Introduction
Donors look at us and see oppression. They think that we do not have any values, that only they can give us values.
1
This article scrutinizes donor-funded women’s empowerment in Tajikistan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the consequent Tajik civil war (1992–1997) between pro-government secular forces and an Islamist-dominated opposition, this newly independent Central Asian country experienced a massive influx of aid. Since the early 1990s, international, mainly Western, donors have been implementing a variety of development projects on the ground (Heathershaw
2009; Kluczewska and Foroughi
2021). These projects are aimed at facilitating post-conflict peacebuilding and a simultaneous transition from a centralized, socialist government and command economy to democracy and capitalism. In accordance with international development trends worldwide as well as across the post-Soviet space (Sundstrom
2002; Ishkanian
2007; Pares Hoare
2016; Lazda
2018), women’s empowerment was also high on donors’ agenda in Tajikistan.
Donors conceptualized women’s empowerment as fostering gender equality through providing women with the same rights and opportunities as men, including equal treatment in the political, social and, in particular, economic sphere (see, e.g. Hotkina and Rabieva
2003: p. 5). In the specific context of post-Soviet, post-civil war and Muslim-majority Tajikistan, women’s empowerment projects aimed to help increase women’s economic productivity, against what donors perceived as the persistence of a communal, patriarchal and religious lifestyle, which hindered gender equality (MacKenzie
2009). Tajikistan demonstrates many similarities with other post-socialist Eastern European and post-Soviet countries, where after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, which led to a rampant economic crisis, donors also aimed to help local women deal with unemployment and integrate into a new capitalist economy (Gal and Kligman
2000: pp. 55–58; Hotkina and Rabieva
2003: pp. 8–9). The situation in Tajikistan, however, was even more acute: fighting, which took place during the civil war displaced at least 680,000 out of 6 million people, resulted in 20–60,000 deaths and nearly led to a total economic collapse in the country (Akiner and Barnes
2001: p. 6). What also differentiates Tajikistan is that donors additionally justified their interventions in the country with the excuse that, to use Lila Abu-Lughod’s (
2002) term, “Muslim women need saving”, not only from communism, but also from patriarchy and oppression which they associated with the rising role of Islam after the Soviet collapse. To justify their intervention into local social relations, donors resorted to drawing images of the particular vulnerability of Tajik women. These were portrayed as passive victims of the war and religious resurgence, subordinated to Muslim men, and also as grateful beneficiaries of international aid (Simpson
2006: p. 20). These narratives also notoriously highlighted the new “status” of Tajikistan as the poorest country of the former Soviet Union (see, e.g. Falkingham
2000; ADB
2006). It is in this context that in the early 1990s, the first internationally funded local women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) appeared in the country to foster women’s empowerment on the donors’ behalf.
Donors did not discuss their women’s empowerment strategies with the Tajik government, the general population or even with their main partners on the ground: the women’s NGOs which they funded (Buxton
2011: pp. 113–116). By treating the country as an empty space where not only a new political and economic but also a social system could be designed from scratch, they ignored the fact that there might be pre-existing norms and values on the ground. Notably, this international women’s empowerment imposition was not the first external attempt to enhance local women’s rights. Starting from
hujum, the unveiling campaign in 1927, the expanding Soviet state had launched its own women’s liberation struggle in Muslim Central Asia (Northrop
2004). Back then, the Soviet Union had used the rhetoric of religious and patriarchal oppression of local women to strengthen its legitimacy in the region. But the Soviet state had also provided women in Tajikistan with education, employment and vast welfare, using these as the main means of women’s emancipation (Mirzoeva
2004: pp. 24–29). This six-decade-long Soviet women’s empowerment resulted in the emergence of a strong social group composed of educated and largely pro-secular women activists across the whole country. As this article shows, the ideas which these activists had about women’s empowerment were fundamentally different from the Western women’s empowerment agenda, and yet the two needed to be reconciled.
Against this backdrop, the article explores a contentious relationship between donor-funded women’s empowerment and local social dynamics. It draws on conceptual insights from critical development studies (Ferguson
1990; Veltmeyer and Bowles
2018) and in particular the post-development theory (Escobar
1992; Ziai
2007). This theoretical strand starts with skepticism of neoliberal assumptions of contemporary international development, and rejection of a hegemonic, Western-centric understanding of what development is. Indeed, it revolves around “alternative(s) to development” (Escobar
1992: p. 22) and calls for a recognition of alternative, multiple visions of modernity and progress, based upon non-western normativities (see Gudynas
2011; Ziai
2017).
This article analyzes the trajectories of donor-funded local women’s NGOs, and their changing perceptions of donor-funded women’s empowerment. These organizations are locally known as
zhenshkie NPO (in Russian) and
tashkiloti zanona (in Tajik), and are headed by local women activists. By focusing on their leaders, goals and relations with donors, this article identifies four types of women’s NGOs, which correspond to time periods that partially overlap. These are elite women’s NGOs between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s; rural women’s NGOs from the late 1990s to the late 2000s; professional women’s NGOs from the late 2000s until now; and NGOs mainstreaming gender from the early 2010s until now. The article shows that the field of women’s empowerment in independent Tajikistan was largely dominated by international donors, both through funding and an accompanying, rights-based normative framework. Importantly, the case of Tajikistan differs from many other post-Soviet countries in terms of local perceptions of donor-funded projects. Elsewhere, in the 1990s, an initial resistance on the part of the public and local NGOs to donor-funded women’s empowerment could be observed, but over time, local reactions normalized and NGOs became more accommodating towards donor-promoted frameworks (see, e.g. Ishkanian
2007; Lazda
2018). In Tajikistan, a reverse trend took place. In the 1990s and 2000s, the public and the government remained largely indifferent to donor-funded women’s empowerment, but local NGOs were welcoming towards such projects. However, in the last decade, an increasing conditionality attached to international funding and deteriorating donor-NGOs’ relations made local contestations more vocal. The donor framework, which relies upon values such as self-reliance and individual responsibility, was criticized by NGO leaders for aggravating the condition of local women by stripping them of their only remaining safety nets, i.e. the family unit, which they have in the context of economic insecurity accompanying Tajikistan’s integration into the global capitalist economy. These contestations are additionally strengthened through an alternative women’s empowerment model, supported by the Tajik government, which is gaining prominence in the country. It advances a heteronormative family model (Tajik:
oila) and relies upon an assumption about gender equity, unlike the donor-promoted framework which favors gender equality. It thus envisages distinct, biologically determined social roles of men and women, which are seen as complementary to each other—with men as providers and women being responsible for the upbringing of children, who in future will take care of aging parents. In the almost total absence of a state welfare system, many local NGO leaders see this framework as the only feasible women’s empowerment model.
Following this introduction, the next section describes the methodology of this research. It then explains how donor-funded women’s empowerment arrived in Tajikistan and analyzes the trajectories of women’s NGOs in the country and changing views on the donor agenda. The article concludes with a reflection on a coexistence of donors’ and local women’s NGOs’ interests over the last three decades.
Methodology
This article draws on my long-term research in Tajikistan between 2013 and 2019. For a total of two and a half years, I used to be a practitioner in the aid sector in Tajikistan, working for one of the international organizations operating in the country and a local internationally funded NGO. It was during my work as a manager of a project discursively aimed at enhancing the rights and opportunities of local women that I was first exposed to the complex dynamics of donor-recipient relations, and the multi-level and multi-actor processes of promoting donors’ normative frameworks on the ground. I could observe these dynamics both in Dushanbe, the capital city, where networking and fundraising take place, and in rural areas of the country, where sub-contracted rural NGOs are implementing internationally funded projects at a very local level. I took part in many high-level conferences and seminars with the participation of government bodies, international donors and what I describe as professional women’s NGOs based in the capital city, and also in information campaigns and mobile consultations conducted by local NGOs for women living in rural areas. These experiences allowed me to become familiar with various perspectives on donor-funded women’s empowerment, from donor agencies to rurally based organizations down the NGO chain. In turn, while working for a local NGO, I was, among other tasks, developing project proposals for calls from several international donors. This helped me better understand the NGOs’ complex positionality at an intersection of donors’, beneficiaries’ and their own interests. These experiences of being an “observing participant” (Mosse
2011) of donor-funded women’s empowerment provide the sub-text of this research.
The article also draws upon my doctoral and postdoctoral field research on development aid in Tajikistan. I specifically refer to semi-structured, in-depth interviews with both leaders and employees of 13 women’s NGOs in the country, nine of whom are women and four are men. Seven of these organizations are based in urban areas (Dushanbe and Khujand) and six in semi-urban and rural areas (in Istaravshan, Konibodom, Kulob, Panjakent districts and the Rasht Valley). In addition, I draw on interviews with three officials from government bodies which work on women’s issues (Committee on Women and Family Affairs and the Ombudsman’s office), and four representatives of international organizations and international non-governmental organizations providing grants to local NGOs in the field of women’s empowerment. I conducted the interviews using Russian, Tajik and English languages. These field data are complemented with secondary sources, such as donor-funded publications on the situation of women in Tajikistan, which exemplify the donors’ point of view (Falkingham
2000; Hotkina and Rabieva
2003; ADB
2006), and writings of local scholars on the condition of local women after the Soviet collapse (Mirzoeva
2004; Kasymova
2008; Lysyh
2007; Sharipova
2008; Mamadazimov and Kuvatova
2012). The analysis is also situated in literature on women’s empowerment promoted by Western actors in the broader post-socialist and post-Soviet space.
Donor-funded Women’s Empowerment Arrives in Tajikistan: Antecedents and Superimpositions
In the early 1970s, Western liberal feminists, mostly upper-class, white female American scholars, coined the concept of “women in development”, which created the basis for the future women’s empowerment framework (Escobar
1995: p. 178). Seeing patriarchy as the main enemy of women, the supporters of the concept advocated enhancing gender equality, especially through women’s access to the labor market on the same conditions as men (Gal and Kligman
2000: p. 809; Ghodsee
2004: p. 732). Notably, Western women’s empowerment emerged largely in reaction to the Soviet Union, that Tajikistan was once part of, which identified the capitalist system as women’s biggest enemy. It was the Soviet support for the international women’s movement on anti-capitalist terms that made the USA adopt an antagonistic approach to women’s empowerment by integrating them into the capitalist economy (Ghodsee
2010). Over time, women’s empowerment became one of the most popular normative frameworks of contemporary western-funded development aid. The dominant framings shifted from “women in development”, through “women and development”, “gender and development” (Crewe and Harrison
1998: p. 51), to, more recently, “gender mainstreaming” (Moser and Moser
2005).
Milestones in the Western women’s empowerment agenda included the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979; regular World Conferences on Women, starting from 1975; the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985) and the Beijing Platform for Action launched in 1995. In 2000, women’s empowerment and gender equality were included in the Millennium Development Goals, and in 2010 in the Sustainable Development Goals. Once established, the “UN theatres” including international women’s conferences started having an impact on non-western states through material support from Western donors accompanied by the diffusion of an uncritical discourse of women’s empowerment (Spivak in Simpson
2006: p. 14). Ironically, perhaps, after the Soviet collapse, Western women’s empowerment started being promoted in the same post-Soviet space that had denounced it previously. As Kristen Ghodsee (
2010: p. 9) posits, in 1995, women from the former Soviet bloc came to the Beijing conference empty-handed. Stripped of the communist agenda, which was no longer useful in the new capitalist reality, women leaders from post-Soviet countries could now be easily “re-educated into accepting Western feminist perspectives”. This is particularly surprising given that in the Soviet era, Western liberal feminism was locally associated with a movement of bourgeois women. Yet, following the conference, with the push from Western donors, new gender laws and action plans were promoted across the post-Soviet space, including Tajikistan (see Hotkina and Rabieva
2003: p. 28; Mamadazimov and Kuvatova
2012: p. 65).
After the Soviet collapse, in Tajikistan, there was little academic interest in gender studies. During the civil war, 320,000 highly educated people, including many academics and teachers, left the country for good and settled mainly in Russia (Kluczewska and Korneev
2018: pp. 35–37). Local activists and scholars who remained, now working in an impoverished Tajik academia, did not develop their own vision of women’s empowerment in the new conflict-stricken and capitalist reality. There were also no locally developed national strategies with regard to women, as this topic was not a priority of policymakers in a country going through a civil war. This additionally facilitated donors’ influence in this field.
Overall, the Soviet collapse and the subsequent war brought about tremendous changes in the social, political and economic life of Tajikistan. Despite Soviet-era achievements with regard to creating economic and political opportunities for women, in the 1990s, women found themselves largely excluded from politics. As Muborak Sharipova (
2008: p. 70) posits, “the political sphere in independent Tajikistan has been ‘hijacked’ by groups of men from specific regions or by criminal clans”. Available statistics show that while in 1989, women occupied 25.8% of high-level positions in Soviet Tajikistan, in 1995, this fell to 3.3% (Mamadazimov and Kuvatova
2012: p. 63). Employment in the public sector, anyway, did not provide the opportunity to secure a sufficient income. In the late 1990s, after the war had officially ended, about 35% of formally employed people in Tajikistan still did not receive salaries on time, and many public sector employees were on an equivalent of what we call today “leave without pay” (Hegland
2008: p. 52).
While unemployment had been rising fast in the 1990s, the data from the State Committee on Statistics pointed to an increase in the women’s official share of the labor market from 40% in 1991 to 46% in 1996 (Kasymova
2008: p. 37). Most probably, however, the actual participation of women in Tajikistan’s economy was much higher due to an informality of the local economic sector. This happened despite the rising role of orthodox Islam after the Soviet collapse—a process which was gradually tying women to the domestic sphere. Feminization and informalization of the labor force was caused not only by the deaths of men in the war, but also by a growing economic instability (see Mukhamedova and Wegerich
2018). While the labor emigration of men to Russia was steadily rising (Kluczewska and Korneev
2018, pp. 33–35), women took over several sectors of Tajikistan’s economy, such as the bazaar trade and agriculture. On the one hand, this process advanced women’s role in households and furthered women’s participation in economic activity. On the other hand, it exposed women to the inequalities of the new market economy in a country located at a new periphery of global capitalism, and characterized by extremely low earnings and scarce social protection.
Following the arrival of international donors in the early 1990s, Tajikistan became a new space of donor-funded women’s empowerment. As in other countries in the post-Soviet space, the rise in the number of women’s NGOs in Tajikistan was a result of abundant donor funding, rather than an expression of a liberal movement of local women. While donors relied on NGOs to channel their funding (Cleuziou and Direnberger
2016: p. 203), in the absence of well-paid jobs, the NGO boom created new, safe, work places and provided women with salaries which were much higher than the ones in, for example, government, education or health sectors (Tadjbakhsh
1998: p. 182; Hegland
2008: p. 61). Nevertheless, women’s NGOs should not be viewed as entirely donor-driven. As the next section shows, the NGO sector became a new arena where women leaders could exercise their pro-secular activism, against the rising religiosity of which they were critical. Moreover, once the space for women in the political scene had shrunk, the NGO work has allowed these women to use their previously acquired leadership skills.
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) prelude to the 2003 publication entitled
Tajikistan: On the Way to Gender Equality sends a clear message: “Gender discrimination is a key factor and cause of poverty. Women are often denied access to such fundamental rights as education, employment, natural resources and financial assets” (in Hotkina and Rabieva
2003: p. 5). Arguably, the situation in Tajikistan was the exact opposite, as it was poverty which deepened gender inequality. Leaders of women’s NGOs in Tajikistan did not question this and other assumptions underlying donor-funded women’s empowerment initiatives in their country, even if the applicability of this normative framework in the post-socialist and Soviet space has been widely queried (Gal and Kligman
2000; Sundstrom
2002; Ghodsee
2004; Ishkanian
2007; Szikra and Szelewa
2010; Pares Hoare
2016; Lazda
2018).
Women’s empowerment has also been widely denounced on conceptual grounds for its one-size-fits-all approach, as this agenda is reflexive of the Western context which produced it, rather than of the needs of non-western countries where it is being promoted. Other criticism pointed to Western arrogance reflected in women’s empowerment projects, as well as prejudices underlying such initiatives, especially with regard to Muslim societies (Abu-Lughod
2002; Billaud
2015). This framework was thus criticized for not taking into specific account socio-economic and political conditions in which gender imbalances appear, as well as ignoring the influence of global capitalism on inequality in peripheral countries, and instead promoting abstracted narratives about gendered power relations in “backward” societies (de Cordier
2010: p. 237). It was also argued that it advances neoliberalism through initiatives which privilege self-reliance and individual responsibility over durable family ties and social cohesion (MacKenzie
2009), and legitimizes expansion of the largely exploitative capitalist system under the guise of making lives of women better (Escobar
1995: p. 181; Gregor
2017). Another crucial question seems to be about who is the driving force of this framework (Crewe and Harrison
1998: p. 52). Depending on whether the quest for empowerment comes from international donors or from local women themselves, it will elicit different social reactions and lead to different outcomes. In many contexts, including Tajikistan, the fact that such initiatives are funded by Western donors and increasingly managed by westernized, urban NGOs only strengthens local perceptions that empowerment initiatives are not just distant from local realities, but also serve foreign interests (see also de Cordier
2010: p. 239).
Before proceeding with analyses of the trajectories of women’s NGOs in Tajikistan, it is worth mentioning that the state-supported women’s empowerment framework stressing the role of the family unit, which started emerging in Tajikistan in the last decade, appeared largely in response to these dynamics. As mentioned in the introduction, by promoting a—morally and physically—“healthy family” (Tajik:
oilai solim), it places women-mothers (Tajik:
zan-modar) at the center of society and tasks them with a mission to maintain Tajik traditions and raise future generations (Cleuziou and Direnberger
2016: p. 198; Roche
2016). It thus promotes gender equity, meant as a complementarity of two gendered, male and female social roles, as a way to maintain social cohesion against the existential insecurity in large part caused by the capitalist system. While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss to what extent such a framework can “effectively” empower women, it is important to recognize that, as in several other post-socialist countries where similar family-centered models emerged (see Grzebalska and Pető
2018), such a normative agenda is presented as a local, more relevant articulation of women’s empowerment.
Conclusion
This article has analyzed the trajectories of internationally funded women’s NGOs in Tajikistan and changing attitudes to the donor-promoted women’s empowerment framework. Since the Soviet collapse, Western donors have exercised a huge impact in the field of women’s empowerment in Tajikistan, both in terms of providing funding and promoting a rights-based agenda. Because of the influence that donors exercised in Tajikistan, it could easily be argued that the formation of a local movement of women in the new post-Soviet reality was largely dominated by Western donors. It seems that women leaders with former experience in Soviet-era women’s empowerment were easily coopted by donors, who gave them space to continue activism, which meant that they simultaneously and significantly reshaped the agenda. This activism might appear to be largely donor-driven and, thus, from the donors’ point of view, unsustainable. In fact, it appears from the trajectories of various local women’s NGOs that once donors stopped supporting these organizations financially, because of changing modalities of funding, more often than not they closed their offices.
The picture, however, is more nuanced. In the 1990s, there was no actual local movement of women to be hijacked, given the fast changing role of women in the family, society and state as a result of the Soviet collapse and the civil war, and in the context of the state withdrawal from welfare provision and a transition to the market economy. Moreover, focusing on various types of Tajik women’s NGOs, their leaders, their aims and their understanding of the donor agenda, allows us to realize that these NGO leaders took what they needed from donors—the NGO experience, funding and prestige associated with internationally funded projects—and reshaped it in accordance with their own beliefs and the needs of women whom they associated themselves with. Once the autonomy of local women’s NGOs started to shrink, these organizations became more critical of donors.
The contestations of donor-funded women’s empowerment, which have been growing in Tajikistan in the recent decade, offer a chance for local activists to develop their own vision of how to empower women in the new capitalist, largely precarious, reality. It is too early to say whether the new normative framework based upon gender equity can offer an effective homegrown alternative to donor-funded women’s empowerment which favors gender equality. It is, however, safe to say that, with the Tajik government’s support, this approach is gaining popularity on the ground. Therefore, it can be expected that contestations of donor-funded women’s empowerment will further develop in the realm of a normative conflict between women’s empowerment which promotes the individual rights of women on the one hand, and a collectivist vision which sees women as an indispensable, central part of the family on the other.
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