1 Introduction
2 Research background, theoretical discussions and literature review
3 Empirical predictions
3.1 CFCEO versus CnotFCEO roles
3.2 Different exogenous shocks and the CFCEO’s CSR commitment
4 Research design
4.1 Sample and data collection
4.2 Variables and measures
4.3 Empirical model
Variable | Definition | References |
---|---|---|
Panel A: ESG Rating
| ||
ES_Refinitiv | Refinitiv ES Rating, estimated by the average of the Environment and Social scores, but the Governance score is excluded. It is estimated by a firm’s Environmental € performance in terms of resource use, emissions, and innovations; and Social (S) performance in terms of workplace, human rights, community, and product responsibility. | |
Environment_Refinitiv | The E element of the Refinitive ES Rating, estimated by the Environmental performance evaluated in terms of resource use, emissions, and innovations. | |
Social_Refinitiv | The S element of the Refinitive ES Rating, estimated by the Social performance evaluated in terms of workplace, human rights, community, and product responsibility. | |
Panel B: Chair-Former-CEO Measures
| ||
CFCEO | Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the current chairman of the board of directors previously served as the CEO of the firm, and 0 otherwise. | |
Panel C: Firm-level control variables
| ||
Governance | The G element of the Refinitive ES Rating, estimated by the Social performance evaluated in terms of management, shareholders, and corporate social responsibility strategy. | |
LnBsize | Board size, estimated by the natural logarithm of the size of the board of directors. | Amin et al. (2020) |
%Ind | The number of independent directors divided by total number of directors. | Li et al. (2023) |
Chair-CEO Duality | Dummy variable, which has a value of 1 if the chair and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise. | Amin et al. (2020) |
%Female | The number of female directors divided by total number of directors. | Li et al. (2023) |
ExComp/TA | The ratio of senior executive compensation to a firm’s total assets. | Trinh and Seetaram (2022) |
LnTA | Natural logarithm of total assets. | Li et al. (2023) |
Leverage | The sum of long-term debts and debts in current liabilities, scaled by the book value of total assets. | Amin et al. (2020) |
ROA | Return on assets. The ratio of earnings to the book value of total assets. | Amin et al. (2020) |
Cash/TA | The ratio of cash to a firm’s total assets. | Bae et al. (2021); |
Div/TA | The ratio of cash dividends to a firm’s total assets. | Hagendorff et al. (2018) |
Tobin’s Q | The sum of market capitalization and book value of debts, scaled by the book value of total assets. | Amin et al. (2020) |
Covid Crisis | COVID-19 Crisis binary variable, which takes a value of 1 if the evaluated year is 2020 and 0 otherwise. | Elnahass et al. (2021) |
Financial Crisis | A binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the observed year is 2007–2009 and 0 otherwise | Hagendorff et al. (2018) |
4.4 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
N | mean | p50 | sd | min | max | skewness | kurtosis | p25 | p75 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ES_Refinitiv | 14,450 | 0.336 | 0.273 | 0.235 | 0.000 | 0.877 | 0.590 | 2.264 | 0.147 | 0.514 |
Social_Refinitiv | 14,450 | 0.413 | 0.384 | 0.223 | 0.000 | 0.927 | 0.296 | 2.531 | 0.257 | 0.565 |
Environmental_Refinitiv | 14,450 | 0.260 | 0.164 | 0.275 | 0.000 | 0.901 | 0.730 | 2.216 | 0.000 | 0.480 |
CFCEO | 14,450 | 0.458 | 0.000 | 0.498 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.170 | 1.029 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Governance | 14,450 | 0.437 | 0.432 | 0.218 | 0.000 | 0.898 | -0.028 | 2.480 | 0.290 | 0.590 |
LnBsize | 14,450 | 1.937 | 2.197 | 0.854 | 0.000 | 2.773 | -1.662 | 4.160 | 1.946 | 2.398 |
%Ind | 14,450 | 0.734 | 0.818 | 0.257 | 0.000 | 0.933 | -2.093 | 6.308 | 0.714 | 0.889 |
Chair-CEO Duality | 14,450 | 0.604 | 1.000 | 0.489 | 0.000 | 1.000 | -0.427 | 1.182 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
%Female | 14,450 | 0.168 | 0.167 | 0.116 | 0.000 | 0.500 | 0.344 | 2.722 | 0.091 | 0.250 |
ExComp/TA | 14,450 | 0.007 | 0.001 | 0.019 | 0.000 | 0.139 | 4.992 | 30.294 | 0.000 | 0.004 |
LnTA | 14,450 | 6.089 | 7.892 | 4.267 | 0.000 | 12.324 | -0.544 | 1.647 | 0.000 | 9.352 |
Leverage | 14,450 | 0.190 | 0.164 | 0.193 | 0.000 | 0.768 | 0.729 | 2.730 | 0.000 | 0.328 |
ROA | 14,450 | 0.042 | 0.028 | 0.067 | -0.191 | 0.262 | 0.331 | 5.114 | 0.000 | 0.078 |
Cash/TA | 14,450 | 0.068 | 0.029 | 0.093 | 0.000 | 0.445 | 1.854 | 6.516 | 0.000 | 0.104 |
Div/TA | 14,450 | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.022 | 0.000 | 0.116 | 2.180 | 8.321 | 0.000 | 0.021 |
Tobin’s Q | 14,450 | 1.151 | 0.752 | 1.412 | 0.000 | 7.463 | 2.005 | 7.935 | 0.000 | 1.655 |
Financial Crisis | 14,450 | 0.100 | 0.000 | 0.300 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 2.669 | 8.125 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Covid Crisis | 14,450 | 0.175 | 0.000 | 0.380 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.715 | 3.941 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1.CFCEO | 1 | ||||||||||||||
2.Governance | 0.053* | 1 | |||||||||||||
3.LnBsize | 0.386* | 0.242* | 1 | ||||||||||||
4.%Ind | 0.084* | 0.165* | 0.211* | 1 | |||||||||||
5.Chair-CEO Duality | 0.096* | 0.033* | 0.070* | 0.298* | 1 | ||||||||||
6.%Female | 0.059* | 0.169* | 0.148* | 0.462* | 0.115* | 1 | |||||||||
7.ExComp/TA | 0.037* | 0.091* | 0.072* | 0.109* | -0.021* | 0.181* | 1 | ||||||||
8.LnTA | 0.009 | -0.005 | 0.015 | 0.034* | 0.100* | 0.060* | 0.087* | 1 | |||||||
9.Leverage | -0.016 | -0.016 | -0.070* | 0.021* | 0.070* | 0.038* | 0.043* | 0.686* | 1 | ||||||
10.ROA | 0.035* | 0.012 | 0.046* | 0.011 | 0.064* | 0.041* | 0.113* | 0.389* | 0.163* | 1 | |||||
11.Cash/TA | 0.003 | 0.005 | -0.007 | -0.001 | -0.003 | 0.010 | 0.326* | 0.372* | 0.128* | 0.326* | 1 | ||||
12.Div/TA | 0.018* | 0.016 | 0.013 | 0.029* | 0.091* | 0.057* | 0.043* | 0.430* | 0.335* | 0.494* | 0.241* | 1 | |||
13.Tobin’s Q | 0.026* | -0.004 | -0.020* | 0.002 | 0.048* | 0.042* | 0.287* | 0.463* | 0.260* | 0.625* | 0.519* | 0.477* | 1 | ||
14.Financial Crisis | -0.026* | -0.093* | -0.061* | 0.059* | 0.078* | -0.091* | -0.076* | 0.023* | 0.040* | -0.006 | -0.019* | 0.028* | -0.014 | 1 | |
15.Covid Crisis | -0.021* | 0.089* | -0.063* | -0.319* | -0.213* | 0.055* | 0.318* | 0.085* | 0.069* | 0.091* | 0.077* | 0.016* | 0.134* | -0.153* | 1 |
5 Results
5.1 Determinants of the chair-Former-CEO
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | CFCEO | CFCEO | CFCEO |
LnTA | 0.010 | 0.014 | 0.014 |
(0.108) | (0.138) | (0.138) | |
Leverage | -0.401*** | -0.358* | -0.365* |
(0.001) | (0.056) | (0.052) | |
ROA | 0.784** | 0.941** | 0.932** |
(0.020) | (0.026) | (0.027) | |
Cash/TA | -0.405* | -0.190 | -0.201 |
(0.063) | (0.560) | (0.537) | |
Div/TA | 0.446 | 3.257** | 3.120** |
(0.629) | (0.027) | (0.034) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.025 | 0.068*** | 0.068*** |
(0.152) | (0.008) | (0.007) | |
Governance | 0.352*** | ||
(0.000) | |||
Year FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Firm FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Industry FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Constant | -0.195*** | -0.960* | -1.100** |
(0.000) | (0.065) | (0.035) | |
Observations | 14,450 | 14,314 | 14,314 |
Wald Chi 2(p-value) | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
5.2 Chair-Former-CEO and firms’ social and environmental performance
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv |
CFCEO | 0.031*** | 0.033*** | 0.033*** | 0.022*** | 0.023*** | 0.023*** | 0.025*** | 0.026*** | 0.026*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
CFCEO * Covid Crisis | 0.058*** | 0.062*** | 0.062*** | 0.055*** | 0.059*** | 0.059*** | |||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||||
CFCEO * Financial Crisis | -0.021** | -0.021** | -0.021** | ||||||
(0.017) | (0.033) | (0.033) | |||||||
Covid Crisis | 0.009 | 0.024* | 0.024* | -0.010 | 0.004 | 0.004 | -0.009 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
(0.455) | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.394) | (0.784) | (0.784) | (0.436) | (0.737) | (0.737) | |
Financial Crisis | -0.066*** | -0.064*** | -0.064*** | -0.065*** | -0.063*** | -0.063*** | -0.056*** | -0.054*** | -0.054*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Governance | 0.698*** | 0.702*** | 0.702*** | 0.694*** | 0.698*** | 0.698*** | 0.694*** | 0.698*** | 0.698*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
LnBsize | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
(0.526) | (0.312) | (0.312) | (0.544) | (0.307) | (0.307) | (0.497) | (0.274) | (0.274) | |
%Ind | 0.020*** | 0.023** | 0.023** | 0.016** | 0.019** | 0.019** | 0.017** | 0.019** | 0.019** |
(0.007) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.025) | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.024) | (0.042) | (0.042) | |
Chair-CEO Duality | 0.008*** | 0.014*** | 0.014*** | 0.005 | 0.009* | 0.009* | 0.005 | 0.009* | 0.009* |
(0.009) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.130) | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.139) | (0.062) | (0.062) | |
%Female | 0.023 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.021 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.021 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
(0.121) | (0.622) | (0.622) | (0.160) | (0.720) | (0.720) | (0.160) | (0.709) | (0.709) | |
ExComp/TA | -0.525*** | -0.478*** | -0.478*** | -0.588*** | -0.549*** | -0.549*** | -0.591*** | -0.551*** | -0.551*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
LnTA | -0.001 | -0.003*** | -0.003*** | -0.001 | -0.003*** | -0.003*** | -0.001 | -0.003*** | -0.003*** |
(0.115) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.115) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.121) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Leverage | 0.023** | 0.048*** | 0.048*** | 0.024** | 0.051*** | 0.051*** | 0.024** | 0.051*** | 0.051*** |
(0.033) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.026) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.026) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROA | -0.021 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.022 | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.022 | -0.003 | -0.003 |
(0.482) | (0.910) | (0.910) | (0.448) | (0.920) | (0.920) | (0.450) | (0.933) | (0.933) | |
Cash/TA | 0.030 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.031 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.031 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
(0.128) | (0.221) | (0.221) | (0.114) | (0.206) | (0.206) | (0.114) | (0.204) | (0.204) | |
Div/TA | 0.049 | 0.197* | 0.197* | 0.044 | 0.182 | 0.182 | 0.047 | 0.186 | 0.186 |
(0.546) | (0.089) | (0.089) | (0.587) | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.568) | (0.107) | (0.107) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.002 | 0.003* | 0.003* | 0.002 | 0.004* | 0.004* | 0.002 | 0.004* | 0.004* |
(0.251) | (0.086) | (0.086) | (0.196) | (0.074) | (0.074) | (0.202) | (0.076) | (0.076) | |
Constant | 0.020* | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.028** | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.027** | 0.052 | 0.052 |
(0.085) | (0.342) | (0.342) | (0.013) | (0.219) | (0.219) | (0.017) | (0.233) | (0.233) | |
Year FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Firm FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Industry FE
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
Observations | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 |
R-squared | 0.485 | 0.528 | 0.528 | 0.487 | 0.530 | 0.530 | 0.487 | 0.530 | 0.530 |
Wald Chi 2 | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
6 Supplementary analysis
6.1 Testing for firm governance quality
Panel A: Better governed firms | Panel B: Worse governed firms | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | ||
CFCEO | 0.040*** | 0.029*** | 0.030*** | 0.027*** | 0.022*** | 0.026*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
CFCEO * Covid Crisis | 0.048*** | 0.047*** | 0.070*** | 0.066*** | ||||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||||
CFCEO * Financial Crisis | -0.013 | -0.026** | ||||||
(0.502) | (0.015) | |||||||
Covid Crisis | 0.063*** | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.009 | -0.008 | -0.006 | ||
(0.008) | (0.152) | (0.149) | (0.577) | (0.633) | (0.727) | |||
Financial Crisis | -0.097*** | -0.096*** | -0.091*** | -0.037** | -0.034** | -0.024 | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.017) | (0.028) | (0.139) | |||
Governance | 0.907*** | 0.909*** | 0.909*** | 0.487*** | 0.480*** | 0.481*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
LnBsize | -0.004 | -0.003 | -0.003 | 0.012*** | 0.012*** | 0.012*** | ||
(0.238) | (0.409) | (0.412) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
%Ind | 0.010 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.045*** | 0.038*** | 0.037*** | ||
(0.509) | (0.467) | (0.462) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |||
Chair-CEO Duality | 0.012 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.020*** | 0.017*** | 0.016*** | ||
(0.131) | (0.410) | (0.411) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |||
%Female | -0.054 | -0.049 | -0.049 | 0.093*** | 0.084*** | 0.085*** | ||
(0.139) | (0.182) | (0.180) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |||
ExComp/TA | -0.977*** | -0.938*** | -0.938*** | 0.121 | -0.061 | -0.064 | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.415) | (0.691) | (0.673) | |||
LnTA | -0.005*** | -0.005*** | -0.005*** | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.477) | (0.371) | (0.404) | |||
Leverage | 0.055** | 0.060** | 0.060** | 0.054*** | 0.055*** | 0.055*** | ||
(0.030) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |||
ROA | 0.017 | 0.020 | 0.020 | -0.029 | -0.034 | -0.034 | ||
(0.765) | (0.729) | (0.726) | (0.464) | (0.387) | (0.392) | |||
Cash/TA | 0.062 | 0.058 | 0.058 | -0.001 | 0.004 | 0.004 | ||
(0.174) | (0.202) | (0.200) | (0.981) | (0.887) | (0.891) | |||
Div/TA | 0.290 | 0.270 | 0.273 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.005 | ||
(0.134) | (0.161) | (0.157) | (0.982) | (0.999) | (0.969) | |||
Tobin’s Q | 0.006* | 0.006* | 0.006* | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||
(0.071) | (0.072) | (0.073) | (0.901) | (0.929) | (0.955) | |||
Year FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
Firm FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
Industry FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
Constant | -0.009 | -0.006 | -0.006 | -0.022 | -0.010 | -0.013 | ||
(0.896) | (0.929) | (0.927) | (0.664) | (0.848) | (0.799) | |||
Observations | 7,225 | 7,225 | 7,225 | 7,225 | 7,225 | 7,225 | ||
R-squared | 0.438 | 0.440 | 0.440 | 0.378 | 0.380 | 0.381 | ||
Wald Chi 2 | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
6.2 Testing for mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
(1) | (2) | (3) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | ES_Refinitiv | Firms with M&A | Firms without M&A | |
CFCEO | 0.031*** | 0.024*** | 0.028*** | |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
CFCEO * M&A | -0.001 | |||
(0.911) | ||||
M&A | 0.000 | |||
(0.905) | ||||
CFCEO * Covid Crisis | 0.079*** | 0.041*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.002) | |||
CFCEO * Financial Crisis | -0.027** | -0.014 | ||
(0.037) | (0.419) | |||
Covid Crisis | 0.012 | 0.005 | 0.007 | |
(0.361) | (0.768) | (0.755) | ||
Financial Crisis | -0.066*** | -0.053*** | -0.063*** | |
(0.000) | (0.005) | (0.008) | ||
Governance | 0.697*** | 0.696*** | 0.701*** | |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
LnBsize | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.000 | |
(0.317) | (0.245) | (0.909) | ||
%Ind | 0.018** | 0.018 | 0.029** | |
(0.018) | (0.149) | (0.048) | ||
Chair-CEO Duality | 0.009*** | 0.010 | 0.010 | |
(0.005) | (0.118) | (0.192) | ||
%Female | 0.026* | 0.016 | -0.027 | |
(0.088) | (0.596) | (0.446) | ||
ExComp/TA | -0.542*** | -0.710*** | -0.559*** | |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
LnTA | -0.001* | -0.001 | -0.005*** | |
(0.058) | (0.382) | (0.000) | ||
Leverage | 0.025** | 0.029 | 0.078*** | |
(0.018) | (0.154) | (0.001) | ||
ROA | -0.018 | -0.047 | 0.031 | |
(0.541) | (0.331) | (0.526) | ||
Cash/TA | 0.027 | -0.034 | 0.087** | |
(0.176) | (0.356) | (0.033) | ||
Div/TA | 0.045 | 0.247 | 0.127 | |
(0.583) | (0.130) | (0.480) | ||
Tobin’s Q | 0.002 | 0.006** | 0.002 | |
(0.159) | (0.046) | (0.596) | ||
Constant | 0.023* | 0.018 | 0.156* | |
(0.094) | (0.725) | (0.083) | ||
Year FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| |
Firm FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| |
Industry FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| |
Observations | 14,017 | 8,087 | 6,363 | |
R-squared | 0.481 | 0.567 | 0.558 | |
Wald Chi 2 | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
6.3 Testing for economic growth periods
Growing period 2002–2004 | Global crisis period 2007–2009 | Growing period 2017–2019 | |
---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
VARIABLES | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv | ES_Refinitiv |
CFCEO | 0.027 | -0.003 | 0.026*** |
(0.157) | (0.752) | (0.001) | |
Governance | 0.729*** | 0.484*** | 0.715*** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
LnBsize | -0.014 | -0.001 | 0.008 |
(0.136) | (0.833) | (0.128) | |
%Ind | 0.015 | -0.066 | 0.044 |
(0.664) | (0.153) | (0.134) | |
Chair-CEO Duality | -0.022 | 0.023 | 0.014 |
(0.515) | (0.280) | (0.478) | |
%Female | 0.086 | 0.003 | 0.058 |
(0.677) | (0.982) | (0.413) | |
ExComp/TA | -8.904 | -1.239* | 0.055 |
(0.122) | (0.096) | (0.873) | |
LnTA | -0.003 | 0.004 | -0.005*** |
(0.549) | (0.252) | (0.008) | |
Leverage | 0.048 | -0.019 | 0.023 |
(0.591) | (0.771) | (0.534) | |
ROA | -0.145 | -0.058 | -0.034 |
(0.423) | (0.634) | (0.691) | |
Cash/TA | -0.079 | 0.102 | 0.097 |
(0.630) | (0.353) | (0.143) | |
Div/TA | 1.894*** | -0.532 | 0.575** |
(0.010) | (0.229) | (0.044) | |
Tobin’s Q | -0.005 | -0.020** | 0.004 |
(0.688) | (0.027) | (0.457) | |
Constant | -0.060 | -0.026 | -0.014 |
(0.616) | (0.787) | (0.896) | |
Year FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Firm FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Industry FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Observations | 794 | 1,443 | 3,758 |
R-squared | 0.680 | 0.666 | 0.605 |
Wald Chi 2 | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
6.4 Chair-Former-CEO and CSR components
Panel A: Social_Refinitiv | Panel B: Environmental_Refinitiv | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | ||
CFCEO | 0.020*** | 0.019*** | 0.019*** | 0.029*** | 0.032*** | 0.032*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
CFCEO * Covid Crisis | 0.061*** | 0.065*** | 0.065*** | 0.051*** | 0.054*** | 0.054*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
CFCEO * Financial Crisis | -0.020** | -0.019** | -0.019** | -0.022** | -0.024* | -0.024* | ||
(0.021) | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.043) | (0.055) | (0.055) | |||
Covid Crisis | -0.044*** | -0.034*** | -0.034*** | 0.026* | 0.044*** | 0.044*** | ||
(0.001) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.060) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |||
Financial Crisis | -0.033** | -0.028** | -0.028** | -0.080*** | -0.079*** | -0.079*** | ||
(0.017) | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
Governance | 0.614*** | 0.615*** | 0.615*** | 0.775*** | 0.781*** | 0.781*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
LnBsize | 0.010*** | 0.011*** | 0.011*** | -0.008*** | -0.007*** | -0.007*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.009) | (0.009) | |||
%Ind | 0.039*** | 0.038*** | 0.038*** | -0.006 | -0.002 | -0.002 | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.525) | (0.887) | (0.887) | |||
Chair-CEO Duality | 0.005 | 0.010** | 0.010** | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.008 | ||
(0.129) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.217) | (0.194) | (0.194) | |||
%Female | 0.030** | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.011 | -0.012 | -0.012 | ||
(0.038) | (0.208) | (0.208) | (0.558) | (0.657) | (0.657) | |||
ExComp/TA | -0.103 | -0.057 | -0.057 | -1.086*** | -1.051*** | -1.051*** | ||
(0.290) | (0.600) | (0.600) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
LnTA | -0.001 | -0.002** | -0.002** | -0.001* | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | ||
(0.330) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.086) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||
Leverage | 0.016 | 0.039*** | 0.039*** | 0.032** | 0.063*** | 0.063*** | ||
(0.133) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.017) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |||
ROA | -0.036 | -0.033 | -0.033 | -0.010 | 0.026 | 0.026 | ||
(0.210) | (0.308) | (0.308) | (0.784) | (0.527) | (0.527) | |||
Cash/TA | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.060** | 0.066** | 0.066** | ||
(0.925) | (0.975) | (0.975) | (0.012) | (0.041) | (0.041) | |||
Div/TA | 0.033 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.064 | 0.302** | 0.302** | ||
(0.673) | (0.514) | (0.514) | (0.520) | (0.034) | (0.034) | |||
Tobin’s Q | 0.004** | 0.006*** | 0.006*** | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | ||
(0.014) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.925) | (0.711) | (0.711) | |||
Constant | 0.095*** | 0.091** | 0.091** | -0.041*** | 0.012 | 0.012 | ||
(0.000) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.003) | (0.819) | (0.819) | |||
Year FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
Firm FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
No
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
Industry FE
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
| ||
Observations | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | ||
R-squared | 0.454 | 0.500 | 0.500 | 0.429 | 0.480 | 0.480 | ||
Wald Chi 2 | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
6.5 Chair-Former-CEO and relative measure of CSR performance
VARIABLES | R_ ES (1) | R_Environment (2) | R_Social (3) | R_ ES (4) | R_Environment (5) | R_Social (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CFCEO | 0.037*** | 0.029*** | 0.042*** | 0.029*** | 0.021*** | 0.036*** | |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
CFCEO * Covid Crisis | 0.068*** | 0.071*** | 0.060*** | ||||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||||
CFCEO * Financial Crisis | -0.024** | -0.021** | -0.026* | ||||
(0.033) | (0.049) | (0.055) | |||||
Covid Crisis | 0.028* | -0.013 | 0.070*** | 0.005 | -0.037*** | 0.049*** | |
(0.065) | (0.347) | (0.000) | (0.737) | (0.010) | (0.008) | ||
Financial Crisis | -0.073*** | -0.041*** | -0.100*** | -0.062*** | -0.031** | -0.088*** | |
(0.000) | (0.005) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.042) | (0.000) | ||
Control included | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
Constant | 0.047 | 0.086* | 0.003 | 0.059 | 0.098** | 0.014 | |
(0.342) | (0.064) | (0.957) | (0.233) | (0.033) | (0.819) | ||
Year FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| |
Firm FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| |
Industry FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| |
Observations | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | 14,450 | |
Adjusted R-squared | 0.528 | 0.497 | 0.479 | 0.530 | 0.500 | 0.480 | |
Wald Chi 2 | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
6.6 Endogeneity concerns and treatment
Panel A: GMM | Panel B: One-year lagged and two-stage OLS model | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Step 1:
ES_Refinitiv
| Step 2:
Residual (ES_Refinitiv)
| ||||
CFCEO | 0.024*** | Excluded | 0.005* (one-year lag) | ||
(0.000) | (0.091) | ||||
CFCEO * Covid Crisis | 0.056*** | Excluded | 0.141*** | ||
(0.000) | (0.000) | ||||
CFCEO * Financial Crisis | -0.022** | Excluded | -0.021** | ||
(0.034) | (0.012) | ||||
ES_Refinitiv t−1 | 0.029*** | ||||
(0.003) | |||||
All control variables | Included | Included | Included | ||
Year FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
No
| ||
Firm FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
No
| ||
Industry FE
|
No
|
Yes
|
No
| ||
Constant | -0.010 | 0.307 | 0.326*** | ||
(0.410) | (0.405) | (0.000) | |||
Observations | 13,186 | 14,450 | 13,186 | ||
Number of firms | 1,263 | ||||
R-Square | 0.524 | 0.091 | |||
Wald Chi 2 (p-value) | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | ||
AR(1) | 0.000 | ||||
AR(2) | 0.457 | ||||
Hansen Test (p-value) | 0.237 |
Dependent variable: ES_Refinitiv Independent variables: CFCEO | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel A: Average treatment effects (ATE) with nearest neighbour matching techniques | ||||||
Treated | Control | Δ | S.E. | T-stat | ||
1:1 matching without replacement | ||||||
Unmatched | 0.363 | 0.314 | 0.049*** | 0.004 | 12.60 | |
Matched | 0.363 | 0.315 | 0.047*** | 0.004 | 11.70 | |
1:1 matching with replacement | ||||||
Unmatched | 0.363 | 0.314 | 0.049*** | 0.004 | 12.60 | |
Matched | 0.363 | 0.329 | 0.034*** | 0.006 | 5.39 | |
Nearest neighbour (n = 2) | ||||||
Unmatched | 0.363 | 0.314 | 0.049*** | 0.004 | 12.60 | |
Matched | 0.363 | 0.324 | 0.038*** | 0.006 | 6.81 | |
Nearest neighbour (n = 3) | ||||||
Unmatched | 0.363 | 0.314 | 0.049*** | 0.004 | 12.60 | |
Matched | 0.363 | 0.327 | 0.035*** | 0.006 | 6.56 | |
Panel B: Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) with 1:1 nearest neighbour matching and bootstrapping of standard errors | ||||||
No of treated obs. | Replications | Observed (Δ) | Bias | S.E. | T-stat | |
6613 | 100 | 0.032*** | -0.000 | 0.005 | 6.186 | |
6613 | 1000 | 0.032*** | -0.000 | 0.005 | 5.795 | |
6613 | 10,000 | 0.032*** | -0.000 | 0.005 | 5.766 | |
Panel C: Regression results on matched samples | ||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |||
Independent variables | 1:1 matching without replacement | 1:1 matching with replacement | Nearest neighbour (n = 2) | Nearest neighbour (n = 3) | ||
CFCEO | 0.031*** (0.000) | 0.037*** (0.000) | 0.040*** (0.000) | 0.036*** (0.000) | ||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||
Constant | 0.023 (0.631) | -0.206*** (0.000) | -0.206*** (0.000) | -0.185*** (0.000) | ||
Year FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
Firm FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
Industry FE
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
| ||
R-squared | 0.517 | 0.564 | 0.542 | 0.535 | ||
Observations | 13,062 | 13,062 | 10,627 | 11,201 |