Abstract
This chapter explores alternate models for allocating delegates to candidates. We review shift-quota and divisor methods and different criteria for determining which allocation is fairest, including the seat-transfer approach and optimization. We compare these methods to delegate apportionment methods based on two indices of disproportionality. We also discuss how the apportionment problem has been solved in the European Union Parliament using the concept of degressive proportionality, and use this concept to motivate the idea of regressive proportionality. This mirror image of degressive proportionality, used in conjunction with divisor methods, offers a potential solution to the delegate apportionment problem which avoids some of the inconsistency and paradoxical behavior exhibited by existing delegate allocation methods. We conclude by discussing the factors that make delegate apportionment unique, and how the apportionment methods used by each state could be better tailored to where the election falls in the primary calendar.