2. Democracy, Stability, and Resilience: Lessons for the Baltics

After World War II, a major concern of American and European political scientists was, as noted above, democratic stability. Two questions dominated the discipline: First, why or how did Fascism and Nazism develop out of ostensibly democratic states and, second, what could be done to stabilize democracies so that they would not degenerate into either authoritarian or communist states (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). In short, the political science literature of the 1950s and 1960s was perplexed by the question of how to create or consolidate and then maintain liberal democracies (Ceaser, 1993).

One of the classic theories is modernization (Lim, 2010). The general modernization thesis is that there is a connection between economic development and democracy (Carugati, 2020). Seymour Lipset saw democratization as the final product of economic development. This is the case because, according to Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 156–7), modernization creates a “differentiation and specialization of political structures from other structures and make democracy possible.” (p. 156–7). Modernization or economic development creates conditions that make democracy possible, such as the emergence of civil societies, but it does not necessarily guarantee democracy will occur (Lim, 185). A variation of this argument is that democracy requires some minimum level of economic development; it cannot exist in dire poverty situations (Feng, 2003). Democracy cannot exist without some form of economic modernization, but the latter does not guarantee the former. Significant economic development, such as in China, Singapore, or the contemporary Russian Federation are proof of this.

A variation of modernization or economic development theory is the assertion that political democracy and capitalism are related. More specifically, the assertion is that there is a historic relationship between the rise of capitalism and democracy, with market and political freedoms mutually reinforcing one another (Lim, 186).

A third variation is not so much that democracy is a product of economic development or capitalism per se, but that instead democracies require a degree of social and economic equality to develop (Lim, 2010, 186; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 41). Capitalist development or modernization that improves the economic conditions will foster democracy if it strengthens working- and middle-class power in relation to that of the political elites. Development empowers some classes, thereby giving them the ability to wrestle power away from the ruling elite.

A second group of theories emphasizes the development of democracy either from above or below. In arguing that democracy arises from above, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) see democracy as a byproduct of elite conflict. When elites divide among themselves, it develops incentives for them to support democracy. It does so as ways for each to maintain power checks upon one another, to appeal to masses for political support. Critical here is the nature of the types of authoritarian regimes.

Huntington (1991) saw the attitude of political elites as critical in promoting the transition toward democracy across the world during the third wave in the 1980s. Geddes (1999) argues that there are four types of authoritarian regimes—personalist, military, single party, and an amalgam of the first three. Military regimes are more likely to transition to democracy because of potential splits in army elites, whereas single-party regimes are the most stable and least likely to transition. Their stability is a result of mass support of elites who are linked through a single party. Given that most regimes in Africa are personalist, single party, or a hybrid, regime type seems not to lay the foundation for the best chance to democratization.

Conversely, theories declaring that democracy comes from below and see it origins in demands among workers initially through mass protests or mobilization. Elites, seeking to preserve their positions, effectively compromise with the masses, resulting in the development of constitutional or democratic structures to limit their authority. Additionally, the development of democracy from the bottom up means a fostering of democratic attitudes and support among citizens and this gets to a third theory regarding democratic transitions addresses culture.

Samuel Huntington (1991) asserted that some cultures across the world simply are not compatible with democracy. This claim is an update of Almond and Verba’s argument in Civic Culture (1963). Cultures either foster impediments to attitudes and values necessary for democracies to form or they can provide support—such as commitment to toleration, rule of law, or peaceful resolution of conflict. Culture arguments assert that cultures are fixed and therefore some states will never be democracies, or need to assert that some forces, such as modernization, can force changes in cultural attitudes, either among elites, the masses, or both.

In addition to these broad economic and cultural forces, numerous studies have sought to locate those institutions and values necessary to maintain stable democracies (Lijphart, 1968; Neubauer, 1967). Factors found important included economic wealth and modernization (Lipset, 1960 28, 87, 116; Dahl, 1971, 60–2; Huntington, 1984, 193, 199; Lipset, 1959, 1960; Needler, 1968; Rustow, 1968; and Rostow, 1971), political participation (Lipset, 1960, 116), civilian control of the government (Diamond et al., 1989, 344, Huntington, 1956), and widely supported and regularized political mechanisms to resolve conflict (Almond & Verba, 1963, 363; Dahl, 1976, 364; Huntington, 1984). They stressed the importance of a democratic political culture that inculcated toleration and a reasonable balance of both social consensus and cleavage, including a respect for difference and a commitment to resolve these differences through the political process (Almond & Verba, 1963, 363; Lipset, 1960, 1, 4, 78, 250; Dahl, 1971, 105; Dahl, 1956, 347; Christoph, 1965). Equally important though, democracy required a social pluralism with crosscutting loyalties, expressed through multiple, competing groups (Lipset, 1960, 78). The significance of overlapping loyalties among social cleavages was to prevent the emergence of social alignments polarizing a nation along race, ethnicity, religion, or other traditional lines of conflict and division. This social pluralism is also central to two other concepts in democratic theory, social capital and civil society.

In Making Democracy Work (Putnam, 1993), the focus was on explaining institutional performance by way of an examination of the northern and southern Italian regions. In noting that the wealthier, more modern regions of the North have a head start over their poorer counterparts in material and human resources, Putnam ties economic performance to the performance of public and civic institutions (85). Speculating on the causes of the strength of these civic institutions, he identifies active citizen engagement and participation in public affairs as important (87), along with political equality (88), and solidarity, trust, and tolerance (89). These norms, according to Putnam, are “embodied in, and reinforced by, distinctive social structure and practices,” and the most important of these institutions are civil associations (89). Borrowing from Tocqueville, Putnam argues that these associations instill internally in their members a sense of cooperation, trust, public-spiritedness, a tempering of self-interest, and other important values critical to democratic practice (89–90). Externally, these groups have a wider impact upon the polity, producing moderation of group conduct and cross-pressures (90).

The performance of representative government is facilitated by the social infrastructure of civic communities and by the democratic values of both officials and citizens. Most fundamental to the civic community is the social ability to collaborate for shared interests. Where norms and networks of civic engagement are lacking, the outlook for collective action appears bleak. Generalized reciprocity thus generates high social capital and underpins collaboration. This type of harmony in society illustrates how voluntary collaboration can create value that no individual regardless of income and intelligence could produce alone (183). In the civic community, associations proliferate, memberships overlap, and participation spills into multiple arenas of community life. Overall, the performance of democratic institutions is enhanced by a developed civil society (182).

Critical to Putnam’s equation is how involvement in voluntary associations generates social capital. Quoting from James Coleman conception of the term, Putnam here defines social capital as those “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, 167). In drawing upon this definition of social capital and the way it is employed in Making Democracy Work, social capital has more of a, well, social aspect to it. Social capital is not the individual property of any individual. Instead, it is the connective tissue, shared norms, and community values that undergird social cooperation and intercourse. Social capital is not divisible; instead, it is a structural byproduct of engagement in and through voluntary associations (Tarrow, 1996). Moreover, voluntary associations are part of an embedded social structure, one part of several institutions necessary to making democracies work.

Hence, the postwar political science paradigm argued that the trick to maintaining democratic stability rested in part on the encouragement of secular national values which all groups supported (Lipset, 1960, 68), the maintenance of overlapping loyalties, and the replacement or amelioration of the divisive forces of race, ethnicity, and religion with less divisive interest politics that could be politically compromised through the electoral and political process (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 1968; Lijphart, 1977, 19; Kornhauser, 1959; Easton, 1965; Huntington, 1968; Budge, 1970; Pennock, 1979, 206–259). These empirical studies stated that democracies depend on support for broad social and political toleration of diverse groups and dissident views as well as a set of regularized and peaceful mechanisms to reconcile disputes without censorship or force. These studies also emphasized that attainment of a certain level of economic conditions or affluence was required, or that a strong middle class was required, or that the gaps between the rich and the poor could not be too great such that there was unchecked class conflict or antagonisms.

Overall, democracy is more than mere form or procedures. There are procedural and political institutional aspects that seem important to define what a democracy is. But democracies also require some substantive components, including an inner morality of law, respect for rule of law, a political culture, social capital, and a set of civil and economic institutions.

The initial conditions that foster democracy are not necessarily the same conditions necessary for democracies to be resilient.

As noted above, (liberal) democracy represents a core set of values. These values are represented in a set of institutions and culture. Liberal democracy requires an initial set of conditions to form, but then there is the issue of democratic stability. Democratic stability refers to the persistence or survivability of democratic values in a state, even if the institutions and culture change. Resilience is the capacity of a regime to adapt and evolve in such a way that it continues to promote democratic values, institutions, and a culture (Carugati, 2020).

Resilience is necessary to promote democratic stability (Merkel, 2023). In the last few years, there has been a significant interest in the issue of democratic resilience, in part prompted by backsliding or erosion of democratic norms across the world, including in Africa, Europe and even the United States. The concept of resilience emerges from fields such as engineering and has been applied to politics and political systems (Holloway & Manwaring, 2023).

What is democratic resilience? There are several definitions for this term. For example, Wolfgang Merkel (2023) offers one definition.

Democratic resilience is the capacity of a democratic regime to absorb external challenges and internal stressors and to dynamically adapt to the changing functional conditions of democratic governance without falling into regime change and then abandoning or damaging democracies, dividing principles, functions, and norms.

For Merkel, resilience in theory is a systemic-wide issue. It is looking at adaptability or agility in terms of addressing internal or external threats. The types of shocks can be economic, technological, climatic, or demographic, for example.

Yet in practice, for the purposes of this book, resilience is about the maintenance or democratic values or practice. Democratic resilience is defined by Lieberman et al. (2022) in their book Democratic Resilience. Here, they declare democratic resilience broadly as a system’s capacity to withstand a major shock, such as the onset of extreme polarization, and to continue to perform the basic functions of democratic governance, electoral accountability, representation, effective restraints on excessive or concentrated power, and collective decision-making.

Democratic resilience, according to the authors, has both an institutional and behavioral component. Institutionally, one thinks of resilience in terms of the way political power is divided up and channeled. It could be classic systems, such as in the United States, with checks and balances and separations of powers, or it could be federalism, or it could otherwise be the way different branches of the government or agencies are assigned types of authority. Institutional resilience is important because it also addresses questions of adaptability versus stability. By that, both institutions that can be stable and withstand challenges but also able to adapt to changing circumstances and external or internal threats.

The authors also point to a behavioral component in terms of democratic resilience. By behavioral component, this refers to the internalization among political actors in terms of respect for democratic norms. This includes, for example, acceptance of electoral defeats and peaceful transitions of power. It includes the legitimacy of elections, the right of rival or opponent political parties to exist, and respect for dissent or disagreement. The behavioral component refers to both observance of official norms and rule of law, but also unofficial values that are part of democracy. Their argument is like that of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) and the importance of unwritten norms such as tolerance for the opposition and forbearance in not pressing one’s advantage as critical to sustaining democracy.

Crum and Oleart (2023) investigate democratic resilience in the context of populist parties in Europe. Their interest is in looking at how democratic pluralism can decay or retreat into polarization. By that one of the hallmarks of a pluralist democracy is the concept of cross-cutting cleavages, where factors such as race, class, gender, and religion cut across one another to preclude polarization. Multiple cleavages produce multiple loyalties which work against polarization. But increasingly they note how political parties in Eastern Europe have become polarized, such that they display ethnic, racial, gender, or religious characteristics. Populist parties grow out of and take advantage of polarization and eventually produce conditions that help undermine democracy and democratic legitimacy.

Holloway and Manwaring (2023) undertake one of the more unique explorations of democratic resilience by doing a literature review of 748 scholarly sources that mention the topic. This review eventually produces fifty-eight sources with significant content discussing democratic resilience. What they found is an inconsistency in the definition and meaning of resilience which oftentimes is used inconsistently, often used interchangeably with words such as stability, adaptability, or agility. When discussing resilience, they additionally find a lack of set metrics and measurement tools for determining what resilience is. Despite this conception confusion, their conclusion is that there are ten values or characteristics associated with resilient democracies, including a social diversity of groups, social learning, and willingness to change, high equity across groups, and effective institutions that respond to citizen demands (72).

Overall, resilience is not an all or nothing proposition. There are levels of resilience, with states demonstrating various capacities. Resilience is also neither merely institutional nor cultural, nor is it premised simply upon formal structures. Resilience is a far more encompassing capacity to address internal and external shocks to a democratic state.

As noted above, the factors leading to the consolidation and fostering of democracy are not necessarily the same as those sustaining stability and resilience. Democracies can be created and lost. The question is how?

Lührmann (2023) explores what she calls a three-step process in the autocratization of democracy. The first step is when citizens express discontent with democratic institutions and parties. At this stage, to prevent further erosion of democratic norms, political systems need to act to be more responsive to address concerns. But if not, it leads to a second stage, where it involves the rise of anti-pluralists who actors lacking commitment to democratic norms and who exploit it and fuel discontent. They rise to power, exploiting issues such as nationalism or ethnic divides, which serve to further divide the population against one another. The third stage occurs when the basic accountability mechanisms and opposition actors enable democratic breakdowns. They challenge basic democratic norms, and again, exploit polarization.

Democratic breakdown is not instantaneous but is slow and gradual and goes through stages. It transforms or exploits pluralism into polarization. But what do we need to do to address the problems of democratic breakdown and how do we promote resilience?

We know there are several things critical to resilience. For example, limits on the centralization of power, especially in terms of a chief executive or president, are critical. One of the most significant characteristics of political systems breaking down is when executives have too much power left unchecked (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

Another characteristic is a lack of trust. This is trust in terms of citizens not trusting government officials, but also a lack of trust among the public itself, one political party not trusting another, or seeing political opposition as criminal or not loyal. This lack of trust is also related to what Robert Putnam and others talked about in terms of social capital. Democracies flourish in places where there is more robust social capital, where individuals trust and interact with one another.

A democratic breakdown occurs when we see, as noted before, a polarization of the electorate. It is when political parties oftentimes fail to respect opposition candidates or question the legitimacy of elections. Polarization in democracies can also be the product of increasing economic disparities in a society and where there is a belief or perception that the government is failing to address these inequities. In effect, a lack of trust or belief in systemic capacity to solve core issues such as growing economic disparities.