Democratic Resilience in the Baltics, Vol. 1

These are the best of times and the worst of times for democracy across the world, including Europe. While democracy seemed to peak in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, it is now in retreat, and under special threat since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2014 and 2022. This retreat makes the topic of democratic resilience important. This chapter examines the concept of democratic resilience while seeking a definition and outlining some of the preconditions for democracy to initiate and then persist. Its argument is that democracy is more than just a set of political institutions but also includes cultural values. But even more so, resilience requires a totality of conditions extending not just to the political sphere, but encompassing many facets that range across economics, civil society, and other arenas of politics.

“Hybrid threats” describes a complex strategy combining military tools with unconventional methods, ranging from economic and energy-related pressure to spreading disinformation. In the Baltics, we understand that addressing hybrid threats is a continuous, never-ending process centred around developing resilience at the societal, national, European, and trans-Atlantic levels. Hybrid threats are constantly changing and evolving, necessitating an equally dynamic response. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many observers anticipated that Russia’s pressure on Ukraine would resemble the hybrid tactics observed in 2014. With the Russian-Ukrainian frontline nearly stagnant, the peace settlement is not progressing despite U.S. engagement, and Russia’s efforts yielding limited results despite enormous casualty rates and physical destruction, the prospects of a prolonged conflict have become apparent. Indeed, Russia is unable to achieve its initial goals in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is now preparing for a long battle both on the frontline and beyond. Consequently, Russia’s use of hybrid strategies, alongside military ones, has become more evident. Moreover, Russia’s application of hybrid threats in the Baltics is expected to increase. This article examines cases relevant to the three Baltic States, overviews the main characteristics of hybrid threats, and highlights several dilemmas that democratic states, regardless of size, face while countering hybrid threats.

The foundation of a state’s overall security is political security, which entails a comprehensive set of measures aimed at safeguarding sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and constitutional order. The political sector refers to the domain of security that focuses on protecting the state’s political system, encompassing its governance mechanisms, democratic processes, rule of law, and institutional frameworks. These elements ensure stability and functionality while fostering resilience against threats that could destabilise them. The nature of these threats can be categorised into domestic and external dimensions. Domestic threats include political instability caused by weaknesses in the political party system, interference with judicial independence, erosion of media freedom, and the lack of integration or protection of minority rights. External threats include hybrid warfare tactics like cyber-attacks, propaganda, economic coercion, and foreign influence operations aimed at destabilising domestic politics. Geopolitical pressures, including energy dependency and economic manipulation, further exacerbate these vulnerabilities. The Baltic States—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—have experienced significant vulnerability in the political security sector for more than three decades, following their re-establishment of independence in 1990 and 1991. This vulnerability is shaped by their geographical location, historical experiences, and their often-tense relationships with Russia and Belarus. This chapter provides a thorough analysis of the systemic resilience of the Baltic States to both domestic threats, including weaknesses in the political party system, judicial independence, media freedom, and minority rights, and external threats posed by actors such as Russia, China, and Belarus. It explores how the Baltic States, as consolidated democracies, have developed mechanisms to counter vulnerabilities and strengthen political security. The analysis underscores that, despite ongoing challenges, the Baltic States demonstrate notable resilience through their commitment to democratic governance and the rule of law.

Resilience to threats posed by foreign intelligence services is one of the national security priorities enshrined in the Law on National Security Framework of the Republic of Lithuania. It declares that the state authorities must protect Lithuania from subversive activities of foreign secret services and their cover structures and prevent them from using the territory of the Republic of Lithuania or as a transit state for subversive activities against other states. Hostile activities by foreign intelligence and security services pose a serious threat to the national security of small states. This threat has recently intensified. The activities of foreign intelligence and security services are not limited to the gathering of national, NATO, and European Union classified and other information through hijacking, extortion, or other means. Intelligence and security services in foreign countries are actively engaged in cyber, information, influence, and other hybrid attacks, organising and carrying out diversions, and assassinating foreign and domestic citizens who threaten their political leadership. Therefore, strengthening the resilience of small states by enhancing the capacity of their intelligence and counterintelligence institutions, citizens’ awareness, critical thinking, and resilience to the unlawful influence of foreign intelligence and security services is crucial to reduce the threat posed by foreign intelligence and security services. This chapter examines Lithuania’s best practices in ensuring the resilience of the state and society against espionage and other subversive threats posed by foreign intelligence services.

Over the past two decades, the Baltic States have faced challenges to their economic resilience, triggered by the global financial and economic crisis, the health crisis (COVID-19), and Russia’s war against Ukraine. The disruption of the supply of food, medicines, and other basic necessities for survival has given the issue of economic resilience a much broader context which is often linked to national security and democratic resilience. The different nature of the challenges faced by the Baltic States has highlighted different weaknesses in their economies each time, which has led to the identification of areas that require solutions from the authorities and responsible institutions. The case studies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania show that, although the effects of the crises affected different segments of the economy each time, the impact on economic resilience became less pronounced in the face of each subsequent crisis. This chapter reveals the main similarities and differences in the economic resilience of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the context of crises caused by financial, health, and security factors.

In the Baltic States, the resilience of national jurisdictions is an important element of comprehensive defence because due to their size and geographic location, in the event of external aggression, they have little, if any, time and resources to modify their legal framework and law enforcement to meet the needs of war, when international law is unable to deliver justice. The national legal framework also ensures that defence resources are available and ready to respond to hybrid and conventional military threats. This chapter discusses the concept of legal warfare, its impact and the challenges faced by the Baltic jurisdictions, as well as the measures to strengthen their resilience to the challenges of legal warfare. It also identifies and discusses potential threats to the integrity of the legal systems of the Baltic States and the measures that could be put in place to ensure the rule of law and law enforcement based on democratic governance in the event of a crisis or external aggression.

Since regaining independence from the Soviet Union, the Baltic States have faced a myriad of challenges and threats, including financial instability, energy dependence, high levels of emigration, and, more recently, illegal immigration from third countries, exacerbated by Belarus and the war between Ukraine and Russia. The dynamic nature of socio-economic situations, especially during crises such as pandemics and natural disasters, affects a country’s resilience. This chapter aims to analyse the determinants of social resilience in the Baltic States while identifying the preconditions for its emergence by looking at social resilience—the ability of communities to adapt and thrive in the face of adversity. It focuses on the historical experience of the Baltic States in building social resilience in the context of migration, crisis situations, disinformation, and propaganda.

Climate resilience is the ability to adapt to changing climatic conditions, mitigate the effects of climate change, and effectively address the associated risks. The effects of climate change pose a major threat to the ecosystems, societies, and economies of small states. In order to build climate resilience, it is necessary to assess and identify the risks posed to countries by climate change. In this context, the most vulnerable sectors identified in the Baltic States are: natural ecosystems, food, health, infrastructure, and the economy. These sectors are vulnerable to increasing extreme weather events, rising Baltic Sea water levels, changes in temperature and precipitation as well as other climate changes. Therefore, this chapter reveals the resilience to climate change in the Baltic States through an analysis of the effects of climate change and identification of key changes and possible solutions through the concepts of absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities. The analysis shows that the Baltic States are focusing on building adaptive resilience capacity through long-term adaptation strategies such as restoring natural ecosystems, developing green urban areas, investing in research, strengthening governance structures responsible for managing climate crises, developing a financial support system, etc. These and other identified strategies and measures provide the basis for reducing the dependence of the Baltic economy on vulnerable sectors, maintaining the stability of natural ecosystems, public health, and quality of life.

In today’s interconnected global economy, financial risk management has become a critical component of national security and sustainable development. In countries, especially small ones such as the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—effective financial risk management is crucial to ensure the viability of the financial system, preserve economic stability, promote growth, and ensure the well-being of citizens. This section examines the importance of financial risk management in the national context, highlighting its link to sustainability and national security. It presents the theoretical and practical aspects of financial risk management, the specificities of financial instability in small countries, an overview of the main economic and financial crises affecting the Baltic States and their consequences, and a discussion of generalised resilience to financial threats.

The resilience of the supply chains is a critical factor in ensuring the economic and geopolitical stability of the small states. This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of how supply chain management influences the region’s ability to withstand external shocks, such as geopolitical tensions, economic disruptions, and global crises. The first section discusses key features of the supply chains. The following section examines types of chains that are critical to small, open economies like those of the Baltic States. It highlights the vulnerabilities inherent in their reliance on international trade and the necessity of robust supply chain frameworks. The subsequent sections delve into theoretical aspects of supply chain resilience. These sections examine strategic approaches to mitigating risks, including diversification, digitalization, and the integration of sustainable logistics practices, and then shifts to the examination of the real-world applications of these theories in the Baltic context. It assesses historical disruptions, policy responses, and industry adaptations. By comparing these findings with global best practices, the chapter underscores the importance of proactive policy-making and private sector engagement. The conclusion synthesizes the key insights, emphasizing the need for coordinated efforts between governments, businesses, and international partners as well as forward-looking policies that incorporate technological advancements and geopolitical considerations to enhance the resilience of supply chains critical to the three Baltic States.

Innovation and technology are essential tools that can be widely used to ensure adequate resilience to the range of threats that small societies face. The Baltic States are often resource constrained and more vulnerable to a variety of threats, which makes innovation and technology a key factor in increasing their resilience. To strengthen their resilience, the Baltic States are innovating and deploying technologies across sectors to adapt to the changing threat landscape. This chapter analyses good practices in innovation and technology development in the Baltic States. Despite their shared history and regional cooperation, the three Baltic States have distinct strategic priorities. Estonia has positioned itself as a global leader in digital governance and cybersecurity. Lithuania has leveraged fintech and energy independence as key resilience strategies, while Latvia has focused on sustainable technologies and transportation innovations.

To be able to properly adapt and use the EU’s crisis management mechanisms in the event of a crisis, the Baltic States need to build resilience by strengthening their administrative capacity. The EU and its Member States have already established cross-border cooperation and solidarity mechanisms to manage crises and protect people effectively. One of them is the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), which, in the case of the Baltic States, was activated during the migrant crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. It enabled the Baltic States to contribute to the defence of Ukraine, help other European countries in the fight against the challenges of climate change, and prepare for future crises. This mechanism is an example of “cyclical Europeanization”, which highlights the importance of the administrative capacity of Member States to ensure resilience in the face of crises. However, administrative capacity has been one of the biggest challenges for the Baltic States in joining the EU. Insufficient administrative capacity to pool resources in times of emergency might make the small states vulnerable. This chapter analyses the EU crisis management context—the theoretical background of Europeanization and the practical aspects of the mechanisms currently in place in the EU. In this context, the importance of the Member States’ administrative capacity for resilience is highlighted.

Lithuania’s national security and economic stability rely on the resilience of its critical infrastructures (CIs), which face increasing threats from hybrid warfare and technological complexity. The article analyses Lithuania’s evolving approach to strengthening critical infrastructure (CI), shifting from traditional Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) to Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR). While CIP focuses on preventing risks and safeguarding assets, CIR emphasizes the ability of systems to anticipate, absorb, and recover from disruptions—especially in the face of hybrid threats and increasing technological complexity. This transition involves proactive policies, integrated risk assessments, and resilience-by-design principles in infrastructure planning. The article points out the foundational role of CI in national security. These systems—ranging from energy and transport to health and ICT—are essential for public safety, economic stability, and societal well-being. Their interdependence with national security sectors underlines the importance of robust protection and resilience frameworks. The article discusses key megatrends impacting CIP in Lithuania, including digital transformation, regulatory shifts, and growing system interconnectivity. These trends necessitate more dynamic and adaptive strategies as infrastructures face both traditional and emerging threats. The author of the article proposes the roadmap that includes seven key steps: adopting a resilience mindset, conducting comprehensive risk assessments, embedding resilience in infrastructure development, enhancing cybersecurity, fostering public–private collaboration, engaging communities, and implementing continuous monitoring and improvement mechanisms. The article concludes by recommending initiatives for further enhancement of the resilience of critical infrastructure.

In 2021, Lithuania had to deal with a massive irregular migrant crisis artificially created by the Belarusian regime using migrants as political pressure. On the Belarusian side, the organised flows of migrants, mainly from the Middle East, threatened Lithuania’s national security, and the security and defence institutions had to take action, including military engagement, to reinforce the capacities of the civilian institutions. This case study examines good practices and challenges in cooperation between the military and the internal affairs system. The case demonstrates that effective inter-institutional cooperation and military engagement can significantly enhance a country’s ability to respond to complex hybrid threats. The successful use of military-specific know-how, effective inter-institutional information sharing, and the establishment of a single channel of communication have enabled timely decision-making and a coordinated response to the crisis. However, smooth cooperation was challenged by differences in organisational cultures between civilian and military institutions in terms of levels of authority and jurisdiction, as well as by the need to ensure that the long-term involvement of the military did not adversely affect the military training processes. These good practices can be of value to other countries seeking to strengthen their capacity to anticipate, respond to, and mitigate future crises, thus ensuring the security of their citizens and building resilience to external threats. The lessons learned from the Lithuanian experience underscore the importance of robust civil-military cooperation and the development of flexible institutional frameworks that can effectively address emerging security threats in different geopolitical contexts. This is particularly important in view of the growing number of hybrid threats, where military engagement is required as a backup for civilian institutions.

Adding to the rich scientific literature on the energy resilience of the Baltic States, this chapter overviews the goals, tools, and results of Russia’s energy coercion activities against Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and identifies how the Baltic States’ responses strengthened or weakened their energy resilience. The primary objective of Russian energy coercion was to achieve preferential political outcomes (changing national policies and taking control over strategic energy companies) by disrupting energy supply and inflating energy prices. Despite establishing significant economic costs on the Baltic States, Russian energy coercion failed to achieve its aims and eventually, the Baltic States were able to instrumentalize the EU’s financial and political mechanisms to counter its energy coercion by diversifying energy supply. However, the increasing quantity and severity of gray zone activities in Europe, likely attributable to Russia, observed after the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine establishes additional requirements for the Baltic States’ energy resilience, emphasizing the need to reinforce physical critical energy infrastructure protection.