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2019 | Book

Jamming in Multiple Independent Gaussian Channels as a Game Read chapter Read first chapter

Game Theory for Networks

8th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2019, Paris, France, April 25–26, 2019, Proceedings

Editors: Dr. Konstantin Avrachenkov, Longbo Huang, Jason R.  Marden, Marceau Coupechoux, Anastasios Giovanidis

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Book Series : Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

Part of: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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About this book

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2019, held in Paris, France, in April 2019.
The 8 full and 3 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 17 submissions. They are organized in the following topical sections: Game Theory for Wireless Networks; Games for Economy and Resource Allocation; and Game Theory for Social Networks.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter

Game Theory for Wireless Networks

Frontmatter
Jamming in Multiple Independent Gaussian Channels as a Game
Abstract
We study the problem of jamming in multiple independent Gaussian channels as a zero-sum game. We show that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the waterfilling to the sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and the best-response strategy of the jammer is the waterfilling only to the noise power.
Michail Fasoulakis, Apostolos Traganitis, Anthony Ephremides
Bandwidth Scanning when the Rivals Are Subjective
Abstract
In this paper we consider how subjectivity affects the problem of scanning spectrum bands, and the impact on both the scanner and invader’s strategy. To model such subjective behavior, we formulate a prospect theoretical (PT) extension of the Bayesian bandwidth scanning game where the Scanner knows only a priori probabilities about what type of intrusion (e.g. regular intensity or low intensity) occurs in the spectrum bands. Existence and uniqueness of the PT Bayesian equilibrium is proven. Moreover, these PT Bayesian equilibrium strategies are derived in closed form as functions of the detection probabilities associated with different invader types. Waterfilling equations are derived, which allows one to determine these detection probabilities. Bands where the Invader’s strategies have band-sharing form are identified. The sensitivity of the strategies to the subjective factors and a priori probabilities are numerically illustrated.
Andrey Garnaev, Wade Trappe
Games and Random Search
Abstract
We use dynamics of measures, i.e. iteration of the operators from measurable space to space of probabilistic measures on this space, to model and prove properties of random search algorithms. Specifically using this technique in the context of Game Theory we show that stochastic better response dynamics, where players in the potential game perform their moves independently choosing the random strategy improving their outcome, converges in stochastic sense to playing strategies near equilibrium.
Artur Popławski

Games for Economy and Resource Allocation

Frontmatter
Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via Lottery-Based Mechanisms
Abstract
We show that, in a resource allocation problem, the ex ante aggregate utility of players with cumulative-prospect-theoretic preferences can be increased over deterministic allocations by implementing lotteries. We formulate an optimization problem, called the system problem, to find the optimal lottery allocation. The system problem exhibits a two-layer structure comprised of a permutation profile and optimal allocations given the permutation profile. For any fixed permutation profile, we provide a market-based mechanism to find the optimal allocations and prove the existence of equilibrium prices. We show that the system problem has a duality gap, in general, and that the primal problem is NP-hard. We then consider a relaxation of the system problem and derive some qualitative features of the optimal lottery structure.
Soham Phade, Venkat Anantharam
Two-Level Cooperation in Network Games
Abstract
The problem of allocating a value in hierarchical cooperative structures is important in the game theoretic literature, and it often arises in practice. In this paper, we consider a two-level structure of players communication and propose a procedure allocating the value in two steps: first the value is allocated at the upper level among groups of players, and then each group allocates the designated value among its members. We demonstrate how to allocate the value in two steps using the Shapley value and show the difference with the classical one-step allocation procedure. We then adopt this approach for games with pairwise interactions and provide relations between several definitions of the characteristic function and the corresponding Shapley values.
Leon Petrosyan, Artem Sedakov
Using Bankruptcy Rules to Allocate CO2 Emission Permits
Abstract
The global growth of technologies and production affects the climate through emissions of greenhouse gases. The total amount of countries’ demands of CO2 emissions permits is higher than what the planet can sustain. This situation can be considered as a bankruptcy problem, where the sum of players’ claims exceeds the endowment of the resource. In this paper, we use an approach based on bankruptcy solutions (in particular, on the Weighted Constrained Equal Awards rule) in order to propose a more efficient and fair allocation protocol for sharing CO2 emissions permits among the EU-28 countries.
Raja Trabelsi, Stefano Moretti, Saoussen Krichen
The Economics of Bundling Content with Unlicensed Wireless Service
Abstract
Adding new unlicensed wireless spectrum is a promising approach to accommodate increasing traffic demand. However, unlicensed spectrum may have a high risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an SP bundles its wireless service with a content service. We show that this can differentiate the SPs’ services and lead to positive SP profits. In particular, we study the characteristics of the content services that an SP should bundle with its wireless service, and analyze the impact of bundling on consumer surplus.
Yining Zhu, Haoran Yu, Randall Berry
Normalized Equilibrium in Tullock Rent Seeking Game
Abstract
Games with Common Coupled Constraints represent many real-life situations. In these games, if one player fails to satisfy its constraints common to other players, then the other players are also penalized. Therefore these games can be viewed as being cooperative in goals related to meeting the common constraints, and non-cooperative in terms of the utilities. We study in this paper the Tullock rent-seeking game with additional common coupled constraints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.
Eitan Altman, Mandar Datar, Gerard Burnside, Corinne Touati

Game Theory for Social Networks

Frontmatter
Community Structures in Information Networks
Abstract
We study community structures that emerge in an information network using a game-theoretic approach. In particular, we consider a particular family of community structures, and provide conditions under which there exists a Nash equilibrium within this family.
Martin Carrington, Peter Marbach
Bargaining in Networks with Socially-Aware Agents
Abstract
We introduce and characterize new stability notions in bargaining games over networks. Similar results were already known for networks induced by simple graphs, and for bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are packing-type. Our results are threefold. First, we study bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are covering-type. Second, we extend the study of stability notions when the networks are induced by hypergraphs, and we further extend the results to fully weighted instances where the objects that are negotiated have non-uniform value among the agents. Third, we introduce and characterize new stability notions that are naturally derived by polyhedral combinatorics and duality theory for Linear Programming. Interestingly, these new stability notions admit intuitive interpretations touching on socially-aware agents. Overall, our contributions are meant to identify natural and desirable bargaining outcomes as well as to characterize powerful positions in bargaining networks.
Konstantinos Georgiou, Somnath Kundu
Consensus Reaching with Heterogeneous User Preferences
Abstract
In this paper, we consider consumers and prosumers who interact on a platform. Consumers buy energy to the platform to maximize their usage benefit while minimizing the cost paid to the platform. Prosumers, who have the possibility to generate energy, self-consume part of it to maximize their usage benefit and sell the rest to the platform to maximize their revenue. Product differentiation is introduced and consumers can specify preferences regarding locality, RES-based generation, and matchings with the prosumers. The consumers and prosumers’ problems being coupled through a matching probability, we provide analytical characterizations of the resulting Nash equilibrium. Assuming supply-shortages occur, we reformulate the platform problem as a consensus problem that we solve using Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM), enabling minimal information exchanges between the nodes. On top of the platform, a trust-based mechanism combining exploitation of nodes with good reputation and exploration of new nodes, is implemented to determine the miner node which validates the transactions. A case study is provided to analyze the impact of preferences and miner selection dynamic process.
Hélène Le Cadre, Enrique Rivero Puente, Hanspeter Höschle
Backmatter
Metadata
Title
Game Theory for Networks
Editors
Dr. Konstantin Avrachenkov
Longbo Huang
Jason R. Marden
Marceau Coupechoux
Anastasios Giovanidis
Copyright Year
2019
Electronic ISBN
978-3-030-16989-3
Print ISBN
978-3-030-16988-6
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16989-3

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