This study empirically investigates the dismissal of U.S. CEOs following negative media coverage of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices. Extending related literature on the media, ESG, and CEO dismissal, I develop a theoretical framework that considers the media as an influential third party that forms and reflects public opinion about ESG issues. In this role, the media reduces information asymmetry by providing cues on their relative salience and prompting corporate directors to attribute firm-level ESG issues to the CEO, regardless of their involvement in the misconduct. Findings confirm this framework and particularly suggest that coverage of issues in prominent media sources is more likely to result in CEO dismissal. Further, companies that have made public commitments to ESG oversight and those with stronger monitoring are more likely to dismiss the CEO following negative coverage of ESG issues. Overall, this study builds an understanding of how contemporary boards approach the uncertain CEO dismissal decision amidst media coverage of ESG- related misconduct and reflects a shifting norm towards ESG integration at the board-level.