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Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications 1/2022

25-01-2022

COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior

Authors: Kenichi Kurita, Shunsuke Managi

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Issue 1/2022

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Abstract

Social stigma can effectively prevent people from going out and possibly spreading COVID-19. Using the framework of replicator dynamics, we analyze the interaction between self-restraint behavior, infection with viruses such as COVID-19, and stigma against going out. Our model is analytically solvable with respect to an interior steady state in contrast to the previous model of COVID-19 with stigma. We show that a non-legally binding policy reduces the number of people going out in a steady state.

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Appendix
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Metadata
Title
COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior
Authors
Kenichi Kurita
Shunsuke Managi
Publication date
25-01-2022
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Dynamic Games and Applications / Issue 1/2022
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Electronic ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00426-2

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