‘De-Risking’, De-Banking and Denials of Bank Services: An Over-Compliance Dilemma?

Banks ought to comply with the law. Non-compliance holds a range of negative consequences for society, for their customers and often for the institutions themselves. Sometimes, however, banks go beyond mere compliance with the law, or act so well within the parameters of the legal requirements, that their behaviour can be called ‘over-compliant’ or may be labelled as ‘gold plating’. In theory, acting well within the law should hold benefits. Going beyond what the law requires should be viewed as an expression of good corporate citizenship. This in turn should enhance trust of its regulator and its customers. It may however also hold unintended negative consequences, for example where the additional processes are more costly and divert compliance resources from higher risk areas where they are more needed. Over-compliance can limit the ability of the bank to engage in sound business opportunities and may create additional risks.¹ Calibrating compliance responses correctly to avoid non-compliance and over-compliance is, however, challenging, especially given the rise in risk-based regulation and risk-based compliance requirements in financial services.

This chapter focuses on money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing-related bank account closures (also known as de-banking) and related denials of banking services to customers. These decisions are essentially compliance risk decisions, often driven in part by concerns that the money laundering or terrorist or proliferation financing risk and risk management costs in these cases outweigh the benefits of doing the relevant business. De-banking is often called ‘de-risking’, though the latter term is best reserved for cases where risk is the primary driver of the de-banking decision. De-banking decisions are causing hardship to an increasing number of customers and countries and has attracted global regulatory attention, including a closer analysis by the Financial Action Task Force, the global standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and counter terrorist and proliferation financing (AML/CTF/CPF).²

‘De-risking’ is itself a contentious label for risk-informed de-banking decisions as it labels the action solely from the perspective of the bank that limits its own risk exposure. It does so by excluding customers and transactions it views as risky. As a result, these customers and transactions are channeled into less regulated services and often the non-transparent cash economy. This in turn increases the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing harms to society, and also increases the crime risk exposure of the parties to such transactions, where these are legitimate. Ultimately, de-risking undermines global financial policies aimed at increasing access to and usage of formal financial services.³

De-banking is again receiving regulatory attention. Current policy initiatives range from the FATF contemplating steps to limit unintended de-risking consequences of its standards,⁴ through to national agencies such as the US Treasury,⁵ the European Banking Authority,⁶ and AUSTRAC (Australia)⁷ adopting new strategies and guidance to counter unnecessary de-risking, aimed at specific customer groups or more generally. In parallel, the Financial Stability Board, in collaboration with other financial standard-setting bodies and regional and national regulators are progressing with the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments, which may address concerns about de-banking impact on correspondent banking relationships.⁸

This chapter reflects on the findings of a South African study of drivers of conservative (also called “overly compliant ”) AML/CTF compliance. That study helped to raise FATF’s awareness of over-compliance.⁹ The chapter discusses the linkages between these drivers, de-banking and the de-risking dilemma and considers technology and especially Compliance by Design and Compliance through Design measures as potential solutions. However, a brief introduction to AML/CTF/CPF is required to provide context for the discussion of conservative compliance.

Concerns about the abuse of the financial system by drug traffickers informed the decision of the G7 plus 1 meeting in Paris in 1989 to establish a task team to advise on measures to address this problem. The task team, called the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), developed a set of forty recommendations and these were adopted by the G7 in 1990 in Houston. At that meeting the task force was given the mandate to assess member countries against the measures set out in the recommendations.¹⁰ Since 1990, this task force developed into the global standard-setter for anti-money laundering. Its mandate also broadened. In 2001, its scope was extended to counter terrorist financing. It scope broadened again in 2012 to include support for targeted financial sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (proliferation financing).¹¹

In April 2019, after three decades of limited term mandates, the FATF was given a permanent mandate to continue its work to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It does so primarily by setting global AML/CTF/CPF standards; encouraging their effective implementation; assessing its members for compliance and effectiveness of their AML/CTF/CPF measures; and strengthening the ability of FATF-style Regional Bodies to undertake similar assessments in relation to their members using the same assessment methodology employed by FATF.

The FATF standards require countries to adopt fairly uniform AML/CTF/CPF laws and create and maintain structures, such as national financial intelligence units. They also require countries to ensure that financial institutions and designated non-financial business and professions take prescribed measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. These include customer due diligence (CDD) measures. Given the focus of this chapter the discussion will be limited to the duties of banks. In terms of the FATF standards and related AML/CTF/CPF obligations, banks must undertake the following CDD measures:¹²Until 2012, FATF standards were predicated on a rule-based approach, requiring countries to stipulate the CDD measures banks had to implement This approach began to change in 2003 when the FATF allowed for CDD measures to be adjusted on the basis of assessed risk.¹⁴ In 2012, however, the FATF adopted revised standards that embedded a mandatory risk-based approach to AML/CTF regulation and compliance.¹⁵ The mandatory risk-based approach requires that national regulators and banks identify and assess their money laundering and terrorism financing risks. Where customers, services or products are assessed as posing a higher risk, enhanced CDD measures must be adopted. Where risks are lower, countries may allow their banks to adopt simplified CDD measures. Banks, in turn, may then elect to simplify their CDD for those customers, products and services posing a lower risk.

Proliferation financing measures were, however, excluded from the risk-based approach as they primarily support the UN Security Council’s rule-based targeted financial sanctions. In 2020, however, the FATF revised its standards to require countries and regulated institutions like banks to undertake proliferation financing assessments and to adopt enhanced CDD measures where higher risks are identified.¹⁶ Given the rule-based nature of the UN sanctions no simplification is allowed where proliferation financing risks are assessed as lower. Even low risk institutions that may benefit from a regulatory exemption from these risk assessment requirements still have to comply in full with the UN Security Council sanctions.¹⁷

A risk-based approach is not accompanied by regulatory provisions setting out the specific measures a regulated institution must implement to mitigate identified risks. In the AML/CTF/CPF context, for example, regulations require banks to identify and verify the identities of their customers. It is left to each bank to decide how to meet that requirement. They need to determine what would be adequate and appropriate to mitigate the relevant risks and comply with their statutory obligations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF and some national regulators have however provided some examples of risk factors that banks can consider.¹⁸

The risk-based approach is viewed as an effective approach to ensure an efficient application of scarce compliance resources by focusing these resources on instances of higher risk. The approach is, however, also vulnerable to its own risks. These include the risk of failing to identify relevant risks; of assessing a risk as lower while it actually poses a higher risk; of under-designing risk control measures either by employing too few controls or not adjusting them appropriately to the level of risk, etc. This chapter focuses on the risk of overestimating risk or overdesigning risk control measures, generally referred to as “over-compliance” in the risk context.

Compliance generally refers to conformity with rules, i.e., following regulatory norms or demonstrating conformity with regulatory constraints.¹⁹ As explained by Governatori, regulatory compliance is generally understood as the set of activities in place in an organisation to ensure that the procedures, policies, processes and operations of the organisation comply with the normative frameworks governing the business and environment where the organisation operates.²⁰

Over-compliance in a rule-based context means going well beyond what the law requires or staying very clearly well within its boundaries. See Fig. 1.²¹

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The phenomenon of institutional over-compliance has been a topic of study since the 1980s, especially in relation to environmental regulations and standards.²²

In some cases it can be adopted as a strategy, for example to signal to regulators that more stringent regulations may be adopted that would undermine competitors lacking the same capacity to comply with higher standards.²³ Wu and Wirkkala found that diverse factors may be at play, including market forces, regulatory pressure and the personal values and beliefs of senior managers regarding environmental stewardship.²⁴ Craswell and Calfee explored the impact of legal uncertainty on legal compliance.²⁵ Where penalties are large, they found that uncertain actors may wish to reduce the probability of punishment by modifying their behaviour further than the law requires.

It has also been shown in the literature in environmental and ecological studies that ‘credible enforcement significantly increases statutory over-compliance with regulations as well’.²⁶ However, especially in the banking sector, we should bear in mind that ‘compliance is not a model of reality, but a control process exercised over the reality that unfolds’.²⁷

What were, however, the factors at play in relation to over-compliance with AML/CTF obligations, especially CDD obligations? This had not been investigated before, so in 2011 a study was undertaken in South Africa to determine why banks were opting not to implement simplified due diligence measures where the law allowed them to do so. The study focused on compliance decisions that banks made in relation to a basic banking product aimed primarily at low-income individuals,²⁸ where regulations allowed simpler customer identity verification processes.²⁹

Data for the study was collected by means of convergent interviewing of bank compliance officers using an unstructured format. The results of the semi-strucured interviews and the insights gained were discussed at two subsequent workshops with compliance and regulatory stakeholders where the findings were refined and endorsed.

In relation to the CDD measures in question the study identified 14 general drivers of conservative corporate responses by the participating institutions. These can broadly be clustered into five groups of factors, although aspects of some may resort in more than one group:³⁰

While much more research is required to understand the drivers and, importantly, how they interact with one another, the study prompted the design of an initial model of the impact of the five broad groups of factors identified above on each other and on the corporate compliance response decisions (see Fig. 2).³⁶

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In some cases, a soft law requirement may prompt a compliance response in its own right, even though that response is not required or enforced by the state. This may occur where the company voluntarily submits itself to compliance with that requirement, for example by signing up to an industry code.

These factors may not all be relevant or equally relevant in all cases but they do summarise and contextualise the drivers identified in the study.

In 2014, a trend of closures of bank accounts of remittance service providers triggered global regulatory concerns.³⁸ An important illustration of the problem was the closure of the account of Dahabshiil, a significant cross-border remittance service provider to Somalia, by Barclays Bank in the UK. Barclays was the last large UK bank to provide services to Dahabshiil and the closure of this account threatened the continued flows of UK remittances sent by the Somalian community in the UK to family members in Somalia.³⁹

The account closures of higher risk customers were not a new or unique phenomenon. It is, in fact, required by FATF standards when a financial institution finds itself unable to manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by that customer.⁴⁰ The trend of closing of accounts of small, cash-intensive businesses providing financial services to the poor was not new either.⁴¹ However, the scale and global impact of this wave of closures caused alarm. The FATF therefore responded with a statement on 23 October 2014, expressing its concern about de-risking. It cautioned banks to implement a risk-based approach and not to engage in ‘the wholesale cutting loose of entire classes of customer, without taking into account, seriously and comprehensively, their level of risk or risk mitigation measures for individual customers within a particular sector’.⁴² The FATF also used the statement to deny that de-risking was solely linked to AML:⁴³

De-risking can be the result of various drivers, such as concerns about profitability, prudential requirements, anxiety after the global financial crisis, and reputational risk. It is a misconception to characterise de-risking exclusively as an anti-money laundering issue.⁴⁴

The factors listed are however closely linked to AML/CTF, especially the costs of compliance impacting on profitability; bank liquidity and financing requirements linked to risk exposure; and reputational risk that may flow from allegations that a bank allowed its systems to be abused to facilitate activities of organised crime or terror groups.

One prominent driver that has had an impact on the risk appetite of banks was the increasing size of penalties for AML/CTF-related contraventions. While million-dollar fines were imposed in serious cases in the past, the fines ballooned into the billions in 2012 when HSBC agreed to pay a then-record fine of $1.92 billion to U.S. authorities for allowing Mexican drug money to be laundered through its operations. In 2014 the record was smashed when BNP Paribas agreed to pay close on $8.9 billion in penalties because it continued to do business with countries and entities on the U.S. sanctions list.⁴⁵ Multi-million-dollar fines for AML/CTF contraventions are now standard.

Very high penalties for contravention of the AML/CTF laws combined with increased global crime, terrorism and proliferation risks globally and stricter banking standards following the global financial crisis resulted in risk averse and cost-conscious conduct by banks.⁴⁶ Higher risk customers, especially where increased compliance spending rendered the relationships unprofitable or insufficiently profitable, became primary targets of account closures.⁴⁷ Groups affected by such closures include virtual asset service providers,⁴⁸ non-profit organisations, foreign missions and diamond dealers.⁴⁹ In parallel, banks have been terminating correspondent banking relationships with other banks, where these are viewed as posing a higher risk of money laundering or financing of terrorism. These terminations have reached levels where some countries and regions of the world face a real risk of losing their access to the global financial system.⁵⁰ Despite various initial initiatives, including by the Financial Stability Board,⁵¹ the problem still persists.

While the South African study was completed in an era when AML/CTF was rule-based, it is submitted that its findings are still relevant in a risk-based context.⁵²

Despite important differences in design, there are many similarities between the rule-based and the risk-based approach. Both consider and respond to money laundering and financing of terrorism risks. In the rule-based approach the regulator considers the risk and determines the risk mitigation measures in rules that the regulated community must implement. Risk assessments are not necessarily formally undertaken but sensible regulators consider risk-relevant information and data when they decide on the most appropriate risk mitigation measures that should be required. The risk-based approach shifts the risk assessment and risk management responsibility to the bank.

An important difference is of course that in a risk-based approach context, the detailed legal compliance response of a bank is a response to an identified and assessed risk rather than a response to a regulatory rule. A overly conservative response in this context could however be evident in risk identification (over-identifying risks), risk assessment (assessing lower risks as higher), and/or in risk mitigation (mitigating risks using excessive control measures).

In a risk-based context both the government and regulated institutions have risk assessment and risk mitigation responsibilities, and similar conservative responses may be evident in the national risk assessment and the design of the national regulatory framework.

A number of the key factors identified in the South African study are also evident in the circumstances that gave rise to de-risking account terminations by banks. For example:

Supervisory conduct drove a risk-averse compliance culture. The exceptionally large fines levied on HSBC in 2012 and on BNP Paribas in 2014 for CDD and other compliance failures impacted on the compliance risk appetite of the global banking industry. The FATF’s ‘naming and shaming’ of jurisdictions that fail to comply adequately with its standards is also an important example of signalling that informs negative compliance and risk management responses in relation to the listed jurisdictions and their businesses. The responses can exceed the risk mitigation measures required.⁵³

Supervisory conduct is also evident in the use of public statements by the FATF and regulators calling on banks not to engage in large-scale account closures. The positive impact of these statements was however limited as it was neutralised by ongoing enforcement actions globally resulting in huge fines for AML/CTF contraventions: Regulatory enforcement actions certainly speak louder here than senior supervisors in statements and speeches. The general lack of supervisory scrutiny of the reasons why services were denied to a specific client and of the quality of the data that informed that decision also signaled to banks that supervisors were actually not particularly concerned about the justification for denials of services.

The absence of a hard law rule requiring banks to manage ML/TF risk without unnecessarily exiting client relationships, for example through recognising a right to a bank account,⁵⁴ especially combined with the FATF soft law principle (supported by harder AML/CTF domestic rules) that banks should terminate relationships with clients where they believe they are not able to manage the risk relating to the relationship.

Costs arguments are generally combined with concerns about reputational risk should abuse occur, i.e. the risk of negative impact that compliance with AML/CTF/CPF obligations may have on the bank’s reputation, especially where these may be linked to a high-profile terrorism outrage. That risk is often raised but rarely quantified.⁵⁵ Reputational risk raises an important policy question: Have governments perhaps shifted too much responsibility to mitigate AML/CTF risk to the banks, with too little protection when they get it wrong? In E-Trans International Finance Ltd v Kiwibank Ltd⁵⁶ a bank’s right to terminate a customer account as a result of ML/FT risks was challenged. The New Zealand High Court considered the interaction between the public policy aims relating to integrity in the financial markets, the important economic role of remittances for communities that relied on them, and the promotion of competition in the market.⁵⁷ Heath J remarked:⁵⁸

The problem is that those laudable policy aims conflict. The co-existence of statutory provisions designed to promote each of those public policy goals seems to have brought about unintended consequences. … By requiring private and public business enterprises to act as reporting entities under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the public policy goal of minimising the risk of money laundering and financing of terrorism is promoted, but at the cost of reputational risk to financial institutions, such as Kiwibank.

Avoiding what may be viewed as significant compliance cost and reputational risk by refusing and terminating risky and unprofitable relationships is therefore a reasonable option for a compliance officer.⁵⁹ From a public policy perspective, however, that decision of the compliance officer holds significant negative consequences. For example, it undermines national crime combating objectives by compelling excluded customers to use cash and undermines economic development and financial inclusion goals by denying those customers access to formal banking services.⁶⁰

The impact of these drivers may be amplified by the nature of the risk concepts and risk assessments that underpin the FATF’s risk-based approach.

The FATF does not define risk for purposes of its risk-based approach,⁶¹ but states that ‘risk can be seen as a function of three factors: threat, vulnerability and consequence’.⁶²

ML/TF/PF risk assessment is not an exact empirical process following a scientific methodology that draws on sufficient evidence.⁶³ Much of the assessment is based on the judgments of the participants. The process is further complicated by challenges to quantify key elements of the risk concept. The FATF, for example, recognises the difficulty of assessing the consequences of ML/TF, accepting that ‘incorporating consequence into risk assessments may not involve particularly sophisticated approaches’,⁶⁴ and, in relation to TF risk, the FATF advised that ‘countries need not take a scientific approach when considering consequences, and instead may want to start with the presumption that consequences of TF will be severe, (whether domestic or elsewhere) and consider whether there are any factors that would alter that conclusion’.⁶⁵ Conservative assumptions about consequences will tend to result in higher risk level assessments, even where the likelihood of an ML/TF/PF event is low. Furthermore, findings of serious and severe consequences are often linked to transactions regardless of the value involved (i.e. assessors adopt methodologies that assume that the consequences of a $100 MLT/TF/PF transaction and a $100,000 transaction are equally severe). This in turn elevates the chances that risk levels of smaller institutions and countries are assessed as higher than warranted.⁶⁶

In 2022 the World Bank published a study by Ferwerda and Reuter.⁶⁷ They analysed 11 pre-2020 National Risk Assessments published by eight systemically important countries (Canada, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to assess their conceptual understanding and methodologies. The authors concluded:⁶⁸

Each raises serious issues regarding the risk assessment methodology. For example, most relied largely on expert opinion, which they solicited in ways that are inconsistent with the well-developed methodology for making use of expert opinion. They misinterpreted data from suspicious activity reports and failed to provide risk assessments relevant for policy makers. Only one described the methodology employed.

In a 2019 study Ferwerda and Kleemans raised six concerns regarding the use of expert opinions in these assessments:⁶⁹

Using expert opinions to assess money laundering risks has a number of disadvantages. First, virtually all experts asked to perform national risk assessments are part of the fight against money laundering. These experts might overestimate the risks of money laundering hoping to increase their AML budget in the future, or underestimate the money laundering risk for their own institutions eager to gain compliments for their ‘good’ fight against money laundering. Second, one might wonder whether these experts have sufficient objective information about money laundering activities—that by definition cannot be monitored—to correctly estimate money laundering risks, especially for sectors in which the expert does not work. Third, it is unclear how to aggregate expert opinions, particularly when experts differ in the undetermined amount of knowledge about money laundering risk. Fourth, even when all experts agree on a certain money laundering risk, one may wonder whether this is because this is a real risk or because they all read the same (e.g. FATF typology) reports or news articles. Fifth, using expert opinions can reinforce stereotypes instead of providing new and objective information. Finally, not all experts will always agree to inform the national risk assessment, which implies self-selection problems.

Institutional risk assessments, in turn, are informed by national risk assessments. The same subjectivity is present in institutional risk assessments and many of these assessments would also employ weak assessment methodologies with weaknesses similar to those that Reuter and Ferwerda identified in their study. Institutional assessments rely on the judgments of internal experts. The same questions raised by Ferwerda and Kleemans arise in relation to these assessments too. These participants may be impacted by some of the drivers outlined in 4.4 and assessments of institutional risk would then tend to be conservative. Where drivers such as these are present the design of risk mitigation measures will also be more conservative.

The over-compliance dilemma identified in the South African study may therefore be exarcerbated in the context of the risk-based approach. This may unduly impact on access to financial services⁷⁰ by denying services to customers whose risk levels are actually lower than assessed. Without constraints by rules, such as the right to access financial services,⁷¹ or clear review standards for appropriate institutional ML/TF/PF risk assessments combined with supervisory reviews of the quality of institutional risk assessments and risk mitigation, the drivers of conservative responses can play a much larger role in these contexts.

Can new technologies assist to mitigate some of the de-risking risks?

Technologies are transforming financial services. Digital financial services enable millions of customers to be serviced without associated with bricks- and mortar banking. Distributed ledger technologies like the blockchain that underpins bitcoin and crypto assets themselves may have a revolutionary impact on financial services.⁷²

Technology is also impacting on traditional CDD and related compliance obligations. More countries are implementing biometric-based national identity systems that support digital identification and facilitate customer identification and verification, which in turn can lower AML/CTF compliance costs. Developments in regulatory technology (Regtech) and new collaborative CDD partnerships, often involving public-private partnerships) promise to transform compliance, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of AML/CTF/CPF processes.⁷³

Exciting developments are also taking place in technology-assisted compliance management, especially in relation to Compliance by Design (CbD) and AI. CbD can be defined as the relation between two sets of specifications, i.e., between the (formal) specifications of a set of regulations and the (formal) specifications of a system.⁷⁴ Thus, CbD refers to the set of formal rules that are considered in the design stage of a business or regulatory process. In the past 10 years, many formal frameworks have been proposed through a diversity of business computational languages.⁷⁵ More recently, CbD has been linked to Open Digital Rights Languages (ODRL) enabling automated business compliance checking against regulatory obligations.⁷⁶

Can CbD assist to prevent counter the unnecessary closure of higher risk accounts? The answer unfortunately is that CbD may not provide an answer, at least not in and by itself. Clarity of the conceptual normative elements is a pre-condition of CbD, a requirement that precedes any CbD formalisation. AML/CTF is unfortunately rife with nebulous concepts. CDD is aimed at identifying suspicious transactions that may involve proceeds of crime or terrorist or proliferation financing. As has been pointed out in the literature, ‘the concept of “suspicion” in itself is still vague and amorphous, proving to have a negative effect on banks to effectively identify the proceeds of crime’.⁷⁷

To be effective in preventing over-compliance effects, the CbD formal approach should be complemented by legal CbD, i.e., by Compliance through Design (CtD). CtD aims to explicitly encompass and incorporate the social and institutional aspects that legal compliance entails—legal interpretation processes, institutionalization, the interface between modelling and coordination, and the relation between the regulated entity and citizens, consumers, and the law.⁷⁸ The more holistic CtD promises to be more useful to limit de-risking than the more formalistic CbD because it broadens and complements the CbD scope. To be successful in a risk-based approach however the CtD system needs to be informed by, and responsive to, fine-grained CDD risk data, money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing data, and customer profiling data.

While risk assessment technologies are improving, much still needs to be done to improve money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing risk identification and assessment systems. Much is being invested in such systems. One challenge, however, is the lack of knowledge about these activities. Our knowledge is limited to the cases of money laundering and terrorist financing that have been identified and it is generally accepted that only a small portion of these activities are correctly identified. Much of the risk may be submerged in the Rumsfeldian ‘unknown unknowns’. Risk-based compliance systems that are designed without a broader grasp of the full risk picture, may identify mainly cases and methodologies that are similar to cases that have been identified earlier (e.g., that resemble the ‘known knowns’).

While CtD systems will be helpful they will, like all solutions, also breed their own problems. Coding legal rules hold its own complications⁷⁹ and coding errors may lead to expensive regulatory fines.

Given the complexity of AML/CTF/CPF, CtD applications in this context should therefore, at least at the start, have human decision makers in the loop. CtD systems may be designed to provide such humans with key information about the risks and the legal obligations to manage those risks proportionally. As appropriate data flows and the quality of CtD analysis increase, the human role may decrease.

Regulatory compliance discussions generally focus either on ensuring compliance or on the reasons for, and the impact of, failures of institutions to comply with their obligations. This chapter highlights a different problem: The risk of over-complying with the law and the negative impact of over-compliance as illustrated by the de-risking dilemma where banks have been terminating business relationships with customers and counterparts.

While technology is changing the shape of banking services it also poses intriguing possibilities of improving compliance management to prevent unnecessary de-risking. The chapter therefore also considered CbD and CtD approaches as possible solutions to the de-risking dilemma. While CbD on its own does not promise to solve the problem, CtD approaches may assist to counter de-risking-related bank account terminations and refusals. However, complex challenges await the developers of such solutions.

Regulators are clearly concerned about the levels of de-banking that is taking place. Should they wish to act more effectively to prevent ML/TF/PF risk-informed de-banking it is important to consider the drivers identified in 4.4 of this chapter. These drivers are highly relevant in the subjective, judgment-based risk assessment and risk management context of the FATF’s risk-based approach.

Regulators that wish to stem de-risking should avoid strengthening any of the drivers unnecessarily, for example by making statements that would unduly inflate risk perceptions of certain types of customers or unduly inflate consequences of any criminal abuse or of minor compliance failures. Regulators should furthermore help instititions to mitigate reputational risk where, despite appropriate compliance systems, abuse occurred. Regulators can furthermore leverage the identified drivers of de-risking to address compliance-related denials of service. These drivers can be harnessed to influence the compliance decisions of banks, for example, by adopting hard law rules that recognise the rights of customers to access formal payment services. Business management and social environment factors can be leveraged by supporting collaborative CDD practices⁸⁰ that lower the costs of compliance and by providing improved risk information and data to inform institutional risk assessment and risk management of ML/TF/PF risks. Supervisory conduct can be leveraged by setting and supervising clear quality standards for institutional risk assessments and for the design and adoption of appropriate risk mitigation measures, and by reviewing the reasons way a bank denied services to a specific client or counterpart to ensure that that the reasons are sound and informed by appropriate data. A clear message that a supervisor is fair and is not trying to build a profile as the harshest policeman on the block or to create enforcement data to impress FATF mutual assessors, will also be helpful.