3. ‘First Our Children, Then Our Gender’: Anti-Gender Mobilization in Slovenia

The struggle for marriage equality in Slovenia spans more than three decades (Antić Gaber & Kuhar, 2019; Mencin Čeplak & Kuhar, 2010). The last decade and a half has been characterized by the involvement of anti-gender actors (Kuhar, 2017), and it can be examined by focusing on two key periods that coincide with two attempts to legalize marriage equality. In the first period (2009–2012), the discourse on ‘gender theory’ was not as developed, consolidated and unified as in the second period (in 2015). Nevertheless, the strategies established in 2009–2012 laid a foundation that facilitated the development of a more comprehensive ‘gender theory’ discourse in 2015.

The discursive strategies challenging marriage equality in the 2009–2012 period uniformly embrace heteronormativity and posit the heterosexual family structure—comprised of a father, a mother, and children—as the sole ‘normal’, ‘natural’, and ‘appropriate’ environment for a child’s healthy development. Any deviation from this heteronormative ideal was depicted as an endeavour to ‘overcome nature’ (Pirnat, 2011) and as a dismissal of the Slovenian nation’s reproductive capacity, which was purportedly facing ‘the worst demographic situation in the world’ (Kragelj Zbačnik, 2012). The opposition to marriage equality centred around the figures of ‘children’ and ‘families’, as exemplified by the ‘Civil Initiative for the Family and the Rights of Children’ (CIDPO), which served as the main organization representing opponents of marriage equality at the time.² Consequently, efforts against marriage equality during the initial period were exclusively aimed at maintaining the traditional definition of marriage.

The key discursive strategies revolved around pseudoscientific, legal, and biblical narratives, without being limited to these alone. The pseudoscientific discourse engaged with the distortion and manipulation of the scientific findings in order to ‘prove’ that same-sex partnerships do not provide viable environments for raising children (Kuhar, 2015b). The early harbingers of ‘gender theory’ are already evident within the pseudoscientific discourse: ‘By ignoring biological reality, any modern theory that claims that the difference between sexes is merely a social or cultural reality, also loses its meaning’ (Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, 2012). The legal discourse, on the other hand, deployed the idea of the ‘free and equal citizen’,³ advocating for the notion that ‘in a democratic, pluralistic, and secular society, no ideological or religious group possesses the authority to force its model of marriage and family upon anyone, nor to legally impose it with the state assistance’ (Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, 2012). Finally, the biblical discourse supported the heteronormative ideal through biblical references that affirm the perceived superiority of unions between a ‘man’ and a ‘woman’ over same-sex relationships. For example, in a 2011 CIDPO rally, youths displayed a banner with ‘Adam and Eve, not Adam and Mitja’ (Masten, 2011), contrasting traditional heterosexual norms symbolized by Adam and Eve with a gay couple, highlighting deviation from these norms.

Presenting ‘gender’ as a galvanizing factor behind marriage equality and as a specific form of ‘theory’ was what the 2015 discursive framing brought in, leading to the coinage of the term ‘gender theory’. ‘Gender theory’ introduced a new discursive logic that reshaped the discursive strategies established in 2009–2012. This transformation was facilitated by the active involvement of anti-gender actors in mass media (Smrdelj et al., 2021) and their strategic utilization of social media (Gorjanc & Fišer, 2018; Popič & Gorjanc, 2022). The Roman Catholic Church (RCC), a covert ally of the ostensibly secular anti-gender actors,⁴ right-wing political parties, and media also played crucial roles in normalizing the ‘gender theory’ discourse. The parties consolidated the presence of ‘gender theory’ discourse at the parliamentary level, while the media gave significant coverage to anti-gender perspectives, making them largely available to the public and consolidated within political life.⁵

While the core of the opposition to the marriage equality—rooted in the heteronormative notions of the ‘normality’ and ‘naturalness’ of the nuclear family, with ‘children’ as the central mobilizing signifier⁶—remained unchanged, the discourse’s structure evolved. A notable shift in 2015 refers to the adoption of the discursive strategies elaborated by marriage equality advocates, particularly those belonging to feminist and LGBT + movements. Anti-gender actors began to use terms such as ‘discrimination’, ‘human rights’, ‘intolerance’, and ‘freedom’ extensively. Additionally, they began to strategically prioritize ‘citizens’ over ‘Christians’ or ‘believers’ to appeal to a wider audience, leveraging ‘citizen’ as the universal category within the context of liberal democracy. In 2015, biblical references were rare, signifying a new, ‘secularized’ approach. Compared to the 2009–2012 phase, ‘gender theory’ framework also considerably intensified the use of the pseudoscientific discourse. By misrepresenting ‘gender’ as erroneous and coercive, it became easier to dispute scientific consensus on parenting in same-sex partnerships. This was done by framing such scientific views as ideological beliefs spread by the academic elite in support of ‘gender theory’.

Another crucial 2015 shift refers to a greater discursive reliance on ‘conspiracy theory’. The discursive structure now operates under the assumption that ‘gender’ is a conspiratorial ‘theory’ lurking in the background, and that the push for marriage equality is driven not only by the ‘academic elite’ but also by the ‘homosexual lobby’, part of a broader ‘left-wing’ project aimed at radically transforming existing society in a supposedly totalitarian manner by imposing norms and legislation that go against ‘the people’ (see, e.g., Brown, 2019; Bogaards & Pető, 2022; Maďarová & Hardoš, 2022). This signalled a transition to a much wider political and social struggle. The shift suggests that the mobilization’s goals extend far beyond opposition to specific policies. Anti-gender actors strove to dismantle current equality mechanisms, positioning themselves not just as a reaction to specific legislative efforts, but as a broader campaign against perceived threats to ‘traditional values’.⁷ Indeed, in contrast to 2012, the anti-gender mobilization took on a neoconservative agenda aimed at creating an illiberal, anti-democratic social order.

The logic of ‘conspiracy theory’ was amplified through ‘scandalization’ tactics, evident in the spreading of controversial stories designed to fuel moral panic about ‘gender theory’. These stories portrayed what the ‘future’ might look like if marriage equality were to be legalized. This reveals another critical aspect of the discourse on ‘gender theory’: the manipulation of temporal perspective. Namely, the ‘past’ is idealized, the ‘present’ is portrayed as under threat and in need of protection, while the ‘future’ is depicted as facing disaster should the ‘gender theory’ agenda be pursued. Such a manipulation of ‘time’ is not merely speculative but also underpinned by affective communication, particularly through the evocation of the fear and anxiety of ‘gender theory’.⁸ These discursive strategies—conspiracy theory, scandalization, manipulation of temporal perspectives, and the deployment of affects—collectively constitute the ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak, 2015).

‘Gender theory’ gained a robust and coherent structure in 2015. The next time when the discourse against marriage equality emerged was in 2022 when the Slovenian Constitutional Court declared that denying same-sex couples the ability to marry and adopt children is discriminatory and unconstitutional. This landmark ruling paved the way for the introduction of marriage equality in Slovenia. Despite the resurgence of ‘gender theory’ discourse with attempts to initiate a new referendum, this effort waned as Constitutional Court rulings cannot be overturned by a popular vote in a referendum.

The discourse on ‘gender theory’ that emerged in Slovenia during 2015 became a model for various organizations and actors opposing equality politics. Prominent were those that fought against reproductive rights, including abortion, hormonal contraception, and artificial insemination. These groups recognized the effectiveness of strategies used against marriage equality and adapted them to their causes. For example, despite the fact that Slovenian anti-abortion actors rarely employ the term ‘gender theory’, the ‘gender theory’ structural components developed during the 2015 marriage equality debates found their way into the post-2015 anti-abortion initiatives. These anti-abortion mobilizations are relevant from the perspective of anti-gender mobilizations in Slovenia for a variety of reasons. First, discourses of anti-abortion mobilizations aim to reconsolidate traditional gendered norms by reducing and limiting women to their motherhood as their sole purpose, thus aligning with the main objectives of anti-gender mobilizations aiming to consolidate particular gendered ways of being. Second, both anti-gender and anti-abortion mobilizations aim to strengthen opposition to what they perceive as ‘common enemy’, that is, the broader ‘leftist agenda’. This idea of a common enemy ideologically and discursively connects the agenda opposing reproductive rights with those opposing marriage equality and transgender rights. Third, its discursive strategies overlap with those of anti-gender mobilizations as they both reach for the toolbox of broader neoconservative populist mobilizations (e.g., scandalization, amplifying and organizing particular affects, especially of fear and anger). Finally, the alignment of both mobilizations is not just inferred from the discourse’s architecture and strategies but also through the involvement—at least to an extent—of identical actors in both the anti-gender and anti-abortion mobilizations in Slovenia, confirming their tightly interwoven characters, when it comes to objectives, strategies, and discourses. Based on this, we argue that between the two there exists a particularly potent ‘opportunistic synergy’ (Graff & Korolczuk, 2022) as both tend to secure a hetero-patriarchal order by employing related discursive tools and mobilizing, to an extent, the very same group of actors.

We will now highlight some examples that show how the main building blocks of the ‘gender theory’ discourse overlap with the realm of reproductive rights. Unlike discussions on marriage equality examined earlier, and transgender rights, which we will address later in the text, the following examples are not divided into distinct temporal phases characterized by specific developments and consolidations of discursive strategies. It is impossible to identify temporal phases where at least partially distinctive discursive tools were employed, as was the case with opposition to marriage equality and transgender rights. Instead, these tools have remained in constant use since at least 2015, when the discourse on ‘gender theory’ first appeared in public discussions.

Anti-gender mobilizations have a significant international dimension, which is particularly evident in the sharing of strategies and mutual support, and the same is evident in opposition to reproductive rights. In Slovenia, two key figures of anti-gender and anti-abortion mobilizations, Aleš Primc and Urša Cankar Soares, founded the ‘Institute Network for Life and Equality’. This organization, responsible for the annual March for Life, symbolizes the collaboration between Slovenian anti-gender activists and anti-abortion advocates. They are well connected to the Croatian anti-abortion movement, demonstrated by the joint appearance of Primc and Željka Markić, a prominent Croatian anti-gender and anti-abortion advocate, on Nova24TV.si in 2019 (Donko, 2019a). Markić also spoke at the 2023 March for Life in Slovenia, further highlighting the cross-border alliance between these movements (Editorial Board of the March for Life, 2023). These are celebrated by the right-wing media, which often cite Croatian anti-abortion mobilizations as exemplary for the Slovenian efforts (Donko, 2019b).

The Together for Life conference exemplifies international cooperation among anti-abortion advocates across the Balkans and beyond, with events in Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia. The conference fosters collaboration among regional organizations, with the help of US organizations Heartbeat International and Movimento Per la Vita from Italy (Gregorec, 2023). The Institute Iskreni’s involvement in the ‘European Advocacy Academy—EAA’ in Brussels in 2017, organized by the European Dignity Watch (EDW), a significant entity in anti-gender mobilizations, underscores the Slovenian presence in the international networking. A report on the 2017 event on the Institute Iskreni’s website, criticizes the spread and perceived aggressiveness of ‘gender ideology’, highlighting its global scale and the unified stance against it (Karlin, 2017).

One of the distinctive features of ‘gender theory’– building a conspiratorial strategy—was observable in the anti-abortion rhetoric shortly after the second referendum on marriage equality. It figured prominently the ‘abortion lobby’ that allegedly influences support for the legal access to abortion behind the scenes. As part of the international ‘40 Days for Life’ initiative in 2015, anti-abortion groups organized rallies in front of the Division of Gynaecology and Obstetrics at the University Medical Centre Ljubljana. The counter-reaction of the supporters of abortion rights followed in February 2016, in the form of an open letter to Slovenian political leaders. In response to this open letter, the article titled ‘List of members of the abortion lobby who oppose the right to life of unborn girls and boys!’ (Belin, 2016) was published on the online portal 24kul.si. It singled out the names of civil society representatives, intellectuals, activists, and organizations supportive of abortion rights, explicitly labelling them as part of the ‘abortion lobby’. The article accused the individuals of promoting the ‘extinction of the Slovenian nation’ and the ‘culture of death’. This tactic was intensified by ‘scandalization’ and heightening of affects, another aspect of ‘gender theory’ discourse, particularly evident in the use of a provocative and emotionally charged image of a pregnant belly with a gun pointed at it to shock viewers and highlight the article’s controversial claims (see Kralj et al., 2024).

The affective dimension of the anti-abortion discourse is also evidenced by referring to the foetuses as ‘unborn girls and boys’, ‘unborn children’, or ‘children under the mother’s heart’, humanizing the foetus and evoking empathy (see Vaggione (2020) for Latin America). While the view that abortion equates murder persists, a newer, more nuanced discourse also emerged, framing pregnant women as ‘mothers in distress’ (Kralj et al., 2024). This narrative suggests that women are in distress due to the challenging life situations that stand in the way of their natural desire to become mothers. Portraying abortion not as a choice, but as an act against the will and nature of woman, it arouses empathy and the need to protect those in distress, that is the ‘mother’ and her ‘unborn child’. Moreover, this framing interpellates a woman who has not yet given birth and is not yet a mother into a maternal role, potentially amplifying feelings of guilt and responsibility towards the ‘unborn child’ (see Mencin Čeplak (2016) for more).

Building on these emotional foundations, anti-abortion discourses further employ the tactic akin to those seen in marriage equality debates, namely, the manipulation of temporal perspectives. By idealizing the past as a time when women purportedly did not face fatal consequences from illegal abortions, (Halas, 2016) and lamenting the post-1952 era—when abortion became legal in Slovenia—as a period marked by the loss of 700,000 children due to abortion up to the present,⁹ anti-abortion advocates extend their emotional and moral appeal by engaging in the creation of an ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm, 2012). This shift not only maintains the emotional momentum established by the personification of 700,000 foetuses but also contextualizes their stance within a broader, ‘cultural’ critique, suggesting the ‘culture of death’ starts with the legalization of abortion.

Conspiracy theories, scandalization, manipulation of affects and temporalities appear in conjunction with the pseudoscientific discourse and the discourse of progressive feminist and LGBT + movements. The pseudoscientific discourse, which seeks not only to undermine the logic of the scientific field but also to co-opt rational, evidence-based scientific language, is especially pronounced in the case of the so-called ‘post-abortive syndrome’, which is allegedly caused by suffering from the negative psychological consequences after abortion, despite the fact that the broader scientific community has not agreed on its existence. Narratives on contraception follow a similar pattern, questioning its reliability through selective citations of studies, and suggesting that it fails to perform as promised in real-life situations.

The utilization of the pseudoscientific discourse is part of a larger strategy of co-opting language traditionally associated with feminist and LGBT + movements, whose claims are often supported with scientific findings, and liberal views. Appropriating the language of the latter was evident, for instance, a few days before the 2023 March for Life, when abortion opponents held a gathering in Ljubljana’s Congress Square and placed 190 flags in Zvezda Park. The organizers claimed that the flags symbolized the 3,000 to 4,000 unborn children lost each year, representing them as 190 missing school classes. A group of women activists removed the flags, criticizing it as symbolic aggression towards women. This act went viral, causing widespread debate. Among the activists was Sara Štiglic, a member of the President of the Republic of Slovenia’s Youth Advisory Committee, who was subsequently dismissed by the President Nataša Pirc Musar, who claimed that this was ‘an inappropriate manner of communication towards those with different opinions’, (R. B. G., 2023) because everyone had the right to freedom of expression (Masten & Kosmač, 2023). Likewise, Urša Cankar Soares’s response in the video shared on X was, ‘It is our human right to express our opinion’. In a similar vein, Matej Tonin, the president of the right-wing NSi party, tweeted, ‘A community that lacks the tolerance to respect diverse opinions cannot be truly democratic’ (Tonin, 2023). This controversy demonstrated how Slovenia’s anti-abortion advocates skilfully use liberal rhetoric to bolster their anti-abortion agenda by prioritizing the right to free speech to condemn abortion as murder. The example illustrates the efficiency with which anti-abortion advocates blurred the boundaries of legitimate public debate through their strategic use of the liberal discourse. By embracing the liberal discourse, they have successfully problematized a right that is not only enshrined in the Slovenian Constitution, but also one that the President of the country is expected to defend categorically.

Anti-gender mobilizations gained ground primarily through the opposition to marriage equality. In the meantime, however, their anti-transgender element crept slowly to the forefront. The ways of ‘doing’ anti-transgender campaign within wider anti-gender mobilizations can be roughly divided into three distinct phases. The first overlaps with the referendum campaigns against marriage equality, extending to 2018; the second covers the period from 2018 to 2021, while the third period covers the anti-trans agenda and the strategies of anti-gender mobilizations from 2022 to the present. Each period is distinguished not only by a specific timeframe, but also by the particular strategies and rhetoric through which the anti-transgender agenda has gradually taken centre stage in anti-gender mobilizations.

Given the political situation—with marriage equality on the horizon—transgender phenomena were initially not the subject of anti-gender opposition per se, but only as long as they could be instrumentalized—as a tool of affective amplification—against marriage equality. Anti-transgender elements were thus used to amplify ‘aversion, anger and moral panic’ (Kuhar, 2017, 222) with the aim of mobilizing resistance to marriage equality. To achieve this, anti-gender actors referred to ‘transsexuals and queersexuals’ where the ‘queersexuals’ stood for those who allegedly change their gender on a daily basis (see also Kuhar, 2017). In this sense, ‘transsexuals and queersexuals’ were represented as gay and lesbian’s evil twins, to borrow Stryker’s designation of the transgender studies in relation to queer theory (2004). The far more dangerous evil twin for now remains in the shadows, but it would loom disproportionately large had marriage equality not been prevented. The figure of the ‘transsexuals and queersexuals’ forewarned: ‘first it will be our children, then [they’ll come for] our gender’ (Vilčnik, 2016).

In this period, however, the threat to the vulnerable child in need of protection—the everlasting figure of anti-gender mobilizations—was still primarily coming from same-sex families, ‘homosexual propaganda’, and abortion, and not from transgender individuals and their rights (Kuhar, 2017, 222). Bearing in mind that it was at that very same point that transgender activism gained increased public visibility in Slovenia,¹⁰ the ensuing opposition to it was initially mostly reactive.

During the next phase, from 2018 to 2021, anti-transgender rhetoric was gradually elevated to the same level as the one pertaining to same-sex partnerships, same-sex families, and marriage equality. Increased awareness of transgender rights prompted the first transgender-friendly institutional changes, such as the ‘Language revolution’ in 2018, when University of Ljubljana’s the Faculty of Arts and later the Faculty of Social Sciences adopted feminine gender in its regulations as a generic term for all genders (Kuhar & Antić Gaber, 2022). Anti-gender actors interpreted the ‘Language revolution’ as another instance of ‘gender theory’ infiltrating academia and as an additional slip on an already slippery slope of gender- and sexuality-related rights: ‘With this way of thinking, will we next intervene in the toilets, which would no longer be exclusively for female or male? […] How far are we going to go?’ (H. M., 2018). As ominous as it was, this question was almost prophetic, as this is exactly what happened next. The ‘Language revolution’ was followed by the ‘Toilet revolution’ in 2019 when the Faculty of Social Sciences introduced four gender-neutral toilets following the initiative by the students.

During this phase—upon the success of anti-gender mobilizations against marriage equality—the anti-transgender agenda intensified as a response to the alleged ‘silent homosexual propaganda targeting Slovenian children’ (the phrase used by anti-gender actors to refer to the period after referendum campaigns on marriage equality, when ‘homosexual activists’ were forced to rely on clandestine ideological tactics) (Donko, 2019c). What began as a threat of ‘normalizing same-sex couples’ now entered the next phase of ‘normalizing transgender’. The field of education was singled out as particularly vulnerable to LGBT + ideology. The figure of the child remains central in the anti-gender agenda, but the scale and number of threats to ‘our children’ appear to be growing—despite the successes of the referendum campaigns against marriage equality. The threats are multiplying, and the child is now perceived as endangered not only by same-sex families and abortion, but also by the threat of being coerced and manipulated into changing and shaping their gender. According to anti-gender rhetoric, the aim of ‘LGBT + ideology’ and/or ‘gender theory’ is to normalize transgender identities, manipulate youth, and isolate them from their families and Christian values in order to make them more compliant (Kavčič et al., 2021).

The last phase that began in 2022 is marked by an ever more refined anti-transgender rhetoric, at the centre of which is still the figure of ‘our children’ (Kuhar, 2017, 227). In addition to the ground-breaking Constitutional Court ruling of July 2022, this phase is also characterized by the gradual strengthening of transgender rights abroad—albeit not in Slovenia—as well as the parallel trend of opposing them. The anti-transgender rhetoric was once again (briefly) mobilized as the tool of affective amplification against marriage equality. However, unlike before, it is now a refined frame standing on its own and, as such, it is mobilized specifically against transgender rights. Children are still indiscriminately represented as the primary targets of the LGBT + movement, or, as stated by one of the main anti-gender actors, Aleš Primc: ‘These people want to take over the soul and the body of your child’ (Hayek Café, 2023). Children are at perceived risk of being adopted into same-sex partnerships and the Constitutional Court’s decision on marriage equality is seen as paving the way for an LGBT + ‘re-education programme’ aimed at changing the children’s gender and sexuality (Mezeg, 2023).

In contrast to earlier periods, the danger of a child choosing their own gender is now much more concretely elaborated. This refinement cannot be seen as a reaction to Slovenian legislative changes, since transgender-related legislation remained largely unchanged from 2015 to 2023 (with two exceptions mentioned above, see en. 10). Rather, it seems to derive from the scandalization of legislative trends abroad (in Australia, the US, Canada, Spain, to name a few), exploiting them to create moral panic ‘at home’. In this sense, anti-transgender rhetoric is predominantly becoming future-oriented rather than reactive: ‘And we are not far away from what is in this very moment happening in the US and other Western countries’ (Brkić, 2023). The events abroad supposedly serve as a harbinger of what is to come to Slovenia: ‘Will the underage youth in Spain be able to mutilate their sexual organs without their parents’ consent!? […] The youth with disorders looking for the magical solution in ‘transidentity’ are in danger’ (Mezeg, 2022), if the natural order of things is not re-established and consolidated (see also Kuhar, 2017).

The focus of transgender-related threats to ‘our children’ thus follows framing strategies from abroad. These strategies range from creating moral panic around detransitioning, to representing the youth with mental health issues as being offered the ‘quick’ and ‘wrong’ solution of transgender identities, depicting those who identify as transgender as falling victim to social contamination and popularization of transgender identities and practices in the media. Thus, in line with the framing strategies abroad, the issue of medical gender confirmation procedures is put to the front of Slovenian anti-gender mobilizations, in which they are also framed and approached as a matter of gender deformation and/or amputation, and as a slippery slope that may lead to the revoking of parental legal rights if parents oppose their child’s gender confirmation procedures.

In June 2023, the anti-gender mobilization brought opposition to transgender identities and practices to the forefront when the Slovenian Democratic Youth, a youth association of the right-wing conservative Slovenian Democratic Party, organized a counter-protest during the Ljubljana Pride Parade. The counter-protest and campaign were led under the slogan ‘Two sexes, one truth’, calling for the restoration of the fundamental and ‘prehistoric’ truth of sex over the ‘fantasy of gender’ (Slovenian Democratic Youth, 2023). This event signalled that the anti-transgender discourse is now at the heart of anti-gender agenda: the Pride Parade was not opposed—at least not primarily—because of gay and lesbian rights, but predominantly because of transgender practices. The counter-protest was led by Zala Klopčič, who had previously collaborated with Karin Planinšek on the conservative webcast Na tekočem, which regularly discusses and problematizes LGBT + issues, particularly transgender phenomena. The webcast says something about the diversification of anti-gender actors and their media, and given its presence on social media, perhaps it also signals the attempt of anti-gender actors to reach out to younger generations.

Becoming ever more refined in their opposition to transgender identities and practices, anti-gender discourses nonetheless always circle back to the idea of the traditional nuclear family. Transgender practices and identities are framed as attacks against the ‘nature of sex’, thus also as attacks on the traditional family, and, by extension, nation. However, despite the fact that the central line—revolving around safeguarding the traditional family—is maintained, the anti-transgender agenda is becoming a potent instrument of anti-gender mobilization in its own right.