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Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications 4/2019

13-02-2019

Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Profiles in Asymmetric Games

Authors: Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Issue 4/2019

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Abstract

Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (J Differ Equ 259(11):5709–5733, 2015) have introduced the concept of a strong uninvadable profile for asymmetric games with continuous pure strategy space and proved that such a profile is Lyapunov stable for the associated replicator dynamics when the profile is monomorphic. In the present paper, we establish that a polymorphic strong uninvadable profile is necessarily monomorphic. Further, it is shown that strong unbeatability is enough to guarantee Lyapunov stability of polymorphic profiles. A stability theorem for sets of polymorphic profiles is also presented and is illustrated using examples.

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Appendix
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Metadata
Title
Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Profiles in Asymmetric Games
Authors
Aradhana Narang
A. J. Shaiju
Publication date
13-02-2019
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Dynamic Games and Applications / Issue 4/2019
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Electronic ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00302-6

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