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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Distance-Bounding, Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Credentials

Authors : Daniel Bosk, Simon Bouget, Sonja Buchegger

Published in: Cryptology and Network Security

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Distance-bounding anonymous credentials could be used for any location proofs that do not need to identify the prover and thus could make even notoriously invasive mechanisms such as location-based services privacy-preserving. There is, however, no secure distance-bounding protocol for general attribute-based anonymous credentials. Brands and Chaum’s (EUROCRYPT’93) protocol combining distance-bounding and Schnorr identification comes close, but does not fulfill the requirements of modern distance-bounding protocols. For that, we need a secure distance-bounding zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge resisting mafia fraud, distance fraud, distance hijacking and terrorist fraud.

Our approach is another attempt toward combining distance bounding and Schnorr to construct a distance-bounding zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge. We construct such a protocol and prove it secure in the (extended) DFKO model for distance bounding. We also performed a symbolic verification of security properties needed for resisting these attacks, implemented in Tamarin.

Encouraged by results from Singh et al. (NDSS’19), we take advantage of lessened constraints on how much can be sent in the fast phase of the distance-bounding protocol and achieve a more efficient protocol. We also provide a version that does not rely on being able to send more than one bit at a time which yields the same properties except for (full) terrorist fraud resistance.

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previous chapter Detecting Word Based DGA Domains Using Ensemble Models

next chapter Trenchcoat: Human-Computable Hashing Algorithms for Password Generation

This means that even things like functional encryption will not help.

Note that [9] uses the abbreviation PoPoK, we prefer PPK for shorter notation.

One of the two competing formal models for DB protocols.

This is due to redundancy for the purpose of error correction.

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Title: Distance-Bounding, Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Credentials
Authors: Daniel Bosk
Simon Bouget
Sonja Buchegger
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Cryptology and Network Security
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-65410-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-65411-5

Copyright Year: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65411-5_8

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