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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

6. Georgia as a Case Study of EU Influence, and How Russia Accelerated EU-Russian relations

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Abstract

That the Russia Federation poses a security threat to the European Union has gained greater credibility after the 2008 War in Georgia and the Ukrainian Crisis since 2014. This chapter argues that Russia plays an accelerating role in reinforcing EU-Georgia relations. The EU has successfully answered Georgia’s aspiration towards the EU via the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP), the Association Agreement including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and the visa-free Schengen Area regime. Russia has in turn been putting pressure on Georgia by means of a belligerent rhetoric, adding new fences for demarcation at the administrative boundary lines of the breakaway regions, that is, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and militarisation in these two regions. Thus, the EU maintains its gravitational pull on Georgia, whereas Russia undoubtedly pushes Georgia towards the Euro-Atlantic realm. The EU welcomes this development, although it is not pleased with Russia’s moves due to security concerns. Georgia is delighted with the ENP and the EaP, yet it does not necessarily mean that Georgia is fully satisfied with the signals from the EU as it aims at becoming a member of the EU, which cannot come to fruition in the near future. Although Georgia will not gain EU membership in the short term, this chapter analyses how Georgia can be regarded as a successful case of the EU using its foreign policy to deepen ties and how Russia’s actions push the EU and Georgia closer to each other.

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Footnotes
1
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipelines.
 
2
The countries are Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. Tuvalu and Vanuatu withdrew their recognition as a result of Western efforts.
 
3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo’, 2008.
 
4
Sebastian Schaeffer,. ‘The Kosovo Precedent – Directly Applicable to Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3 (1) (Winter 2009), pp. 108–110.
 
5
Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. ‘Facts and Figures’, Georgia-EU cooperation, 2017. Online.
 
6
The agreement was concluded in line with ‘Agreement between the Russian Federation and Georgia on Terms and Rules of Temporary Functioning and Withdrawal of the Russian Military Bases and Other Military Facilities of the Group of Russian Military Forces in South Caucasus Deployed on the Territory of Georgia’, which was signed by both parties in April 2006.
 
7
Nazi German forces could not surpass this mountain range during World War II.
 
8
When Russia’s military bases withdrew from Georgia, Andrey Kelin, head of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, said: ‘Our [military] bases have been withdrawn from Georgia under the precondition of this pledge [by Georgia not to host foreign bases], which hasn’t been honored yet. So in the context of Georgia’s NATO aspiration, it is of crucial importance for us that Georgia pass a law on the non-deployment of foreign troops on its soil. If Tbilisi fails to show the amiability expected by Moscow, Russia can always resort to more decisive support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.’ (See Civil.ge. ‘Russia Wants Georgia Not to Host Foreign Bases,’ 23 February, 2008. Online.)
 
9
‘Georgia and Russia collide over “spy ring”: Moscow denounces Tbilisi’s “provocative” arrest of 13 people on espionage charges as attempt to derail NATO summit’, The Guardian, 5 November 2010. Online.
 
10
Civil.ge., ‘Russia Mounts Pressure by Cutting Links with Georgia’, 3 October, 2006. Online.
 
11
European Court of Human Rights, and Council of Europe, ‘3255/07 Georgia v. Russia (I) Annex 1 Summary of documents submitted by the applicant Government’, (27 March 2007).
 
12
The author received this information from an anonymous vice minister of Georgian government.
 
13
Ronald D. Asmus. A Little War That Shook The World, Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
 
14
Ibid.
 
15
Ibid.
 
16
Ibid.
 
17
President Boris Yeltsin started new partnerships with NATO and the EU and strengthened the relationship with the OSCE.
 
18
It sets the right to territorial integrity, sovereignty, equal security and choose one’s own alliance affiliation.
 
19
Ibid.
 
20
The package contained five points: (1) non-use of force declaration by the Georgians; (2) internally displaced persons (IDPs) return to the breakaway regions; (3) a mutual withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge close to Abkhazia; (4) confidence-building measures between Georgia and Abkhazia; (5) a settlement of Abkhaz political status with the help of international mediation (see Asmus, Little War. pp. 155–156).
 
21
Ibid., p. 156.
 
22
Ibid., p. 156.
 
23
Rick Fawn and Robert Nalbandov, ‘The difficulties of knowing the start of the war in the information age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia, August 2008’, European Security Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 57–91.
 
24
The website of the Georgian government outlines the six points as follows:
  • non-use of force
  • definitive cessation of hostilities
  • free access for humanitarian aid
  • withdrawal of the Georgian military forces to their usual bases
  • withdrawal of Russian military forces to the lines they held before hostilities began
  • initiation of international discussions on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
 
25
Nonetheless, and interestingly, according to many Western media outlets such as BBC News, which ran the headline ‘Sarkozy warns Russia over Georgia “threats” during tour,’ they tried to promote the image that only Russia should be blamed and that it was a one-sided public speech to criticise Russians. (See BBC World, ‘Sarkozy warns Russia over Georgia “threats” during tour’, 8 October 2011. Online.)
 
26
Radio Free Europe, ‘Reclusive Georgian Billionaire Philanthropist Hopes To Enter National Politics’, Caucasus Report, 11 October, 2011. Online.
 
27
While not Saakashvili’s intention, decentralisation and dispersion of power was achieved, and a political balance of power between the president and prime minister was also accomplished to some degree in Georgia. It came about unintentionally for Saakashvili based on his constitutional amendments; however, the most important thing is the fact that it was achieved by the Georgians themselves, who succeeded in conducting free and fair elections three times in 2012, 2013, and 2016.
 
28
Georgian Journal. ‘Zurab Abashidze to be Prime Minister’s Special Representative for Russian Issues’, 1 November, 2012. Online.
 
29
The first meeting was conducted right after the fatal shooting in Khurcha, which became a reason to resume the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting, co-chaired by the EUMM and OSCE, in Abkhazian side in the Gali district after a four-year break.
 
30
For example, the territorial integrity of Georgia or security issues including the conclusion of the bilateral non-use of force agreement between Georgia and Russia.
 
31
Ivanishvili administration detained political figures, especially at the ministerial level, such as former defense and interior minister Bacho Akhalaia and former energy and finance minister Alexander Khetaguri. Subsequently, Saakashvili left Georgia for the US, and eventually gained Ukrainian citizenship and lost his Georgian one to become a political advisor to president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and governor of the Odessa region in Ukraine, although Saakashvili resigned as governor of that region on November 7, 2016, and lost his Ukrainian citizenship as well.
 
32
Laura Thornton, and Koba Turmanidze, ‘Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a June 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC’, National Democratic Institute, March, 2016. Online.
 
33
Ibid.
 
34
Luis Navarro, and Ian T. Woodward, ‘Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a June 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC’, National Democratic Institute, June, 2012. Online.
 
35
Ben Hubbard and David E. Sanger, ‘Russia, Iran and Turkey Meet for Syria Talks, Excluding U.S.’, New York Times, 20 December 2016. Online.
 
Literature
go back to reference Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Shook The World, Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Shook The World, Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
go back to reference Fawn, Rick and Robert Nalbandov, ‘The Difficulties of Knowing the Start of War in the Information Age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia, August 2008’, European Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 57–91.CrossRef Fawn, Rick and Robert Nalbandov, ‘The Difficulties of Knowing the Start of War in the Information Age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia, August 2008’, European Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 57–91.CrossRef
go back to reference Schaeffer, Sebastian, ‘The Kosovo Precedent – Directly Applicable to Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3 (1) (Winter 2009), pp. 108–110. Schaeffer, Sebastian, ‘The Kosovo Precedent – Directly Applicable to Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3 (1) (Winter 2009), pp. 108–110.
go back to reference Uchida, Shu. 2017. ‘What Kind of Role Should the European Union Play for Achieving Sustainable Peace in Georgia?’ Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD) (ISSN 1867 9323), Vol. 99 (October 2017), pp. 10–13. Uchida, Shu. 2017. ‘What Kind of Role Should the European Union Play for Achieving Sustainable Peace in Georgia?’ Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD) (ISSN 1867 9323), Vol. 99 (October 2017), pp. 10–13.
Metadata
Title
Georgia as a Case Study of EU Influence, and How Russia Accelerated EU-Russian relations
Author
Shu Uchida
Copyright Year
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26937-1_6