Expanding overseas: the contribution of board role performance from an emerging market perspective

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12-03-2025
Original Paper

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Authors: Wajdi Ben Rejeb; Sarra Berraies
Published in: Review of Managerial Science | Issue 12/2025

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Abstract

The article delves into the intricate relationship between board role performance (BRP) and the internationalization of firms, particularly those in emerging markets like Tunisia. It highlights the significance of BRP, conceptualized as the board's ability to perform its roles effectively, in shaping a firm's internationalization strategies. The study is grounded in agency theory (AT) and the resource-based view (RBV), providing a multi-theoretical lens to understand how boards can foster internationalization. The research reveals that while the control role of the board may hinder internationalization due to its risk-averse nature, the strategy and service roles significantly contribute to a firm's global expansion. The strategy role is crucial for developing competitive advantages and leveraging directors' knowledge and skills. Meanwhile, the service role provides valuable resources and networks that facilitate internationalization. The article also underscores the importance of board composition and the need for directors with the right intellectual and social capital to support internationalization efforts. By examining the board roles of Tunisian listed firms, the study offers empirical evidence and practical implications for boards, policymakers, and stakeholders aiming to promote sustainable business practices in emerging economies.

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1 Introduction

The process of internationalization remains a central focus of scholarly inquiry, recognized for its strategic potential in enabling firms to access new markets (Hafner 2021). Yet, internationalization is fraught with challenges, complexities, and uncertainties, necessitating a nuanced understanding of its dynamics (Chatterjee et al. 2023; Panicker et al. 2023; Purkayastha et al. 2021). With emerging economies significantly shaping the global business landscape, research attention has increasingly turned towards understanding the internationalization strategies of firms from these regions (Mukherjee et al. 2021; Duque‐Grisales et al. 2020). However, amidst this discourse, the role of an important governance mechanism, namely the board of directors, has received insufficient attention in the literature, particularly with regard to emerging-market firms (Duque‐Grisales et al. 2020).

Despite being acknowledged as a critical governance mechanism as firms react to the complexity arising from internationalization due to the increased demand for organizational mechanisms to govern the top-management (Musteen et al. 2009), the way a board’s behavioural aspects affect firms’ internationalization strategies remains relatively understudied, especially within the emerging-market context (Barroso et al. 2011; Ruzzier and Ruzzier 2015). While existing literature has primarily focused on the structural dimensions of boards, such as composition, leadership structure, and size, it has provided mixed results that may reflect unaddressed elements of boardroom dynamics (Veltrop et al. 2021). Moreover, only a limited number of studies have examined how board dynamics and behaviors affect internationalization, including board role performance (Bauweraerts et al. 2022). Since the roles performed by boards can significantly impact internationalization concerning strategic choices, resource allocation, risk management, and social networking (Beecher and Streitwieser 2019; Deng et al. 2020; Pérez-Calero et al. 2013), we need to better understand how specific board roles promote or inhibit a firm’s internationalization efforts. By addressing this gap, we can gain valuable insights into the nuanced relationship between board roles and firms’ internationalization endeavors (Sivakumar et al. 2017).

This study seeks to address this gap by examining the relationship between board role performance (BRP) and firms’ internationalization within the context of Tunisian companies. Our paper is situated at the intersection of agency theory (AT) and resource-based view (RBV) frameworks. We argue that BRP, conceptualized as the board’s ability to perform its roles effectively, namely proper monitoring and advising of management, resource provision, and strategizing (Forbes and Milliken 1999; Ong and Wan 2008; Zahra and Pearce 1989), is crucial in shaping a firm’s internationalization. The focal point of our investigation, guided by the following research question, is: Does the performance of board roles contribute to firm internationalization?

Following the RBV, boards are strategic assets for firms’ internationalization as they provide access to tangible and intangible resources required for internationalization (Calabro and Mussolino 2013; Purkayastha et al. 2021). Furthermore, internationalization is viewed as a mixed gamble because it offers access to new markets and potentially increases profits but also increases the complexity of firms’ operations, agency costs, and inherent international risks (Alessandri et al. 2018; Kraus et al. 2017). Considering both AT and the RBV provides a better understanding of how boards could foster internationalization by using directors’ risk management skills to monitor managers’ opportunistic behavior, while leveraging their human and social capital to assist managers in crafting internationalization strategies and providing access to the resources needed for internationalization (Purkayastha et al. 2021).

The Tunisian context offers a fertile ground for this investigation, characterized by limited domestic markets, scarce resources, and an evolving economic landscape shaped by structural reforms and geopolitical dynamics (Panicker et al. 2023). Despite being one of the first countries to conclude a free trade agreement with the European Union, Tunisia’s international performance has been challenged by competition from Asian countries, political unrest in neighboring regions, and economic slowdowns in Europe (Boubakri et al. 2013). In response to these challenges, Tunisian firms are intensifying their efforts to diversify their international portfolios and access new markets, underscoring the critical importance of effective governance mechanisms, particularly the role of boards, in guiding firms’ internationalization strategies (Boubakri et al. 2013). Furthermore, the study of the boards of Tunisian listed firms holds significance due to recent progress in implementing good corporate governance principles aimed at fostering board independence and safeguarding minority shareholder rights (Ben Rejeb 2021; Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019).By focusing on a relatively underexplored context such as Tunisia, our study offers the potential for novel insights into the relationship between board roles and internationalization. By elucidating the distinct roles of boards—including control, strategy, and service roles—in shaping firms’ internationalization strategies, our research aims to provide valuable guidance for boards of directors, policymakers, and stakeholders seeking to promote sustainable business practices in Tunisia and similar emerging countries.

The contributions of this research are threefold. First, it enriches the corporate governance and international business literature by highlighting the contribution of BRP to firms’ internationalization, investigating the specific roles boards should perform to foster internationalization in an emerging-market context. Second, it portrays a broader picture of board roles compared to previous studies through a multi-theoretical lens, linking insights from AT and the RBV to develop an integrated theoretical framework. Third, it provides additional insights into understanding boards’ role performance and its influence on emerging-market firms’ internationalization, offering empirical evidence through a mixed-method approach to test the links between BRP and firms’ internationalization using a sample of listed firms in Tunisia.

The paper is structured as follows: Section Two is dedicated to the literature review on the relationship between board roles and internationalization. Hypotheses are then formulated based on the theoretical framework developed. Section Three deals with research methods. Section Four sets out and interprets the findings of the quantitative and qualitative surveys. Section Five highlights the theoretical contributions, whereas the managerial implications and the limitations are discussed in Sections Six and Seven, respectively.

2 Theoretical development

2.1 Theoretical foundation

BRP is a complex phenomenon on which board effectiveness depends (Jansen 2021). Depending on their perception of the board’s mission, corporate governance theories suggest different board roles (Boivie et al. 2021). Three main roles emerge: a monitoring or control role, a resource provision or service role, and a strategic role (Boivie et al. 2021; Zahra and Pearce 1989).

The board’s strategic role entails participation in mission development, environmental analysis, strategy selection, and assistance in strategy implementation (Ben Rejeb et al. 2020; Pearce and Zahra 1991). The board’s control role is part of the disciplinary view of corporate governance, where the board’s primary mission is to limit managers’ opportunism and protect shareholders’ interests (Boivie et al. 2021). The board’s service role involves offering guidance, support, assistance, and mentorship to top management while also engaging in networking activities to access external resources (Bananuka et al. 2019; Ben Rejeb et al. 2020). This study draws on a perception-based measure of BRP (Bananuka et al. 2019), conceptualized through the performance of these three board roles and their relationship with internationalization. It addresses the relationship between BRP and internationalization by drawing on AT and the RBV.

First, AT posits that boards can alleviate agency conflicts by performing a control role. Through this role, the board strives to align top executives’ and shareholders’ interests to reduce agency costs and protect shareholders’ wealth. The board’s control role may influence managers to prioritize routine initiatives over innovative and riskier projects with long-term effects (Ben Rejeb et al. 2020), such as internationalization. Second, the RBV asserts that resources are key drivers of value creation and competitive advantage. As maximizing value is one of the primary motivations for entering new markets, the role of resources in emerging-market firms’ internationalization is particularly important (Mukherjee et al. 2021). Firms’ internationalization is linked to better access to technologies, resources, funds, and managerial capacity (Mukherjee et al. 2021). In this context, by fulfilling strategy and service roles, boards serve as strategic resources that enable firms to pursue internationalization strategies by using directors’ specific knowledge, skills, and resources to exploit opportunities (Barroso et al. 2011; Bauweraerts et al. 2022; Calabrò et al. 2009).

We focus in the next sections on the contribution of these three roles to firms’ internationalization.

2.2 Board control role and internationalization

Internationalization introduces additional complexity and risks, particularly for emerging-market firms that must contend with the liabilities of emergingness, resource constraints, and negative evaluations based on their home country (Alessandri et al. 2018; Mukherjee et al. 2021). In this context, a strong focus on board monitoring may be counterproductive (Ben Rejeb et al. 2020) and could discourage top managers of emerging-market firms, such as Tunisian companies, from pursuing risky and long-term initiatives like internationalization, especially if they do not perceive the board as supportive (Finkelstein et al. 2009).

According to AT, the board’s role is to minimize agency costs by monitoring managers and avoiding unnecessary risk-taking (Purkayastha et al. 2021). Strategies such as internationalization might be perceived as conflicting with AT’s view of the board’s mission (Castellanos and George 2020; Pugliese et al. 2009). Since AT posits that directors should monitor managerial opportunism, involvement in strategic choices may compromise the required distance between directors and managers needed for effective control (Castellanos and George 2020). Conversely, the RBV considers boards to be an internal source of competitive advantage if they effectively leverage directors’ knowledge through advisory tasks (Calabro et al. 2009). However, an emphasis on control may hinder knowledge-sharing activities between directors and managers, impeding the firm’s ability to leverage its resources effectively for internationalization.

Moreover, a focus on control tasks can weaken the board’s ability to provide strategic advice to top executives and generate managerial myopia (Faleye et al. 2011), as managers may be less willing to share strategic information with outside directors about risky strategies like internationalization (Adams and Ferreira 2007). Since boards that emphasize control roles often include many outside directors, this situation may negatively influence strategies involving risk-taking, such as internationalization. Agency theory suggests that boards engage in strategy only when ratifying proposals and controlling their execution (Pugliese et al. 2009). Therefore, the ratification of internationalization strategies will depend on directors’ risk propensity and their perception of associated risks. In this regard, Nas and Kalaycioglu (2016) propose that outside directors, often hired from owners’ circles, tend to avoid strategies involving risk-taking, such as internationalization. Because outside directors focus primarily on financial control rather than balancing it with strategic control, they may reject management’s internationalization proposals as a result (Balsmeier et al. 2017).

In the Tunisian context, firms are characterized by concentrated ownership (Ben Rejeb 2021; Douagi and Boussaada 2008). In this environment, agency conflicts arise not between managers and shareholders but rather between large shareholders and minority shareholders, as managers are often either large shareholders themselves or representatives of large shareholders (Douagi and Boussaada 2008). This situation implies that an overemphasis on the board’s control role could make both the board and management more risk-averse, potentially leading to a cautious approach to internationalization. Furthermore, from an RBV perspective, this could discourage managerial risk-taking and the experimentation required to develop unique capabilities tailored to international markets (Barroso et al. 2011).

Thus, we can hypothesize that the board’s control role may hinder firms’ internationalization:

The board’s control role is negatively linked to firms’ internationalization.

2.3 Board strategy role and internationalization

The strategic role of the board of directors has garnered significant attention from both scholars and practitioners (Bezemer et al. 2022). The involvement of the board in strategy aligns with the RBV, which posits that boards are crucial for developing competitive advantages as they serve as a source of knowledge and play a vital role in acquiring, mobilizing, allocating, and combining the resources needed for firms to succeed (Madhani 2017).

In emerging-market companies, group decision-making among directors is likely to produce more effective, risky strategic choices, such as internationalization, than solo decision-making (Sivakumar et al. 2017). Tunisia’s high collectivist culture emphasizes achieving consensus or compromise when making group decisions (Douagi and Boussaada 2008; Riahi and Islam 2025). This cultural characteristic can lead to more dialogue and the exchange of viewpoints within the board, with directors actively seeking input from one another (Dimitratos et al. 2011). Such collaborative dynamics aimed at achieving consensus can facilitate brainstorming strategic solutions and identifying strategic options, including internationalization opportunities (Haapanen et al. 2020).

Previous studies have demonstrated that the board’s strategic role creates value by simplifying the strategic decision-making process through processing complex information using directors’ knowledge, experience, and skills (Calabro et al. 2013; Huse 2007; Pugliese et al. 2009). This process promotes learning (Arzubiaga et al. 2021) and leverages managers’ cognitive abilities to formulate appropriate internationalization strategies (Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019). However, this involvement may boost directors’ satisfaction with the firm’s performance and their own strategic choices, potentially leading to cognitive entrenchment and spurring inertial tendencies (Khanin et al. 2021). From an AT perspective, the board’s role in ensuring managerial actions align with shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976) implies that active board involvement in strategic decision-making may help identify growth options, such as internationalization, that are consistent with the firm’s long-term objectives and shareholder value maximization. Boards collaborate with managers on strategy development and implementation, with evidence suggesting that boards contribute to internationalization by serving as a sparring partner for the management team in the development of internationalization strategies (Nisuls et al. 2010).

Directors contribute to the board’s strategic role by assessing the risks of strategic options, such as internationalization, and suggesting risk mitigation strategies that protect shareholder value and enhance the likelihood of success for the internationalization strategy (Beecher and Streitwieser 2019; Chen 2011).

Tunisia’s cultural landscape is characterized by high power-distance (Douagi and Boussaada 2008; Riahi and Islam 2025). In such cultures, decision-making is often centralized, and strategy formulation follows a top-down approach (Dimitratos et al. 2011). Consequently, directors in Tunisian firms are expected to be more actively involved in setting the firm’s strategy and initiating strategic initiatives, such as internationalization. This cultural context suggests a more prominent strategy role for the board, as management might be more likely to follow the board’s strategic guidance due to the influence of high-power-distance norms.

Thus, we can hypothesize that the board’s strategy role positively contributes to firms’ internationalization:

The board’s strategy role is positively linked to firms’ internationalization.

2.4 Board service role and internationalization

By performing a service role, boards contribute a set of resources that foster value creation in both financial and non-financial outcomes, such as internationalization (Åberg et al. 2019). From the RBV perspective, directors utilize their knowledge and their human and relational capital to perform advisory tasks, compensating for a limited knowledge base among the management team regarding internationalization strategies and risk management (Bankewitz 2018; Scafarto et al. 2021). The board’s service role enhances managers’ ability to make effective decisions about strategies, enabling them to seize global business opportunities (Oxelheim et al. 2013).

In this regard, an investigation of the Austrian context by Mitter et al. (2014a, b) found that boards playing an advisory role are more likely to embark on international activities, as they can leverage the tangible and intangible resources needed to operate internationally. Similarly, Nisuls et al. (2010) suggest that the board’s service role facilitates internationalization by leveraging directors’ knowledge and experience to provide advice, mentoring, and novel perspectives to top managers.

Moreover, boards that perform service tasks provide firms with valuable information and unique access to the business networks required for internationalization (Huse 2007; Zahra and Pearce 1989). Lu et al. (2015) argue that the board’s service role also helps firms secure the funding necessary for international expansion. Consistent with the RBV, Sivakumar et al. (2017) highlight that boards offer critical intangible resources that act as enablers of internationalization by addressing the complexity and uncertainty inherent in this strategy and promoting effective decision-making regarding risky projects. This aligns with AT, which emphasizes the importance of reducing information asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976). By performing a service role, directors facilitate access to the information needed for successful internationalization, potentially alleviating information asymmetry with managers (Renneboog and Zhao 2020) and enabling the crafting of better internationalization strategies. Directors’ relational capital is especially important for emerging-market firms, as network connections provide access to valuable information and unique knowledge to bridge knowledge gaps related to foreign markets (Puthusserry et al. 2021). Furthermore, research demonstrates the importance for firms in emerging markets to establish relationships with home-country institutions, as some institutions can support while others may hinder their internationalization efforts (Domínguez Romero et al. 2024; Nuruzzaman et al. 2020). From an AT perspective, directors signal managerial quality by networking with internal and external stakeholders (Lamb and Roundy 2016). This enhances their legitimacy and influence over managers, driving buy-in and increasing the likelihood of successful internationalization, thereby creating shareholder value (Chiu et al. 2022). Tunisian listed firms are characterized by interlocking directorates (Ben Rejeb 2021). Interlocked directors have greater opportunities to acquire external knowledge and gain access to contacts that can benefit their firm’s strategies, such as internationalization (Wang et al. 2021).

In Tunisia, relational capital plays a significant role in helping managers access the resources required to implement their strategies (Ben Rejeb et al. 2020). Studies have reported a positive link between managers’ relational networks and Tunisian firms’ internationalization (Omri and Becuwe 2014). Thus, we expect that by performing a service role, boards allow firms to leverage their unique resources and access relational networks that facilitate internationalization. Therefore, we hypothesize:

The board’s service role is positively linked to firms’ internationalization.

2.5 Theoretical framework

To test the relationships between the variables, we developed a theoretical framework depicted in Fig. 1. It outlines the positive effects of the board’s strategy and service roles on internationalization using the RBV perspective. The theoretical framework suggests a negative effect of the control role on internationalization following an agency perspective. To test the relationships between the variables, we developed a theoretical framework depicted in Fig. 1. This framework illustrates the positive effects of the board’s strategy and service roles on internationalization through the lens of the RBV. Conversely, it suggests a negative effect of the control role on internationalization, following an AT perspective.

Fig. 1

Theoretical framework

Full size image

3 Methodology

To test the hypotheses depicted in Fig. 1, we adopted a mixed data collection approach to provide an in-depth explanation of the results. The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods enables a more comprehensive understanding of the research problem. The complex nature of board research and the limited number of studies on this topic that employ mixed methods justify moving beyond solely quantitative or qualitative analysis.

This study employs a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design consisting of two distinct phases. Phase 1 involves a quantitative study, while Phase 2 focuses on a qualitative study. To enhance the validity of the findings, triangulation was used to integrate and evaluate the quantitative and qualitative data.

3.1 Phase 1: quantitative study

3.1.1 Sampling and data collection

For the quantitative study’s purpose, we targeted listed companies in Tunis Stock Exchange. These firms were selected because they disclose their corporate governance data and have relatively advanced governance practices compared to other Tunisian firms because of the transparency and governance requirements set by the Tunisian financial authorities (Ben Rejeb et al. 2020). Moreover, several Tunisian listed companies are flagships of large business groups which are among the main exporters in Tunisia (Daviet 2015).

We targeted all 81 companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange. To this end, a standardized questionnaire was prepared and pretested among two directors and two researchers in corporate governance to ensure its content validity. We contacted the boards’ secretaries who provided us with the name of a director who is knowledgeable about their firms’ international operations. We choose to target directors because, compared to managers, they are involved in all board tasks. Indeed, they participate to all board’ meetings while managers only participate to board meetings to obtain the approval of the strategy or to review the financial performance (Petrovic 2008).

In the perspective of studies on board roles and effectiveness that relied on a single respondent (Jansen 2021; Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019; Minichilli et al. 2012), we managed to get one respondent per firm. In line with several corporate governance studies, including Minichilli et al. (2012) and Krause et al. (2024), the survey approach was employed because there is no published data on board roles (Machold et al. 2011). An online survey using Google Surveys was carried out within a period of 2 months (February and March 2018). Via emails, the respondents were invited to contribute to the survey. For some firms, due to their internal policies, the questionnaire was completed by the board secretary as they are also knowledgeable about board agenda items and director duties (McNulty and Stewart 2015). Information was provided to reassure respondents regarding the anonymity and confidentiality of their responses and the time needed to complete the survey to minimize response bias (Minichilli et al. 2009). Demographic data about ownership structure, board composition and size, and international sales, was obtained from the information disclosed by the Tunisian financial market authorities, and firms’ annual reports.

Responses were received from 72 respondents including 9 board secretaries, representing a response rate of 89%. Director respondents were either executive (50.79%) or outside directors (49.20%). Even outside directors can be less involved in strategic operations compared to executive directors, many authors like De Haas et al. (2021) stressed that they usually participate in high-level governance and strategic decision-making. The RDT highlights the value that outside directors bring to the firm through their external networks, expertise, and access to critical resources. Besides, as we stated earlier, the boards’ secretaries provided us with the names of directors who are knowledgeable about their firms’ international operations. Most importantly, in emerging markets and particularly the Tunisian corporate governance context, outside directors, often play a significant role in the strategic decision-making process inside the firm, such as internationalization (De Haas et al. 2021). In Tunisia, outside directors, often including lawyers, consultants, and representatives of investment funds, provide vital connections to external resources, such as funding for international expansion and strategic partnerships. Their professional networks and advisory expertise provide vital connections to external resources, such as funding for international expansion and strategic partnerships. Despite not engaging in daily operations, they often influence strategic decisions by leveraging their insights and relationships (Lai et al. 2019).

Our sample includes a diverse range of industries: manufacturing (49.4%), finance (18.5%), and non-financial services (32.1%). Although financial institutions may face unique regulatory constraints, their boards composition, roles and decision making processes are comparable to those of other industries (Switzer and Wang 2013). Moreover, financial and non-financial firms alike can benefit from robust governance in strategic decision-making, including internationalization (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith 2007). The inclusion of financial firms is particularly relevant in the Tunisian context. Several Tunisian financial institutions, particularly leasing, factoring, and investment companies, operate subsidiaries in Algeria and Central African countries, actively participating in international markets. Including financial firms allows us to capture a wider range of internationalization strategies and their implications in the context of an emerging economy. Furthermore, financial firms play a pivotal role in supporting internationalization by providing funding and resources to Tunisian firms involved in global trade. Additionally, financial institutions support internationalization through trade finance, cross-border investments, and partnerships with foreign entities, further amplifying their role in Tunisian firms’ global expansion. Among the surveyed companies, 25.4% have at least one independent director. While financial firms are legally required to have at least two independent directors on their boards, non-financial firms in Tunisia are not obligated to do so (Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019). Moreover, 43.3% of firms are family-controlled, which may introduce agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders (Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019). The average company size is 800.33 employees, while the average age is 38.83 years. Large businesses with more than 200 employees constitute 68.06% of the sample, while small and medium-sized businesses account for 31.94%. These firms expanded their activities to North Africa (41.2%), Sub-Saharan Africa (29.2%), Europe (23.6%), the Middle East (8.3%), Asia (5.6%) and the Americas (4.1%). On average, the firms have been expanding their activities for 19.66 years.

3.1.2 Variables operationalization and measurement

We followed prior literature to measure all the variables. As the scales of measurement used were originally developed in English, the back-translation technique was used with the assistance of two bilingual professors. For internationalization, literature review shows that there is no broadly accepted measurement (Alayo et al. 2019). Although most of studies opted for measuring internationalization using composite measures, this approach is not without criticism (Alayo et al. 2019; Ramón-Llorens et al. 2017). As internationalization is not limited to exports, more comprehensive or alternative measures should be considered (Alayo et al. 2019; Mitter et al. 2014a, b) as exporting can be sporadic or opportunistic in nature (Mitter et al. 2014a, b). This applies to Tunisian firms who show an up and down export performance during the last years. We adopted the perspective of Mitter et al. (2014a, b) to measure internationalization and we asked firms about their internationalization level and its importance in their strategies. There were three categories of answers: “yes, important”, “yes, but not important” and “no”. This approach allowed to identify firms with a non-essential international activity or ones that export accidentally, and those that place internationalization among their strategic priorities. Using the criteria developed by Mitter et al. 2014a, b, i.e. (1) they are internationally active to a considerable extent, and (2) they use their internationalization as part of their strategy and to ensure firm survival, we classified firms as internationally active and inactive and coded as following: “important international activity” = 1 and “unimportant or no international activity” = 0. This approach is convenient as it does not rely on composite measures of internationalization which include dimensions such as the ratio of foreign assets and geographic dispersion on which we do not have information. Indeed, there is no obligation for Tunisian firms to provide detailed information about their foreign sales in their financial statements (Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019).

Ten items have been developed to measure BRP. The wording of each item was developed based on the qualitative research available (Zahra and Pearce 1989) and the scales developed by previous studies (Levrau and Van den Berghe 2009; Van Den Heuvel et al. 2006, Zona and Zattoni 2007). These items have been adapted to the Tunisian context and their validity and reliability were tested on a sample of Tunisian listed companies (Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019). To measure board roles, respondents were asked to assess the importance of each task performed by their boards using a Likert scale of 5 points (1 means not at all important and 5 means very important).

We included seven control variables that may affect internationalization: firm age, firm size, board size, CEO duality, presence of foreign shareholders, board independence, and ownership concentration. Following Ruzzier and Ruzzier (2015), firm size is considered significant as its lack may prevent firms from exporting, while small-sized firms are more flexible and able to seize international opportunities (Rashid et al. 2021). Additionally, some scholars suggest that internationalization decisions are based on firms’ experience and age (Gkypali et al. 2015). Others argue that with age, firms and their management might develop inertia that could inhibit risk-involved decisions such as internationalization. Furthermore, a large board could indicate diverse resources among directors (Mitter et al. 2014a). However, AT suggests that large boards involve higher coordination costs (Fama and Jensen 1983).

The presence of foreign shareholders may reduce the complexity of international operations and provide incentives for firms to internationalize (Fernandez and Nieto 2006). CEO duality can influence firm internationalization by expediting decision-making and promoting long-term strategies. However, it may reduce independent oversight, increase entrenchment, and trigger potential conflicts of interest (García-García et al. 2022). Independent directors can bring outsider perspectives, knowledge, networks, and information about foreign markets (Masulis et al. 2012; Oxelheim et al. 2013) while exerting appropriate monitoring to ensure managers act in shareholders’ best interests rather than avoiding internationalization-related risks for their own comfort. Finally, from an AT perspective, in firms with concentrated ownership, dominant shareholders often have more influence on strategic decisions, including internationalization. However, this could lead to either risk aversion or increased risk-taking and potential conflicts with minority shareholders due to risk differentials (Santulli et al. 2019).

For control variables measurement, firm size was measured using the logarithm of total employees, following Calabrò and Mussolino (2013) and Arregle et al. (2012). Firm age was measured using the logarithm of years since the firm’s founding, following Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) and Arregle et al. (2012). Board size was captured using the logarithm of total directors, as literature indicates a convex relationship between board size and firm performance (Zahra et al. 2000).

The presence of foreign shareholders was operationalized using a dummy variable, coded as 1 if at least one of the four largest shareholders was foreign and 0 otherwise (Fernandez and Nieto 2006). Board independence was measured as the proportion of independent directors to total board size. CEO duality was operationalized using a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the CEO also held the board chair role and 0 if the roles were separate (Pongelli et al. 2023). Ownership concentration was measured using the Herfindahl index, which ranges from 0 to 1, calculated as the sum of squared percentages of shares controlled by the five largest significant shareholders (Santulli et al. 2019).

3.1.3 Data analysis method

We used hierarchical regression analysis to assess the impact of board roles on internationalization. This approach enables assessment of the incremental explanatory power of our variables of interest and avoids potential issues from examining the roles collectively (Cabrera-Suárez and Martin-Santana 2015).

In our analysis, the first model tested the control variables’ effect on internationalization. The second model incorporated the control role variable into the first model. The strategy role and service role variables were subsequently added in the third and fourth models, respectively. This allowed us to evaluate each board role’s individual contribution while controlling for other variables.

3.2 Phase 2: qualitative study

To give more depth to the findings and understand how boards operate (Ma et al. 2021), we conducted semi-structured interviews over a period of 2 months (April and May 2018) with twelve directors. The sample size was determined using the grounded theory and adhering to the concept of saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Guest et al. 2006). This approach considers the respondents’ perceptions and concerns while offering a structured analysis technique that enables themes to be generated from the data. Respondents were selected according to their knowledge, experience and involvement in the field studied (Glaser and Strauss 1967). We systematically conducted interviews (addition of respondents) and analyzed data until no new useful information appear (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Although saturation typically occurs after the tenth interview, researchers are advised to conduct additional interviews to confirm saturation (Guest et al. 2006). Saturation was achieved after twelve interviews. To verify reliability, we employed expert verification. Two researchers specializing in this topic coded the records independently. No new codes emerged compared to earlier coding. Subsequently, the data, codes, and findings were presented to two additional experts for assessment, who confirmed theoretical saturation.

The sample is diverse in terms of age, gender, directors’ type, and industries. Most of the respondents (75%) are men and aged between 45 and 60 years. Industry representation included: Finance (33.33%), manufacturing (41.67%), and services (25%). The sample comprised executive directors (58.33%) and outside directors (41.67%). The interview guide included three open-ended questions addressing our research question:

Overall, what aspect of your board’s roles or tasks do you see as important in fostering or inhibiting internationalization in this firm?
Why this aspect of your board’s roles or tasks fosters or inhibits internationalization in this firm?
How this aspect of your board’s roles or tasks fosters or inhibits internationalization in this firm?

We conducted the interviews in French, as it is commonly used in Tunisia and participants were comfortable with this language. To establish trust and credibility and ensure data reliability, we explained the research aims and ethics protocols before each interview (Ma et al. 2021). Interviews averaged 50 min in duration and were recorded with participants’ consent. All interviews were transcribed and analyzed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). The qualitative data analysis followed the coding scheme presented in Appendix A, enabling in-depth understanding of emergent themes.

Initially, data were transferred to a spreadsheet to clearly display each participant’s responses and eliminate ambiguous phrases. The subsequent coding process involved documenting invariant constructs to identify repeated themes. To develop subthemes, we first examined the meanings of each theme independently and then conducted comparative analysis. We then quantified the frequency of core themes and subthemes to assess their relative importance.

For theme effect determination, two corporate governance researchers independently rated each comment using a 5-point Likert scale (− 2 = very negative, − 1 = negative, 0 = neutral, 1 = positive, 2 = very positive). The analysis achieved 95% inter-rater reliability for both theme identification and effect ratings. The final theme effect was calculated by multiplying the mean rating by the number of directors who commented on each theme.

4 Results

4.1 Quantitative data analysis

4.1.1 Descriptive statistics

As shown in Table 1, the mean value for international activity is 0.65, indicating significant international engagement among sample firms. The logarithm of firm size shows a mean of 5.72, suggesting moderate-sized firms predominate in the sample. The logarithm of firm age demonstrates a mean of 3.38, indicating well-established companies. The logarithm of board size averages 2.16, with relatively low cross-firm variation.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics

Variable	IA	CR	SR	SVR	BS	DUAL	IND	FORS	OC	FS	FA
Min	0	2.75	2.33	1.33	1.10	0	0.00	0	0.038	2.30	0.69
Max	1	5.00	5.00	5.00	2.56	1	0.25	1	0.625	9.06	4.87
25 percentile	0.00	4.000	3.083	3.000	1.946	0.00	0.000	0.00	0.142	4.412	2.996
75 percentile	1.00	4.750	5.000	4.310	2.485	1.00	0.083	0.00	0.383	6.813	3.850
Mean	0.65	4.238	4.034	3.589	2.158	0.57	0.042	0.19	0.267	5.722	3.380
Median	1.00	4.250	4.000	4.000	2.197	1.00	0.000	0.00	0.212	5.707	3.497
SD	0.479	0.550	0.805	0.996	0.334	0.499	0.077	0.399	0.155	1.448	0.702

IA, international activity; CR, control role; SR, strategy role; SVR, service role; BS, board size; DUAL, duality; IND, board independence; FORS, presence of foreign shareholders; OC, ownership concentration; FS, firm size; FA, firm age

Although prior research demonstrates that firm market value increases with the number of independent directors (Fernández-Gago et al. 2016), our sample shows a notably low mean board independence of 0.042, with a maximum of 0.25. This finding is particularly significant given that Tunisian regulations mandate only financial firms to have a minimum of two independent board members. CEO duality displays a mean of 0.57, indicating that board chair and CEO roles are combined in over half the sample firms. Foreign ownership presence is limited, with only 19% of firms having at least one foreign shareholder among their four largest shareholders. The mean ownership concentration of 0.267, measured by the Herfindahl index, suggests moderate ownership concentration across the sample.

A confirmatory factor analysis performed through SPSS 21 highlighted three factors associated to board roles. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients ranging from 0.82 to 0.92 as well as the composite reliability (CR) values higher than 0.70 supports the constructs’ reliability (Hair et al. 2019). The average variance extracted (AVE) values exceed 0.5, which confirms the constructs’ validity (Hair et al. 2019). The variables measurement’s structures are depicted in Table 2.

Table 2

Summary statistics of confirmatory factor analysis on board’s roles

Board roles’ items	Service role	Control role	Strategy role
Monitor the performance of the top-management	0.059	0.854	0.120
Create sustainable wealth for the shareholders	0.418	0.736	− 0.204
Nominate new top executives	0.229	0.739	0.075
Evaluate and compensate the top-management	− 0.008	0.811	0.152
Formulate and/or approve strategic plans	0.040	− 0.062	0.898
Review strategic purpose (vision and mission statements) and set strategic objectives	0.166	0.157	0.892
Identify new strategic business opportunities	0.521	0.242	0.709
Advise and counsel the top-management	0.879	0.076	0.251
Assist, coach, or mentor the top-management	0.895	0.220	0.185
Connect with external environment and maintain the network	0.931	0.145	0.034
Cronbach’s Alpha	0.92	0.82	0.86
CR	0.929	0.866	0.875
AVE	0.814	0.619	0.702

Bold values represent the factor loadings that correspond to their respective constructs in the confirmatory factor analysis

Table 3 shows significant correlations between internationalization and board roles indicating potential causal relationship between these variables. Besides, results do not show any correlations above 0.8 between the independent variables which reflects the absence of multicollinearity issues (Shrestha 2020).

Table 3

Correlation analysis and descriptive statistics

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1	1
2	−.390***	1
3	.664***	−.007	1
4	.710***	−.188	.798***	1
5	−.431***	.180	− 0.212	−.277*	1
6	.059	−.092	0.014	.014	−.050	1
7	−.467***	.135	− 0.230	−.325**	.399***	−.076	1
8	−.453***	.235*	−.299*	−.355**	.311**	−.142	.316**	1
9	.047	−.027	0.050	.020	−.072	.043	−.165	.067	1
10	.304**	−.120	0.144	.089	.143	.015	−.023	−.025	.193	1
11	−.110	.028	− 0.071	−.167	.394***	.025	.039	.148	.102	−.370***	1

1 = International activity, 2 = Control role, 3 = Strategy role, 4 = Service role, 5 = Board size, 6 = Duality, 7 = Independent directors, 8 = Presence of foreign shareholders, 9 = Ownership concentration, 10 = Firm size, 11 = Firm age

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; N = 72

4.1.2 Hypotheses testing

We performed a multiple regression analysis to test our hypotheses. Considering the number of variables and the size of our sample, the multiple regression analysis suits our research’s needs. Hair et al. (2019) suggest that each main variable should have at least 10 respondents. Our sample size, i.e. 72 companies, meets the requirements. Table 4 displays the regression analysis’s results and shows a significant adjusted R-Squared coefficient (72%).

Table 4

Results of regression analysis for board’s role performance on internationalization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4
	Stand coef.		Coll. statistics		Stand coef.		Coll. statistics		Stand coef.		Coll. statistics		Stand coef.		Coll. statistics
	Beta	T	Tol	VIF	Beta	T	Tol	VIF	Beta	T	Tol	VIF	Beta	T	Tol	VIF
Constant	1.159**	3.269			1.930***	4.034			0.793*	2.034			0.615	1.569
BS	− 0.263*	2.300	0.672	1.488	− 0.234*	− 2.102	0.663	1.508	− 0.176*	− 2.131	0.656	1.523	− 0.179*	− 2.205	0.656	1.524
DUAL	− 0.013	− 0.132	0.974	1.026	− 0.025	− 0.272	0.971	1.030	− 0.011	− 0.162	0.970	1.031	− 0.006	− 0.092	0.969	1.032
IND	− 0.280*	− 2.602	0.763	1.311	− 0.276**	− 2.655	0.762	1.311	− 0.217**	− 2.801	0.753	1.327	− 0.189*	− 2.450	0.726	1.377
FORS	− 0.257*	− 2.480	0.819	1.221	− 0.219*	− 2.153	0.797	1.255	− 0.094	− 1.220	0.755	1.325	− 0.084	− 1.112	0.751	1.332
OC	− 0.063	− 0.644	0.911	1.097	− 0.063	− 0.661	0.911	1.097	− 0.070	− 0.994	0.911	1.097	− 0.064	− 0.926	0.909	1.100
FS	0.373***	3.620	0.829	1.206	0.344***	3.429	0.816	1.226	0.251**	3.323	0.790	1.265	0.251***	3.403	0.790	1.265
FA	− 0.088	− 0.800	0.725	1.379	− 0.089	− 0.832	0.725	1.379	− 0.059	− 0.751	0.723	1.383	− 0.037	− 0.474	0.707	1.415
CR					− 0.219*	− 2.307	0.911	1.098	− 0.274***	− 3.872	0.899	1.112	− 0.238**	− 3.324	0.838	1.193
SR									0.510***	6.987	0.846	1.181	0.338**	2.951	0.328	3.052
SVR													0.228^†	1.912	0.302	3.307
Adj R²	0.418				0.458				0.703				0.716
F-test	7.775***				7.966***				18.344***				17.643***

BS, board size; DUAL, CEO duality; IND, board independence; FORS, foreign shareholders; OC, ownership concertation; FS, firm size; FA, firm age; CR, control role; SR, strategy role; SVR, service role

Stand coef., standardized coefficient; Coll. Statistics, collinearity statistics; Tol, tolerance; Adj R², adjusted R squared

^†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N = 72

To ensure the model’s validity, we checked the residuals to ensure that they follow a normal distribution. We tested the existence of correlation among the residuals using the Durbin Watson test, which is 1.439, indicating the absence of auto-correlation between residuals (Field 2013). Additionally, a VIF analysis shows that all values are below 4 which evidences the absence of multicollinearity issues (Hair et al. 2019).

The results from the hierarchical regression analysis in Table 4 provide insights into how board roles influence the internationalization of Tunisian listed firms.

Model 1, containing only control variables, achieved an adjusted R² of 0.418. Board size, board independence and the presence of foreign shareholders demonstrated negative and significant effects on internationalization (β = − 0.263, p < 0.05; β = − 0.280, p < 0.05; β = − 0.257, p < 0.05 respectively). Firm size has a positive and significant effect on internationalization (β = − 0.373, p < 0.001) while other control variables exhibited no significant effects (p > 0.10). Model 2, incorporating the control role, showed a modest increase in adjusted R² to 0.458, indicating that adding this variable contributes slightly to explaining the variation in internationalization. Board control role has a significant negative effect on internationalization (β = − 0.219, p < 0.05).

Model 3, adding the strategy role, which significantly improves the explanatory power of the model with an adjusted R² of 0.703. Board strategy role has a strong positive and significant effect on internationalization (β = 0.510, p < 0.001).

Model 4, adding the service role, achieved an adjusted R² of 0.716. The service role showed a marginally significant positive effect (β = 0.228, p < 0.10).

4.1.3 Robustness check

To validate our findings, we re-estimated the model using export intensity as an alternative dependent variable. The results, presented in Table 5, confirmed the negative, significant effect of the board control role and the positive, significant effect of the board strategy role on internationalization, corroborating our primary findings. However, the board service role coefficient, while positive, was not significant. The robustness test model’s adjusted R-squared of 0.231 indicated lower explanatory power compared to the primary model, supporting the latter’s superiority for examining the relationship between BRP and internationalization.

Table 5

Results of regression analysis for board’s role performance on export intensity: Robustness check

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4
	Stand coef.		Coll. statistics		Stand coef.		Coll. statistics		Stand coef.		Coll. statistics		Stand coef.		Coll. statistics
	Beta	T	Tol	VIF	Beta	T	Tol	VIF	Beta	T	Tol	VIF	Beta	T	Tol	VIF
Constant	0.348	1.366			0.831*	2.396			0.408	1.130			0.387	1.031
BS	− 0.149	− 1.053	0.672	1.488	− 0.117	− 0.843	0.663	1.508	− 0.080	− 0.608	0.656	1.523	− 0.081	− 0.606	0.656	1.524
DUAL	0.145	1.237	0.974	1.026	0.132	1.149	0.971	1.030	0.141	1.297	0.970	1.031	0.142	1.295	0.969	1.032
IND	− 0.335*	− 2.525	0.763	1.311	− 0.331*	− 2.553	0.762	1.311	− 0.293*	− 2.377	0.753	1.327	− 0.287*	− 2.268	0.726	1.377
FORS	0.051	0.396	0.819	1.221	0.093	0.730	0.797	1.255	0.172	1.398	0.755	1.325	0.174	1.400	0.751	1.332
OC	− 0.175	− 1.441	0.911	1.097	− 0.174	− 1.471	0.911	1.097	− 0.179	− 1.597	0.911	1.097	− 0.178	− 1.570	0.909	1.100
FS	0.163	1.279	0.829	1.206	0.132	1.049	0.816	1.226	0.072	0.596	0.790	1.265	0.072	0.591	0.790	1.265
FA	− 0.002	− 0.011	0.725	1.379	− 0.002	− 0.015	0.725	1.379	0.017	0.134	0.723	1.383	0.021	0.167	0.707	1.415
CR					− 0.237*	− 1.995	0.911	1.098	− 0.272*	− 2.409	0.899	1.112	− 0.264*	− 2.243	0.838	1.193
SR									0.327**	2.808	0.846	1.181	0.291	1.544	0.328	3.052
SVR													0.047	0.242	0.302	3.307
Adj R²	0.112				0.154				0.244				0.231
.F-test	2.185*				2.506*				3.368**				2.987**

BS, board size; DUAL, CEO duality; IND, board independence; FORS, foreign shareholders; OC, ownership concertation; FS, firm size; FA, firm age; CR, control role; SR, strategy role; SVR, service role

Stand coef., standardized coefficient; Coll. statistics, collinearity statistics; Tol, tolerance; Adj R², adjusted R squared

^†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N = 72

To address potential response bias related to the respondents’ status, we conducted additional regression analyses excluding board secretaries’ responses. Table 6 shows that the relationships between board roles and internationalization maintained their directional significance consistent with the primary model. The overall adjusted R-squared of the robustness test model is equal to 0.686 indicating a marginally lower explanatory power compared to the primary regression model.

Table 6

Results of regression analysis for the effect of board’s role performance on internationalization considering only directors’ responses

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4
	Responses of all respondents		Responses of directors only		Responses of all respondents		Responses of directors only		Responses of all respondents		Responses of directors only		Responses of all respondents		Responses of directors only
	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T
Constant	1.159**	3.269	1.013**	2.662	1.930***	4.034	1.838***	3.520	0.408	1.130	0.733	1.659	0.615	1.569	0.563	1.264
BS	− 0.263	2.300	− 0.233^†	− 1.857	− 0.234*	− 2.102	− 0.218^†	− 1.802	− 0.080	− 0.608	− 0.186	− 1.996	− 0.179*	− 2.205	− 0.192*	− 2.099
DUAL	− 0.013	− 0.132	− 0.022	− 0.215	− 0.025	− 0.272	− 0.047	− 0.467	0.141	1.297	0.011	0.144	− 0.006	− 0.092	0.018	0.240
IND	− 0.280*	− 2.602	− 0.238*	− 2.050	− 0.276**	− 2.655	− 0.225*	− 2.010	− 0.293*	− 2.377	− 0.204*	− 2.368	− 0.189*	− 2.450	− 0.175*	− 2.029
FORS	− 0.257*	− 2.480	− 0.339**	− 2.919	− 0.219*	− 2.153	− 0.288*	− 2.523	0.172	1.398	− 0.123	− 1.336	− 0.084	− 1.112	− 0.106	− 1.169
OC	− 0.063	− 0.644	− 0.072	− 0.668	− 0.063	− 0.661	− 0.056	− 0.541	− 0.179	− 1.597	− 0.068	− 0.847	− 0.064	− 0.926	− 0.065	− 0.828
FS	0.373***	3.620	0.370***	3.362	0.344***	3.429	0.344**	3.221	0.072	0.596	0.278**	3.363	0.251***	3.403	0.279***	3.434
FA	− 0.088	− 0.800	− 0.088	− 0.753	− 0.089	− 0.832	− 0.088	− 0.780	0.017	0.134	− 0.060	− 0.686	− 0.037	− 0.474	− 0.035	− 0.405
CR					− 0.219*	− 2.307	− 0.231*	− 2.218	− 0.272*	− 2.409	− 0.275**	− 3.426	− 0.238**	− 3.324	− 0.242**	− 2.987
SR									0.327**	2.808	0.490***	5.932	0.338**	2.951	0.332**	2.678
SVR													0.228^†	1.912	0.219^†	1.674
Adj R²	0.418		0.404		0.458		0.447		0.703		0.675		0.716		0.686
F-test	7.775***		6.523***		7.966***		6.770***		18.344***		14.128***		17.643***		13.473***
N	72		63		72		63		72		63		72		63

^†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

BS, board size; DUAL, CEO duality; IND, board independence; FORS, foreign shareholders; OC, ownership concertation; FS, firm size; FA, firm age; CR, control role; SR, strategy role; SVR, service role

Stand coef., standardized coefficient; Coll. statistics, collinearity statistics; Tol, tolerance; Adj R², adjusted R squared

This additional analysis validates the robustness of the original model, which included both directors and board secretaries. The significance of key variables suggests that the inclusion of board secretaries did not materially affect the results. The observed minor reduction in significance levels may reflect a reduction in sample size rather systematic bias in the original model. These findings corroborate our primary results and support the reliability of the first model.

To account for industry effects, we conducted additional regression analyses excluding financial firms. Table 7 presents the results, showing that the adjusted R-squared values for all models remain relatively high, indicating robust explanation of variance in internationalization.

Table 7

Results of regression analysis for the effect of board’s role performance on internationalization excluding financial firms

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4
	All the sample		Financial firms excluded		All the sample		Financial firms excluded		All the sample		Financial firms excluded		All the sample		Financial firms excluded
	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T	Beta	T
Constant	1.159**	3.269	0.824*	2.516	1.930***	4.034	1.718***	3.512	0.408	1.130	0.719	1.656	0.615	1.569	0.675	1.546
BS	− 0.263*	2.300	− 0.369*	− 2.688	− 0.234*	− 2.102	− 0.365**	− 2.823	− 0.080	− 0.608	− 0.263*	− 2.549	− 0.179*	− 2.205	− 0.265**	− 2.563
DUAL	− 0.013	− 0.132	− 0.154	− 1.308	− 0.025	− 0.272	− 0.200^†	− 1.777	0.141	1.297	− 0.090	− 0.994	− 0.006	− 0.092	− 0.092	− 1.017
IND	− 0.280*	− 2.602	− 0.499**	− 3.418	− 0.276**	− 2.655	− 0.430**	− 3.050	− 0.293*	− 2.377	− 0.406***	− 3.689	− 0.189*	− 2.450	− 0.387**	− 3.463
FORS	− 0.257*	− 2.480	0.160	1.141	− 0.219*	− 2.153	0.196	1.474	0.172	1.398	0.181^†	1.735	− 0.084	− 1.112	0.180^†	1.730
OC	− 0.063	− 0.644	0.056	0.451	− 0.063	− 0.661	0.056	0.482	− 0.179	− 1.597	0.046	0.510	− 0.064	− 0.926	0.042	0.462
FS	0.373***	3.620	0.577***	4.573	0.344***	3.429	0.507***	4.132	0.072	0.596	0.380***	3.827	0.251***	3.403	0.367***	3.662
FA	− 0.088	− 0.800	− 0.084	− 0.596	− 0.089	− 0.832	− 0.058	− 0.437	0.017	0.134	− 0.081	− 0.782	− 0.037	− 0.474	− 0.058	− 0.547
CR					− 0.219*	− 2.307	− 0.281*	− 2.355	− 0.272*	− 2.409	− 0.276**	− 2.966	− 0.238**	− 3.324	− 0.265**	− 2.822
SR									0.327**	2.808	0.445***	4.831	0.338**	2.951	0.342**	2.467
SVR													0.228^†	1.912	0.139	0.992
Adj R²	0.418		0.430		0.458		0.494		0.703		0.691		0.716		0.691
F-test	7.775***		5.626***		7.966***		6.238***		18.344***		11.678***		17.643***		10.603***
N	72		63		72		63		72		63		72		63

BS, board size; DUAL, CEO duality; IND, board independence; FORS, foreign shareholders; OC, ownership concertation; FS, firm size; FA, firm age; CR, control role; SR, strategy role; SVR, service role

Stand coef., standardized coefficient; Coll. statistics, collinearity statistics; Tol, tolerance; Adj R², adjusted R squared

^†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

The robustness test revealed comparable, and in some instances marginally higher, adjusted R-squared values. Model 2 (excluding financial firms) achieved an adjusted R-squared of 0.430, exceeding the original Model 1 value of 0.418. However, Model 4’s adjusted R-squared in the robustness test (0.686) showed a slight decrease from the primary model (0.716), indicating minimal reduction in explanatory power when excluding financial firms.

Regarding control variables, board size, board independence, and firm size continue to exhibit significant effects and the same directions in both models, with slightly stronger effects when financial firms are excluded. Other variables, such as CEO duality and ownership concentration, remain insignificant across both models. Importantly, the board control role maintains its significant negative effect on internationalization when financial firms are excluded, while the positive effects of the strategy and service roles are consistent, with the significance of the service role increasing in the robustness test.

These findings demonstrate the model’s stability across industry subsamples. The consistency in direction and significance of key variables, particularly the board roles, provides additional validation of the primary model’s robustness. The results suggest that the relationship between board roles and internationalization is not significantly influenced by the inclusion of financial firms.

4.2 Qualitative data analysis

Three core themes from the 85 comments that interviewed directors made about the relationship between board roles and internationalization were identified and reported in Table 8, with their relative number of occurrences (N) in directors’ responses i.e. Risk and management control (50%), strategy development and decision-making (20%) and knowledge and networking (30%). Details about the main themes, subthemes and sample comments provided by directors are presented in Table 8.

Table 8

Analysis of the qualitative data about the relationship between board’s roles and internationalization

Core/sub theme	N	%	Mean	SD	Total effect
(a) Risk and management control	43	50
Financial control	25	29	− 0.48	0.92	− 12.00
Fiduciary responsibility	7	8	− 0.14	0.38	− 0.98
Risk management	8	9	0.13	1.25	1.04
Managerial opportunism mitigation	3	4	− 0.25	0.58	− 2.01
(b) Strategy development and decision-making	16	20
Strategy making	5	6	1.60	0.55	8.00
Resources allocation	8	9	1.63	0.52	13.04
Strategy monitoring	3	4	1.00	0.00	3.00
(c) Knowledge, and networking	26	30
Knowledge provision	12	14	1.75	0.45	21.00
Support provision	6	7	1.67	0.52	10.02
Networking	8	9	1.25	0.46	10.00

N, number of occurrences; %, Percentage of occurrences; SD, standard deviation

For most of the core themes and subthemes identified, the values of mean rating of their effect and the associated standard deviation suggest that most directors agree about the effect of the construct in question on internationalization. However, two subthemes related to the broader theme of “Risk and Management Control”, namely financial control and risk management, show variability in directors’ opinions. These subthemes garnered ratings ranging from “neutral” to “negative” in most cases, and occasionally “positive,” reflecting differing perspectives on their impact on internationalization.

4.2.1 Risk and management control

The findings highlight the significance of control and risk management tasks in board sessions, with this core theme appearing in 43 quotations. Interviewees emphasized that their focus on financial control may inhibit internationalization, as they consider management oversight their primary mission due to fiduciary duties toward shareholders, aligning with agency theory perspectives.

Director 1 (Finance): ‘As we put so much emphasize on financial control during board sessions, we are not able to review and consider strategies that can improve business performance like internationalization or innovation.’

Director 2 (Non-Financial Services): ‘My duty as a shareholders’ representative is to make sure that their interests are protected against any unhealthy risk taking in relation to growth strategies.’

Consequently, attention to strategic issues such as internationalization is overshadowed by the board’s focus on control tasks. Directors tend to prioritize monitoring tasks and avoid risk-taking strategies to preserve their reputation in the Tunisian directors’ market (Hakim and Omri 2009). Some respondents indicated that risk management tasks contribute to internationalization by identifying potential threats and opportunities in foreign markets.

Director 3 (Manufacturing): ‘We screen carefully all the proposals of the management team relating to strategies involving risk-taking such as internationalization.’

Other participants suggested that board control helps mitigate management opportunism, as internationalization could be leveraged within managers’ opportunistic strategies to increase role complexity and make their replacement costlier for organizations. Internationalization represents a complex strategy involving risk-taking and the development of relational networks, leading to idiosyncratic investments specific to management’s human capital, thereby increasing replacement costs.

Director 4 (Manufacturing): ‘When managers propose new strategic directions like internationalization, we play the role of the devil’s advocate’.

The responses reveal directors’ challenges in balancing trust and empowerment of managers to promote risk-taking strategies like internationalization while maintaining rigorous control to prevent excessive risk-taking or managerial entrenchment.

4.2.2 Strategy development and decision-making

The second theme highlights the positive contribution of strategy development and decision-making tasks to internationalization, with this core theme referenced in 16 quotations. Respondents emphasized the board’s role in formulating internationalization strategies through involvement in strategic decision-making and internationalization choices, aligning with the RBV.

Director 5 (Manufacturing): ‘As part of our role, we help the CEO to retain strategic options compatible with the company’s core competencies and local and international opportunities.’

Some interviewees stressed that boards contribute to strategy execution as resources catalyst by granting the resources needed by the firm to internationalize.

Director 6 (Finance): ‘The board has the power to release strategic resources in addition to providing technical assistance to managers helping them to make better decisions in relation to internationalization’.

Interviewees indicate that they contribute to internationalization through their involvement in strategy review and monitoring. They emphasized the role of the board in the implementation phase as a strategic advisor of the top-management team.

Director 10 (Non-Financial Services) ‘We evaluate the implementation of the internationalization strategy, and we might intervene to help the manager adjusting the strategy when needed’.

4.2.3 Knowledge and networking

The third core theme, occurring 26 times in the interviews, relates to the positive contribution of service tasks to internationalization. Interviewees emphasized the board’s role in providing valuable and unique knowledge about international operations and experience in international markets to enable internationalization strategies, consistent with the RBV.

Director 8 (Manufacturing) ‘We share our experience and knowledge with the management team to help them figuring out the best way to develop and implement internationalization strategies’.

Other respondents indicated that their boards act as a coach of the top-management team and use their human capital to provide them with advice, guidance and support to formulate winning internationalization strategies.

Director 8 (Manufacturing): ‘We stimulate the management team’s ability to consider new ways of thinking about the best strategies to enter new markets.’

Some participants highlighted the board’s role in contributing unique resources that facilitate internationalization, such as providing access to relational networks for funding or external support, aligned with RBV perspectives.

Director 12 (Manufacturing): ‘Having directors who are former bankers helped us to have privileged relationships with banks and obtain the financial resources we need to internationalize’.

The main findings from both quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews are visually represented in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2

Summary of the findings. Notes: †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Bolded arrows depict hypothesized relationships that were tested quantitatively. Dashed shapes and arrows indicate qualitative themes and their connections to the dependent variable

Full size image

5 Discussion

Given the challenging economic context following the Arab Spring and the constraints of a small domestic market, Tunisian companies are increasingly compelled to leverage their boards in pursuing successful internationalization strategies. This research aimed to enhance understanding of the relationship between BRP and internationalization among Tunisian listed firms. Our findings contribute to improving board functionality and agenda management while advancing the literature on corporate governance and international business in emerging economies.

5.1 The effect of the control variables on internationalization

Our findings suggest that larger firms are more likely to pursue internationalization, as they typically possess greater resources and capabilities for overseas expansion (Aksoy et al. 2023). Conversely, we found that board size and the proportion of independent directors negatively affect internationalization. This negative relationship may be attributed to increased monitoring by independent directors, potentially deterring Tunisian firms’ managers from pursuing riskier international ventures (Balsmeier et al. 2017). This finding aligns with the observed negative relationship between board control role and internationalization. Additionally, decision-making complexities within larger boards may impede organizational agility by hindering swift exploration and exploitation of international opportunities (Aksoy et al. 2023).

5.2 The effect of the board control role on internationalization

Both quantitative and qualitative survey results confirm the negative effect of board control role on internationalization in Tunisian listed firms. These findings corroborate AT perspectives, which suggest that agency costs tend to decrease in the presence of large shareholders and trust between shareholders and managers due to the proximity of ownership and control (Dharwadkar et al. 2000). As Tunisian listed companies’ ownership structure is characterized by high block holder capital percentage (Ben Rejeb 2021), boards of internationalized firms place less emphasis on control compared to firms with diluted capital (Zattoni et al. 2015).

Our findings contrast with Chen and Yu (2017), who found that Taiwanese firms with strong monitoring ability demonstrate higher internationalization degrees. This divergence may be attributed to differences in cultural and institutional contexts and specificities of Tunisian corporate governance.

These results align with Ben Rejeb et al. (2020), who investigated the relationship between corporate governance and ambidextrous innovation, finding that board monitoring in Tunisian listed firms may pressure managers to avoid risk-taking, demonstrate due diligence, and focus on short-term profit maximization. Monitoring-oriented boards thus limit managers’ latitude to pursue risk-taking and long-term strategies (Berraies and Ben Rejeb 2019). The current performance evaluation system for Tunisian managers does not support risk-oriented projects, particularly significant given that internationalization represents a risky strategy for emerging-market firms (Mukherjee et al. 2021). Consequently, Tunisian managers tend to focus on short-term projects to maintain their position and protect their reputation in the local manager market, which exhibits high turnover rates (Ben Rejeb et al. 2020). Several interviewees noted their focus on monitoring management opportunism over healthy risk-taking, as internationalization can be pursued as a form of managerial entrenchment.

Results may also be explained by outside director appointment practices. Directors connected to firm owners tend to avoid risk-taking strategies to maintain board harmony and avoid accountability for failed internationalization strategies (Nas and Kalaycioglu 2016). This suggests control tasks become dominant when directors lack adequate knowledge and skills to monitor internationalization risks, as reported by Purkayastha et al. (2021) in their study of board human capital and internationalization in India. Moreover, the minimal representation of independent directors outside Tunisian financial firms may exacerbate excessive control’s negative effects, given board independence’s essential role in balancing strategic and control functions.

As the performance and relative importance of board roles vary with firms’ growth stages (Bjornali et al. 2016), our results may reflect our sample’s mean firm age of 36 years. Board control roles tend to predominate in early-stage or newly professionally managed businesses (Ingley et al. 2017) to ensure compliance, reduce management opportunism, and avoid risks threatening firm survival.

5.3 The effect of the board strategy role on internationalization

The quantitative and qualitative survey findings confirm the positive contribution of board strategy role to Tunisian listed firms’ internationalization. Internationalization represents a risky strategy for emerging-market firms due to their limited financial resources and knowledge of target foreign markets (Mukherjee et al. 2021). Our results align with Sivakumar et al. (2017), who found that emerging-market firms’ involvement in risky projects, such as internationalization, is enhanced by collective board decision-making processes. The findings also corroborate Boubakri et al. (2013), who emphasized that successful internationalization of Tunisian firms depends on proactive strategic behavior and their ability to identify and exploit foreign market opportunities.

Through strategy tasks, directors influence managers’ perception of internationalization risks by leveraging their knowledge and skills to process complex international business environment information and streamline strategy development decision-making processes (Mitter et al. 2014a, b). As one interviewee noted, boards serve as sparring partners to the management team in internationalization strategy formulation and execution.

Our findings support the RBV, which conceptualizes boards as strategic resources that add value by assisting managers with complex strategic decisions and helping overcome internationalization-related complexities (Zattoni et al. 2015). One respondent emphasized that board-management interaction creates synergies and facilitates brainstorming of strategic options for internationalization opportunities by combining their respective knowledge and experience. These results align with Veilleux and Roy (2015), who found board strategy involvement associated with higher internationalization levels in Canadian biotech firms, and Calabro et al. (2013), who reported positive contributions of board strategic involvement to international sales in Norwegian firms. In emerging economies, our findings parallel Berraies and Ben Rejeb (2019), who identified positive effects of board strategy role on exploitative innovation in Tunisian listed firms. Our results demonstrate the importance of boards’ strategy role in both emerging and developed economies, supporting recent calls for more active board involvement in strategic decision-making (Boivie et al. 2021).

5.4 The effect of the board service role on internationalization

Our findings demonstrate a positive effect of board service role on Tunisian listed firms’ internationalization. These results align with the RBV and support numerous studies reporting positive relationships between boards’ service task performance and internationalization (Arregle et al. 2012; Calabrò et al. 2013; Mitter et al. 2014a, b; Sanchez et al. 2015).

Given that internationalization requires resources, knowledge, and information about foreign markets (Mukherjee et al. 2021), the board service role facilitates access to these essential resources. Consistent with RBV, our results corroborate Sivakumar et al. (2017), who found that boards support emerging-market firms’ internationalization through provision of intangible resources, helping firms manage uncertainty in challenging and unfamiliar environments.

Our findings also align with Chen et al. (2017), who demonstrated that directors with international and industry-specific experience positively influence Taiwanese firms’ international expansion through their advisory capacity and ability to facilitate access to critical internationalization resources and information. Several interviewees emphasized their role in assisting managers during strategic reflection phases to develop enhanced internationalization strategies. Board advice and mentoring help mitigate management risk-averse behavior and knowledge gaps that might impede international expansion (Lahiri et al. 2020; Mitter et al. 2014b).

Our results support González and González-Galindo (2022), who found that provision of industry-specific knowledge, networks, and information more strongly correlates with internationalization in emerging markets than developed economies, as it compensates for resource scarcity and market limitations.

In the Tunisian context, our results parallel those of Ben Rejeb et al. (2020), Berraies and Ben Rejeb (2021), and Ben Rejeb and Berraies (2024), who identified positive relationships between the board service role and various aspects of innovation, such as ambidexterity and strategic innovativeness. The Tunisian business culture emphasizes relational economy and social capital, enabling firms to access various resources and overcome administrative and commercial barriers (Ghodbane and Affes 2018; Omri and Boujelbene 2015). Multiple interviewees highlighted boards’ role in promoting internationalization by providing access to essential resources, including information, contacts, and funding. Tunisian listed firms characteristically maintain high board interlocks (Ben Rejeb 2021), which respondents identified as a key driver for valuable knowledge absorption by emerging-market firms (Puthusserry et al. 2021), enabling them to navigate uncertain situations.

6 Theoretical contributions

In the Tunisian context, our results parallel Ben Rejeb et al. (2020) and Berraies and Ben Rejeb (2021), who identified positive relationships between board service role and ambidextrous innovation. The Tunisian business culture emphasizes relational economy and social capital, enabling firms to access various resources and overcome administrative and commercial barriers (Ghodbane and Affes 2018; Omri and Boujelbene 2015). Multiple interviewees highlighted boards’ role in promoting internationalization by providing access to essential resources, including information, contacts, and funding. Tunisian listed firms characteristically maintain high board interlocks (Ben Rejeb 2021), which respondents identified as a key driver for valuable knowledge absorption by emerging-market firms (Puthusserry et al. 2021), enabling them to navigate uncertain situations.

7 Managerial implications

This research offers key implications for practitioners and government policymakers.

Our findings are useful to decision-makers in emerging-market firms looking to improve their international business performance or expand globally. Our research raises their awareness about the importance of their corporate boards as strategic assets for internationalization and the need for setting effective board agendas to avoid an intensive focus on control tasks and to further emphasize board strategy and service roles. In this respect, our findings suggest that greater consideration should be given to selecting directors who have the intellectual and social capital needed to enable boards to effectively perform their roles and foster internationalization. Our findings lead us to question the determinants of BRP. This issue is particularly important in emerging countries where shareholding structure and regulation are the main factors shaping board size and composition. Although some progress has been made regarding the independence of the boards of Tunisian listed firms, they continue to operate as an elite circle limited to large shareholders and directors appointed from shareholders’ business or family circles, who often lack the knowledge and relational networks necessary to properly contribute to firms’ internationalization. Our findings indicate that boards should strike an appropriate balance between monitoring and empowering top executives and supporting managers when they take healthy risks. This research also suggests that Tunisian firms may benefit from the implementation of an enterprise risk management system as part of the whole strategy of the organization to manage risky strategies like internationalization.

Additionally, this study provides recommendations to Tunisian corporate governance regulators and policymakers related to the development of specific guidelines that can leverage the contribution of boards to internationalization. These guidelines can address aspects pertaining to how boards perform strategy, control, and service roles and the best practices in appointing outside and independent board members who can add value to the work of the board by providing new knowledge, contacts, and information about foreign markets.

8 Limitations and research perspectives

There are a number of limitations to this study, but they could offer potential avenues for future research. First, the data gathered using questionnaires was based on the answers of a single respondent who provided information for their respective firm and thus may present some degree of bias. Second, our results are derived from a relatively small sample from a single year, which limits the scope of findings and our ability to generalize the results due to the risk of causality inference and the bias arising from omitted variables and reverse causality. Results would certainly benefit from extending the sample by considering non-listed companies and making comparisons with other types of firms such as SMEs and family businesses, as these dominate the fabric of businesses in Tunisia. Moreover, future studies could include other corporate governance variables that may influence BRP, such as board processes, and draw on composite measures of internationalization.

Our findings highlighted the importance of considering the distinct roles of boards in influencing internationalization, notably how the inclusion of the strategy role contributed significantly to explaining the variance in internationalization beyond the board control role. Future research could focus on understanding the factors influencing how strategy-oriented boards perform their role and promote internationalization.

While our findings showed a high explanatory power of our model, we acknowledge the need for cautious interpretation of R-squared values, particularly in the presence of multiple predictors. Future research could explore additional contextual factors as moderators, such as directors’ profiles, organizational culture, and the level of uncertainty related to companies’ markets. This may provide enhanced understanding of the drivers shaping board and internationalization outcomes. Finally, since this was mentioned several times by respondents during the interviews, future research could focus on investigating the antecedents of effective boards of directors that would promote various strategic outcomes such as competitive advantage, internationalization, and innovation.

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Metadata
Appendix
Literature

Title: Expanding overseas: the contribution of board role performance from an emerging market perspective
Authors: Wajdi Ben Rejeb
Sarra Berraies
Publication date: 12-03-2025
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in: Review of Managerial Science / Issue 12/2025
Print ISSN: 1863-6683
Electronic ISSN: 1863-6691
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-025-00871-4

Appendix A: Coding scheme to categorize directors’ comments about the relationship between board’s roles and internationalization

Category label	Criteria
(a) Risk management and control
Financial control	Refers to financial control and compliance check tasks performed by directors
Fiduciary responsibility	Refers to tasks performed by directors when asking challenging questions to the management and dig deep on internationalization proposals to avoid incurring their personal liability and protect shareholders’ interests
Risk management	Refers to the tasks performed by directors to oversee, assess the nature and scope of risks in relation to the pursuit of international opportunities
Managerial opportunism mitigation	Refers to the tasks performed by directors to contain managerial opportunism and entrenchment strategies
(b) Strategy development and decision making
Strategy making	Refers to the tasks performed by directors in relation to making decisions regarding internationalization
Resources allocation	Refers to the tasks performed by directors in relation to making decisions about how resources are allocated to the pursuit of international opportunities
Strategy monitoring	Refers to tasks performed by directors to monitor the implementation of decisions in relation to internationalization
(c) Knowledge and networking
Knowledge provision	Refers to tasks performed by directors when sharing their knowledge, skills, experience and information with managers to help them to pursue international opportunities
Support provision	Refers to tasks performed by directors in relation to advising, mentoring and supporting managers to assist them with internationalization strategies
Networking	Refers to tasks performed by directors to connect the organization with its external environment to secure legitimacy and resources needed for internationalization

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Springer Professional

Abstract

Publisher's Note

1 Introduction

2 Theoretical development

2.1 Theoretical foundation

2.2 Board control role and internationalization

2.3 Board strategy role and internationalization

2.4 Board service role and internationalization

2.5 Theoretical framework

3 Methodology

3.1 Phase 1: quantitative study

3.1.1 Sampling and data collection

3.1.2 Variables operationalization and measurement

3.1.3 Data analysis method

3.2 Phase 2: qualitative study

4 Results

4.1 Quantitative data analysis

4.1.1 Descriptive statistics

4.1.2 Hypotheses testing

4.1.3 Robustness check

4.2 Qualitative data analysis

4.2.1 Risk and management control

4.2.2 Strategy development and decision-making

4.2.3 Knowledge and networking

5 Discussion

5.1 The effect of the control variables on internationalization

5.2 The effect of the board control role on internationalization

5.3 The effect of the board strategy role on internationalization

5.4 The effect of the board service role on internationalization

6 Theoretical contributions

7 Managerial implications

8 Limitations and research perspectives

Publisher's Note

Appendix A: Coding scheme to categorize directors’ comments about the relationship between board’s roles and internationalization

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