13. Failed Asylum Seekers as Agents of Development? New Approaches to Voluntary Return and Sustainable Reintegration in Germany’s Post-2015 Migration Policy

First instance decisions on applications according to the Eurostat database [migr_asydcfsta] (https://​appsso.​eurostat.​ec.​europa.​eu/​nui/​show.​do?​dataset=​migr_​asydcfsta&​lang=​en. Accessed 17 September 2020). However, there was in this context a continual exit of failed asylum seekers, and appeals were often lodged against the first instance decisions of BAMF with the result that the actual number of foreign citizens with an asylum background obligated to leave Germany who had not been granted a temporary stay of deportation remained in the lower five-digit range (see Vollmer et al. 2017, p. 86f.; German Bundestag 2018b).

Meeting of the Federal Chancellor with the Minister-Presidents of the federal states, decision of 9 February 2017. (https://​www.​bundeskanzlerin.​de/​resource/​blob/​1830100/​394654/​f55cc78e90ab64d6​a89ec620b1f4f1a7​/​2017-02-09-abschlussdokumen​t-treffen-bund-laender-data.​pdf?​download=​1) (German only). Accessed 8 July 2021.

The term (assisted) voluntary return is used here with an awareness that, for failed asylum seekers, even such repatriation is compulsory. After all, there is no alternative legal option available and, as such, we cannot speak in the strict sense of voluntary return for persons obligated to leave the country (Davids/van Houte 2008: 182; Noll 1999). Nonetheless, if we look at the terminology in the relevant literature and in state funding programmes, we find frequent use of the terms ‘voluntary departure’ and ‘voluntary return’.

The Moroccan Government, for example, refused collective repatriations and only accepted a maximum of five deported Moroccan nationals per scheduled flight from the EU (see Parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia 2017).

Since 2017, the legislator has primarily attempted to remove the obstacles to deportation in the first and fourth categories by means of two ‘Laws for better enforcement of the obligation to leave the country’ (BGBl 2017, p. 2780; BGBl 2019, p. 1294). It remains to be seen whether and to what extent it will be possible to carry out more deportations of foreigners who are obliged to leave the country.

According to a media report, for example, one Moroccan national had been deported from Germany ten times within just a few years, returning again in each case (see Hamburg Parliament (2016).

While the ratio between third country nationals ordered to leave and those effectively returned outside the EU has never been particularly low in comparative perspective, political and media discourses have repeatedly scandalised Germany’s policy on repatriation as a total failure. As a rather recent example: Germany’s weekly ‘Der Spiegel’ devoted its front page and cover story to the issue in early 2019 and coined repatriation a ‘German disaster’ (Abschiebung – Ein deutsches Desaster; Der Spiegel of 2 March 2019).

A point of criticism to be made here is that, although both portals were developed and expanded largely in parallel, they have significant overlaps. Together with the website www.​integplan.​de, which lists returnee advisory centres in Germany, and the Information Centre for Voluntary Return (ZIRF), which itself has a separate online database and an IOM-managed access portal for individual queries, this creates an extremely confusing picture for professionals engaged in repatriation assistance work as well as for those interested in returning to their countries of origin. Against the backdrop of different portals that are not very user-friendly, require resource-intensive maintenance and contain some overlap in the information they provide, there is an urgent need for more integration.

This budget item for ‘return assistance’ was also massively increased in 2017 to over EUR 64 million, as part of the introduction of the temporary special return assistance funding ‘StarthilfePlus’ (see http://​germany.​iom.​int/​de/​starthilfeplus. Accessed 24 June 2019).

For the time being, however, there are no plans to expand consulting structures at large scale. In the second half of 2018, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community launched a rather blatant multilingual poster campaign entitled ‘Your country. Your future. Now!’. It provided incentives for asylum seekers and potential returnees from 45 countries of origin to return from Germany: Voluntary returnees who registered their departure by the end of 2018 could be granted the assumption of considerable housing costs in addition to the regular return assistance (for a summary of the program see German Bundestag (2019a) as well as https://​www.​bmi.​bund.​de/​SharedDocs/​faqs/​EN/​topics/​migration/​dein-land-deine-zukunft-jetzt-en/​faq-liste-en.​html (Accessed 20 September 2020); critical of the overall approach Feneberg 2018).

For reasons of space, it is not possible to go into more depth on the matter in this chapter; the position is based largely on the study and the literature report by Koser and Kuschminder (2015).

Davids and van Houte (2008) take a similar approach with their ‘mixed embeddedness’ concept.

In addition, empirical findings indicate that the willingness of those obliged to leave the country to effectively return decreases if the prospects for future mobility deteriorate (see Flahaux 2017; on the significance of options for circular migration for development, see also Miller Scarnato 2018, p. 10).

At the same time, researchers and practitioners are all in agreement that, in a number of cases, the threatening backdrop of forced deportation plays no small role in motivating individuals to register for voluntary assisted return (see Black et al. 2011).

In Germany, too, there was a significant increase in the number of repatriations and voluntary departures in 2015 and 2016; however, this increase can presumably be attributed to the higher absolute numbers of foreigners obliged to leave the country, especially nationals from the states of the Western Balkans, for which increased repatriation efforts were undertaken by the German Federal States following the determination of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia as safe countries of origin. In 2017 and 2018, fewer persons subject to deportation returned, although their absolute number continued to increase moderately. This can be explained in part by the fact that a much larger proportion of those who are obliged to leave the country now come from countries to which repatriation is more difficult to achieve (see SVR 2019, p. 87ff.).

Launching the idea of ‘return sponsorship’ in its New Pact on Migration and Asylum (EC 2020), the European Commission introduced a new paradigm into the debate on responsibility sharing within the CEAS. Allowing for ‘flexible solidarity’, member states who would object to admit asylum seekers or beneficiaries of international protection within the EU framework of solidarity should be able to ‘compensate’ by becoming return sponsors for those member states who are under pressure to return a high number of failed asylum seekers. Thus, the supporting member state would assume full responsibility for repatriating, or in other ways dealing with, third country nationals who become obligated to leave another member state. In case this proposal, against all odds, was implemented, this would mark a watershed, as those member states opposing refugee admission could become the ‘official bouncers’ of the EU, thus manifesting the division of at least two camp, which could further counter European integration.

While in Germany, the departure deadline is set at 30 days pursuant to Section 38 (1) of the Asylum Act (AsylG) (unless the asylum application is unlawful or clearly unsubstantiated: in such case, there is a one-week deadline pursuant to Section 36 (1) AsylG), the European Commission has appealed to member states to set the ‘shortest possible period for voluntary departure needed to organise and proceed with the return’ (EC 2017b, clause 18/19). According to the current version of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), this period is seven days; according to the European Commission's plans to revise the Directive, which were submitted in September 2018 (but not agreed on between the European Parliament and among the Member States), the minimum period is to be completely eliminated under acceleration aspects (see EC 2018). However, this reflects a rather narrow view of repatriation, presenting it as a mere ‘logistical problem’ and thus ignoring the sustainability necessary for properly preparing the reintegration process. For a thorough critical appraisal of the length of the time limit for voluntary departure in the member states’ legal systems and jurisprudence see Brandl (2020).

Examples in this context include the measures carried out by the European Commission in cooperation with the IOM (see EC 2017c) as part of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (see Castillejo 2016).

The Federal Government registered about 29,500 voluntary departures in 2017 (16,000 in 2018 and 13,000 in 2019), while 24,000 foreign nationals were deported in the same year (23,600 in 2018 and 22,000 in 2019) (see German Bundestag 2020).