Berlin: Springer. Anselin, L., Le Gallo, J., & Jayet, H. (2008). Spatial panel econometrics. In L. Mátyás & P. Sevestre (Eds.), The econometrics of panel data. Berlin: Springer.
go back to reference Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2004). Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2004). Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
go back to reference Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. The Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. CrossRef Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. The Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. CrossRef
go back to reference Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: an overview of empirical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175–188. CrossRef Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: an overview of empirical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175–188. CrossRef
go back to reference Chen, K.-P., & Chu, C. Y. C. (2005). Internal control versus external manipulation: a model of corporate income tax evasion. The RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 151–164. Chen, K.-P., & Chu, C. Y. C. (2005). Internal control versus external manipulation: a model of corporate income tax evasion. The RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 151–164.
go back to reference Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41–61. CrossRef Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41–61. CrossRef
go back to reference Collins, J., & Shackelford, D. (1999). Writers challenge claim of favorable cross-border taxation. Tax Notes, 82(4), 131–134. Collins, J., & Shackelford, D. (1999). Writers challenge claim of favorable cross-border taxation. Tax Notes, 82(4), 131–134.
go back to reference Cowling, K., & Waterson, M. (1976). Price-cost margins and market structure. Economica, 43, 267–274. CrossRef Cowling, K., & Waterson, M. (1976). Price-cost margins and market structure. Economica, 43, 267–274. CrossRef
go back to reference Crocker, K. J., & Slemrod, J. (2005). Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1593–1610. CrossRef Crocker, K. J., & Slemrod, J. (2005). Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1593–1610. CrossRef
go back to reference Desai, M. A., Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2007). Theft and taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(3), 591–623. CrossRef Desai, M. A., Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2007). Theft and taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(3), 591–623. CrossRef
go back to reference Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006a). Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 145–179. CrossRef Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006a). Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 145–179. CrossRef
go back to reference Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006b). Earnings management and corporate tax shelters. Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 884812. Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006b). Earnings management and corporate tax shelters. Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 884812.
go back to reference Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2009). Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(3), 537–546. CrossRef Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2009). Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(3), 537–546. CrossRef
go back to reference Desai, M. A., & Hines, J. R. Jr. (2002). Expectations and expatriations: tracing the causes and consequences of corporate inversions. National Tax Journal, 55(3), 409–441. Desai, M. A., & Hines, J. R. Jr. (2002). Expectations and expatriations: tracing the causes and consequences of corporate inversions. National Tax Journal, 55(3), 409–441.
go back to reference De Waegenaere, A., Sansing, R. C., & Wielhouwer, J. L. (2006). Who benefits from inconsistent multinational tax transfer-pricing rules? Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(1), 103–131. CrossRef De Waegenaere, A., Sansing, R. C., & Wielhouwer, J. L. (2006). Who benefits from inconsistent multinational tax transfer-pricing rules? Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(1), 103–131. CrossRef
go back to reference Freedman, J., Loomer, G., & Vella, J. (2009). Corporate tax risk and tax avoidance: new approaches. British Tax Review, 74–116. Freedman, J., Loomer, G., & Vella, J. (2009). Corporate tax risk and tax avoidance: new approaches. British Tax Review, 74–116.
go back to reference Graham, J. R., & Tucker, A. (2006). Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 563–594. CrossRef Graham, J. R., & Tucker, A. (2006). Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 563–594. CrossRef
go back to reference Gupta, S., & Newberry, K. (1997). Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16(1), 1–34. CrossRef Gupta, S., & Newberry, K. (1997). Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16(1), 1–34. CrossRef
go back to reference Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 127–178. CrossRef Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 127–178. CrossRef
go back to reference Hanlon, M., & Slemrod, J. (2009). What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Ecnomics, 93, 126–141. CrossRef Hanlon, M., & Slemrod, J. (2009). What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Ecnomics, 93, 126–141. CrossRef
go back to reference Hines, J. R. Jr. (1999). Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation. National Tax Journal, 52(2), 305–322. Hines, J. R. Jr. (1999). Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation. National Tax Journal, 52(2), 305–322.
go back to reference Huizinga, H., Laeven, L., & Nicodeme, G. (2008). Capital structure and international debt shifting. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(1), 80–118. CrossRef Huizinga, H., Laeven, L., & Nicodeme, G. (2008). Capital structure and international debt shifting. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(1), 80–118. CrossRef
go back to reference Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 193–228. CrossRef Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 193–228. CrossRef
go back to reference Kelejian, H. H., & Robinson, D. P. (1993). A suggested method of estimation for spatial interdependent models with autocorrelated errors, and an application to a county expenditure model. Papers in Regional Science, 72, 297–312. CrossRef Kelejian, H. H., & Robinson, D. P. (1993). A suggested method of estimation for spatial interdependent models with autocorrelated errors, and an application to a county expenditure model. Papers in Regional Science, 72, 297–312. CrossRef
go back to reference Kelejian, H. H., & Prucha, I. (1998). A generalized spatial two-stage least squares procedures for estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 17, 99–121. CrossRef Kelejian, H. H., & Prucha, I. (1998). A generalized spatial two-stage least squares procedures for estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 17, 99–121. CrossRef
go back to reference Kelejian, H. H., & Prucha, I. R. (2010). Spatial models with spatially lagged dependent variables and incomplete data. Journal of Geographical Systems, 12, 241–257. CrossRef Kelejian, H. H., & Prucha, I. R. (2010). Spatial models with spatially lagged dependent variables and incomplete data. Journal of Geographical Systems, 12, 241–257. CrossRef
go back to reference Kleibergen, F., & Paap, R. (2006). Generalized reduced rank tests using the singular value decomposition. Journal of Econometrics, 127(1), 97–126. CrossRef Kleibergen, F., & Paap, R. (2006). Generalized reduced rank tests using the singular value decomposition. Journal of Econometrics, 127(1), 97–126. CrossRef
go back to reference Leblang, S. (1998). International double nontaxation. Tax Notes International, 134(10), 181–183. Leblang, S. (1998). International double nontaxation. Tax Notes International, 134(10), 181–183.
go back to reference Levenson, A. (1999). Worldly planning for global firms. Electronic News, 16. Levenson, A. (1999). Worldly planning for global firms. Electronic News, 16.
go back to reference Machin, S., & Van Reenen, J. (1993). Profit margins and the business cycle: evidence from UK manufacturing firms. Journal of Industrial Economics, 41(1), 29–49. CrossRef Machin, S., & Van Reenen, J. (1993). Profit margins and the business cycle: evidence from UK manufacturing firms. Journal of Industrial Economics, 41(1), 29–49. CrossRef
go back to reference Mills, L., Erickson, M., & Maydew, E. (1998). Investments in tax planning. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 20, 1–20. Mills, L., Erickson, M., & Maydew, E. (1998). Investments in tax planning. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 20, 1–20.
go back to reference Moore, P. J. (2008). Tax planning by firms and tax competition by governments. PhD thesis, Trinity College, Dublin. Moore, P. J. (2008). Tax planning by firms and tax competition by governments. PhD thesis, Trinity College, Dublin.
go back to reference Omer, T., Molloy, K., & Ziebart, D. (1993). An investigation of the firm size-effective tax rate relation in the 1980s. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 8(2), 167–182. Omer, T., Molloy, K., & Ziebart, D. (1993). An investigation of the firm size-effective tax rate relation in the 1980s. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 8(2), 167–182.
go back to reference Overesch, M., & Rincke, J. (2009). What drives corporate tax rates down? A reassessment of globalization, tax competition, and dynamic adjustment to shocks. CESifo Working Paper No. 2535. Overesch, M., & Rincke, J. (2009). What drives corporate tax rates down? A reassessment of globalization, tax competition, and dynamic adjustment to shocks. CESifo Working Paper No. 2535.
go back to reference Posner, E. A. (2000). Law and social norms: the case of tax compliance. Virginia Law Review, 86, 1781–1819. CrossRef Posner, E. A. (2000). Law and social norms: the case of tax compliance. Virginia Law Review, 86, 1781–1819. CrossRef
go back to reference PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2009). Tax benchmarking survey for the transportation & logistics industry 2008/2009. New York: PriceWaterhouseCoopers. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2009). Tax benchmarking survey for the transportation & logistics industry 2008/2009. New York: PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
go back to reference Rego, S. O. (2003). Tax avoidance activities of U.S. multinational corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(4), 805–833. CrossRef Rego, S. O. (2003). Tax avoidance activities of U.S. multinational corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(4), 805–833. CrossRef
go back to reference Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). Equilibrium verification and reporting policies in a model of tax compliance. International Economic Review, 27(3), 739–760. CrossRef Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). Equilibrium verification and reporting policies in a model of tax compliance. International Economic Review, 27(3), 739–760. CrossRef
go back to reference Schaffer, M. E. (2007). xtivreg2: stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models. Schaffer, M. E. (2007). xtivreg2: stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models.
go back to reference Shleifer, A. (1985). A theory of yardstick competition. Rand Journal of Economics, 16(3), 319–327. CrossRef Shleifer, A. (1985). A theory of yardstick competition. Rand Journal of Economics, 16(3), 319–327. CrossRef
go back to reference Slemrod, J. (2004). The economics of corporate tax selfishness. National Tax Journal, 57(4), 877–899. Slemrod, J. (2004). The economics of corporate tax selfishness. National Tax Journal, 57(4), 877–899.
go back to reference Slemrod, J. (2007). Cheating ourselves: the economics of tax evasion. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(1), 25–48. CrossRef Slemrod, J. (2007). Cheating ourselves: the economics of tax evasion. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(1), 25–48. CrossRef
go back to reference Swenson, C. (1999). Increasing stock market value by reducing effective tax rates. Tax Notes, 83, 1503–1505. Swenson, C. (1999). Increasing stock market value by reducing effective tax rates. Tax Notes, 83, 1503–1505.
go back to reference Weisbach, D. (2002). Ten truths about tax shelters. Tax Law Review, 55, 215–253. Weisbach, D. (2002). Ten truths about tax shelters. Tax Law Review, 55, 215–253.
go back to reference Wilkie, P. (1988). Corporate average effective tax rates and inferences about relative tax preferences. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 10(2), 75–88. Wilkie, P. (1988). Corporate average effective tax rates and inferences about relative tax preferences. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 10(2), 75–88.
go back to reference Zimmerman, J. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5(2), 119–149. CrossRef Zimmerman, J. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5(2), 119–149. CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Corporate tax competition between firms
Authors
Simon Loretz
Padraig J. Moore
Publication date
01-10-2013
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
International Tax and Public Finance / Issue 5/2013
Print ISSN: 0927-5940
Electronic ISSN: 1573-6970
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-012-9248-6

Premium Partner