Decolonizing African Politics

Table of Contents

1. Frontmatter

2. Chapter 1. Introduction

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This introductory chapter provides a synopsis of each chapter of the book. Eight top keywords for the book are: decolonizing; nationalisms and nationhood; neopatrimonialism; arbitrary borders and tribes; françafrique; superpower relations; South-South collaborations; Security Council Reform.

3. Chapter 2. Decolonizing the Concept of Nationhood

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This chapter decolonizes the concept of nationhood. On 30 September 2021, French president Emmanuel Macron met a delegation of young French citizens of North African origin and stated that: “the post-1962 Algerian nation was built on a memory rent … Was there an Algerian nation before the French colonization? That’s the question”. This coming from the former colonial power almost 60 years after Algeria’s independence echoes existing theorizing on the subject of Nationalism, that: “modern nationalism originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in north-western Europe and its American settlements” and that “nationalism was unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century”. Connecting Macron’s statements to these two quotes presupposes that whatever occurred prior to this period outside of Western Europe was not deemed as nationalism and the political entities which experienced such could not be deemed as nations. In existence is a ten-point checklist or criteria for determining whether a political entity could be referred to as a nation or not. This chapter therefore traces the source of the criteria and operationalizes the checklist, point by point, to explain their real meanings and significance. Operationalizing or applying the criteria to two non-Western political entities (the Fanti and Ashanti) reveal that these two nations of Modern Ghana attained nationhood earlier than some European nations, judging by the very criteria derived by Western authors. The operationalization therefore teaches how to do similarly for any other political entities of choice or investigation, to demonstrate how these entities likely meet the ten-point criteria. Furthermore, this chapter debates the concept of nationhood, how the theorizing assumed, and to what extent the theorizing is applicable to nations and nationalism across the globe. The chapter discusses terms such as nationalism, nationhood, nation-state, state, primordialism, perennialism, modernism, instrumentalism, typologies of the nation and nationalisms, while highlighting the technicalities and interpretations embedded within the terms.

4. Chapter 3. Decolonizing Neopatrimonialism

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This chapter decolonizes the term neopatrimonialism. It has been common for most university readings on Africa, for example Bayart (1993) and Chabal & Daloz [1999 (2010)], to discuss neopatrimonialism principally in connection with African countries, which somehow renders the concept synonymous with Africa and portrays neopatrimonialism as an African thing. A closer look at the literature reveals that when Max Weber originally used the term patrimonialism in his 1919 speech to university students at Munich, he was not even talking about Africa, but rather discussing England until 1868, the United States (US) until 1824, and Germany until 1919. Furthermore, the term “patrimonial state” had been used by Karl Ludvig von Haller before Weber developed its variant “neopatrimonialism”. This chapter will not argue that neopatrimonialism does not occur in Africa. There is a lot of it there, in fact. However, Africa is not the only place where neopatrimonialism occurs on a regular basis, and university teaching needs to reflect that. This chapter delves into the theorizing on neopatrimonialism, and subsequently discusses practical examples in Ghana, France, the US and the UK.

5. Chapter 4. Decolonizing “Arbitrary” Borders and Tribes

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This chapter decolonizes the popular notion that Africa’s borders have been arbitrarily drawn by Europeans at the Scramble for Africa 1884–1885. Equally, the chapter proves map by map that European borders have been arbitrarily drawn too, therefore, Africa’s borders should not be problematized unnecessarily. This chapter also discusses unsuccessful attempts by constructivist authors who have argued spuriously that African tribes or ethnic groups were formed by the colonial period or invented by the colonial state. The chapter then discusses colonial borders in Africa and the new African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which took effect from 2021 to ensure a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of businesspersons and investments fostered by non-tariff barriers such as border posts. Arbitrary boundaries and landlocked countries have been problematized among Africa’s colonial legacies, particularly by Alex Thomson’s An Introduction to African Politics. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 accepted the borders created by the Partition of Africa, principally to avoid the risk of potential wars among African states if their ethnonational identities were to evolve without respect to the borders. Other scholars such as Mamdani have argued that “all boundaries are artificial; none are natural”, and in this respect, European borders are equally arbitrary, having undergone several revisions by respective power brokers over the course of at least four successive milestones or events in European history: (a) Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after the 30 Years’ War; (b) Congress of Vienna in 1815; (c) Treaty of Versailles in 1919 after WWI; (d) and the Paris Peace Treaties in 1947 signed between Western allies and the Soviet Union after WWII. Africa’s current borders were agreed to stay fixed in 1963 just as Europe’s were agreed to stay fixed in 1947.

   The chapter illustrates with relevant European maps showing arbitrary border revisions made by the respective power brokers at each of the four European milestones listed. A comparison of the current political map of Europe and the corresponding ethnolinguistic map of Europe shows clearly that the languages and people-groups of Europe do not fit neatly into the current state boundaries. This buttresses the point that European borders have been arbitrarily drawn and revised over the decades by successive post-war agreements and political considerations which ensued at the time of drawing or agreeing those borders. The current European political borders do not mirror Europe’s languages and ethnic distribution, just as Western authors are quick to point out that Africa’s borders do not mirror its languages and ethnic distribution.

   The chapter equally illustrated with maps of Africa at four key milestones: (a) 1885 at the Scramble for Africa; (b) 1914 at the beginning of WWI; (c) 1939 at the beginning of WWII; (d) 1964 after the OAU-agreed borders of 1963. A comparison of the current political map of Africa and the ethnolinguistic map of Africa shows clearly that the languages and people-groups of Africa do not fit neatly into Africa’s current state boundaries, just like Europe’s. Furthermore, both continents have landlocked countries, and this chapter sheds light on how African states demonstrated best practice by collaborating among coastal and landlocked states even before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) took effect in 1982 to serve as a guide for the rest of the globe. The chapter discusses how Africa set the pace for UNCLOS, and the crucial contributions Africa made in bringing about UNCLOS. The chapter further debates the issue of borders and explores to what extent AfCFTA’s economic and political integration impacts on Africa’s current borders in interesting ways.

6. Chapter 5. Decolonizing the French Colonial Pact: From Anticolonial Wars of Independence to Presidential Extensions

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This chapter decolonizes the existing narrative on anticolonial nationalisms of independence in Africa and post-independence politics in selected African countries, to discuss and reflect on the French Colonial Pact. The chapter discusses colonial resistance and moves towards independence, including liberation movements, nationalist movements and their associated nationalist leaders. The discussion includes Kenya, Zimbabwe and Algeria which fought liberation wars, and francophone sub-Saharan Africa where there were no liberation wars. The discussions reveal different experiences for Algeria versus francophone sub-Sahara. The French Legion was based in Algeria for 130 years before the hard-fought 1954–1962 Algerian War of Independence brought their stationing to a close. Francophone sub-Saharan states did not fight wars for their independence but were made to pay that price by signing the French Colonial Pact which included bilateral defense and technical assistance agreements with France that allow for stationing French special forces and military facilities in these countries after independence. The pact continues to saddle these countries to date. Aptly put by the Harvard International Review, “the lack of a war separating colonial rule from statehood meant that many French systems set up to exploit their colonies remained in place”. The chapter further analyses the impacts of the agreements on post-independence politics, including systematic patterns of prolonged presidencies in eight countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Togo and Tunisia. The chapter concludes with Table 5.1, which has the full list of presidential extensions beyond term limits in Africa from November 1960 to March 2025, the latest tally being 38 extensions across 25 countries since the independence wave of the 1960s. The data in Table 5.1 and its related chart (Fig. 5.1) show that a significant majority (14 or 56%) of African states perpetrating the phenomenon of extended presidencies are francophone, perhaps because France itself was not practicing term limits until 2008 and therefore encouraged its former colonies along this path. More importantly, this system of prolonged presidencies kept the French puppets in power to facilitate the delivery of the French Colonial Pact. The question mark over francophone Africa being prone to conflict because of the pact and presidential extensions is illustrated by Fig. 5.2.

7. Chapter 6. Decolonizing Françafrique: Unravelling Françafrique and the Formation of the Alliance of Sahel States

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This chapter decolonizes françafrique and discusses its systematic unravelling in the last decade. Françafrique has been defined as “the French strategy of exerting military, political and commercial influence over its former colonies in Africa”. The term covers the French sphere of influence on the continent, with strong connotations for that sphere in which France calls the shots, influences progress and engineers the opposite. Originally targeted towards ex-colonies of France, françafrique as a policy encompasses non-ex-colonies or other African territories that allow themselves to come under the spell of French influence. France appears to have kept a tighter influence over its ex-colonies in areas of economy and governance. As discussed in Chapter 5, one modus operandi of the French Colonial Pact signed with ex-colonies is that, francophone Africa became the epitome of longest-serving heads-of-state in Africa to facilitate the pact, while governing with impunity, and in the process generated political contexts prone to conflicts. Hence, Sahelian West Africa and Central Africa which make up most of françafrique territory became conflict-prone; this territory has faced the worst jihadist and terrorist campaign on the African continent so far (see Fig. 6.1). This chapter examines françafrique, the military aspect of the post-independence relationship and the increasing contention between francophone sub-Saharan Africa and the “Metropole”. The chapter discusses the Francophone Spring and explores to what extent françafrique has been unravelling in the last decade, with the departure of French troops (Operation Sangaris) from Central African Republic (CAR), and later from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad (Operation Barkhane), along with the wave of regime changes to remove French puppet-presidents from Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Burkina Faso (January and September 2022), Niger (July 2023), Gabon (August 2023) and Senegal (March–April 2024), plus the shock announcements by Chad and Senegal on 28 November 2024 to end defence cooperation pacts with France. The chapter also provides detailed analysis on the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

8. Chapter 7. Decolonizing Superpower Relations: Partnerships with China and Russia

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This chapter focuses on Africa’s post-independence relationships with non-Western powers such as China and Russia, and the potential for a recurrence of the repudiated discourse and practices which Africa experienced with the previous colonial powers from Europe. In the fast-evolving multipolar world, the posture of the old European powers and the United States (US) regarding Africa’s relations with the emerging economies of China and Russia has shifted from interference to caution and competition. Africa’s response to the Western narrative on Africa’s ongoing relationships with China and Russia is one of a win–win equation. Meanwhile, the Second Russo-Ukrainian War which commenced in February 2022, coupled with the global green energy transition, have generated a new scramble for African resources by both the West and the East. We also see the prominence of foreign legions and state-sponsored private military companies competing for Africa’s security space, along with the systematic departure of Western legions from certain countries and their replacement by Russian forces. At play is a resurgence of Cold War or East/West competition for African allies, together with the new scramble for natural resources. To what extent is Africa’s partnerships with the emerging economies decolonizing African reliance on the advanced economies? Is this trend sustainable in the evolution of world politics?

9. Chapter 8. Decolonizing Collaboration: Africa’s South-South Collaborations

   Michael Amoah

   Abstract

   This chapter decolonizes collaboration and discusses Africa’s South-South collaborations, such as: the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the Group of 77 Nations (G77); the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group of emerging economies; the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) which is interchangeable with the Vulnerable 20 Group (V20); the African Adaptation Acceleration Program (AAAP) in response to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s state of play on climate change policy, particularly in the light of the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) meeting at Sharm-El-Sheikh in November 2022 and COP29 at Baku in November 2024; the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Union (AU)’s reorganized Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Under APSA, the chapter discusses the AU Peace Fund, Continental Early Warning System, a foreign policy department at the AU, the African Standby Force and its sub-regional security collaborations such as: the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) along with Rwandan collaboration with Mozambique on counterterrorism; the SADC Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC); the Nairobi Process for mediating a resolution between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and armed groups operating in Eastern DRC brokered by the East African Community (EAC); the Luanda Process for addressing the inter-state dimension of the Eastern DRC crises via a political dialogue between Rwanda and DRC brokered by the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR). The chapter ends with a note on what Russian forces and other potential Global South collaborators have to do with Africa’s emerging security landscape.

10. Chapter 9. Decolonizing Global Governance: Realizing the Ezulwini Consensus

    Michael Amoah

    Abstract

    Over 75 years since the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established with five permanent seats, and over 60 years after colonialism, Africa as a continent of 55 states has still not acquired a permanent seat at the UNSC to reflect the evolution of international politics despite the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus, also known as the Common African Position (CAP). Humanitarian (military) interventions in Africa authorized by the UNSC have been decided largely without the African voice. The role of the veto-holding UNSC members in the 2011 Libyan crisis whereby UNSC Resolution 1973 to implement a no-fly zone under Responsibility to Protect (R2P) turned into regime change after the resolution had been granted, presents the view that the UN system of global governance is rather a new colonial instrument that is taking advantage of Africa’s lack of a permanent seat at the horseshoe.¹ This chapter explored the potential for the African Union (AU) realizing the CAP for a minimum of two permanent seats for Africa with veto powers and five non-permanent seats at the UNSC. At the 77th UN General Assembly (UNGA), US President Joe Biden announced “that the United States fully supports reforming the U.N. Security Council to include permanent representation for Africa”.² The chapter is therefore about UNSC Reform, and to some extent that of the UN body itself.

11. Chapter 10. Conclusions

    Michael Amoah

    Abstract

    This chapter captures the conclusions of the book. It is a comprehensive summary of all the essential debates in Chapters 2–9 and their pinpoint conclusions, chapter by chapter.

12. Backmatter